"In the absence of statute, an obligee has a right to assign a chose in action and the general rule is that the unqualified assignment of such right of action vests in the assignee the title thereto to the same extent as the assignor had it at the date of the assignment." Kivett v. Mayes, 354 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1961); see also Can Do, Inc. v. Manier, Herod, Hollabaugh and Smith, 922 S.W.2d 865, 867 (Tenn. 1996) (causes of action are as a rule assignable "except those involving matters purely personal in nature" and "tort actions involving personal injuries and wrongs done to the person, reputation, or feelings of the injured party"). As a factual matter, there can be no dispute that Grand Tobacco intended to assign to ITP all rights to any funds released from escrow relating to cigarette sales in Tennessee for the year 2003, including the right to bring a claim against the Defendant for wrongfully failing to release such funds.
In Tennessee, the assignment of a chose in action is not effective against third party creditors of the assignor unless notice of the assignment is given to the party obligated to pay. See Moran v. Adkerson, 168 Tenn. (4 Beeler) 372, 79 S.W.2d 44 (1935); DeSoto Flooring Co. v. Old Dominion Table Cabinet Works, 163 (10 Smith) 532, 43 S.W.2d 1069 (1931); Clodfelter v. Cox, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 330 (1853); Union Livestock Yards, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner Smith, 552 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn.App. 1976); Kivett v. Mayes, 49 Tenn. App. 272, 354 S.W.2d 492 (1961); In re Expressco, Inc., 99 B.R. 395 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1989); Dickenson v. Third National Bank (In re Yates), 58 B.R. 257 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn.
1986); Robbie's Pancake House of Florida, Inc. v. R.K. Walker, 24 B.R. 989, 1001 (Bankr.E.D.Tenn. 1982); Kivett v. Mayes, 49 Tenn. App. 272, 354 S.W.2d 492 (1961). The right to payment of unearned premiums is clearly a chose in action.
1982), aff'd, Robby's Pancake House of Florida, Inc. v. Warren Brothers Co., (No. 3-83-57 E.D.Tenn. Mar. 29, 1983), this court, inter alia, stated: A chose in action, absent a statutory prohibition, is assignable. Kivett v. Mayes, 49 Tenn. App. 272, 354 S.W.2d 492 (1961), cert. denied. The assignment of a chose in action is not within the registration laws.
A chose in action, absent a statutory prohibition, is assignable. Kivett v. Mayes, 49 Tenn. App. 272, 354 S.W.2d 492 (1961), cert. denied. The assignment of a chose in action is not within the registration laws.
The validity of an assignment of a chose in action is not affected by failure of the assignee to give notice of the assignment to the debtor. State Street Furniture Co. v. Armour Co., 345 Ill. 160, 177 N.E. 702, 76 A.L.R. 1298 (1931); State Investment Co. v. Cimarron Insurance Co., 183 Kan. 190, 326 P.2d 299 (1958); Kivett v. Mayes, 49 Tenn. App. 272, 354 S.W.2d 492 (1961). See Annot. 80 A.L.R. 413, at 414, and cases there cited, where it is stated the weight of authority is that the assignment of part of a debt, although not assented to by the debtor, is enforceable against him in equity; however, notice to the debtor should be given by the assignee in order to protect himself against successive assignees.
1931); Clodfelter v. Cox, 33 Tenn. 330 (Tenn. 1853); Union Livestock Yards, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 552 S.W.2d 392 (Tenn. Ct. App.1976); Kivett v. Mayes, 354 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1961); In re Expressco, Inc., 99 B.R. 395 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1989); In re Yates, 58 B.R. 257 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986); and In re Robby's Pancake House of Florida, Inc., 24 B.R. 989 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982). Some aspect of notice of the assignment was the primary issue in each of these cases; the existence of the right to assign was not questioned. "An assignment of a right is a manifestation of the assignor's intention to transfer it by virtue of which the assignor's right to performance by the obligor is extinguished in whole or in part and the assignee acquires a right to such performance."
In this respect, the assignee obtains only that title which the assignor originally had. See Kivett v. Mayes, 354 S.W.2d 492-94 (Tenn.Ct.App. 1961). This gratuitous assignment, if it vests Ms. Parchman with legal title at all, vests at best a legal title which she "ought not in equity and in good conscience enjoy" beyond her father's share.
"In the absence of statute, an obligee has a right to assign a chose in action and the general rule is that the unqualified assignment of such right of action vests in the assignee the title thereto to the same extent as the assignor had it at the date of the assignment." Kivett v. Mayes, 354 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tenn.App. 1961). An assignment "passes the whole right of the assignor, nothing remaining in him capable of being assigned, and the assignor has no further interest in the subject matter of the assignment."
(Citations omitted).Kivett v. Mayes, 354 S.W.2d 492 (Tenn.App. 1961). We have determined to our satisfaction that the evidence does not preponderate against the judgment of the trial court.