Therefore, such statutes must be strictly construed. Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968). As a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under section 57.105, the court must find "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party."

In addition, this Court in Pepper's Steel Alloys, Inc. v. United States, 850 So.2d 462 (Fla. 2003), reaffirmed the general rule that "[u]nder Florida law, each party generally bears its own attorneys' fees unless a contract or statute provides otherwise." Id. at 465; see also State Farm Fire Cas. Co. v. Palma, 629 So.2d 830, 832 (Fla. 1993) ("This Court has followed the `American Rule' that attorney's fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties."); Florida Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1148 (Fla. 1985) (recognizing that this Court has adopted "the `American Rule' that attorney fees may be awarded by a court only when authorized by statute or by agreement of the parties"); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967) ("It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party . . . (1) where authorized by contract; [and] (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment;. . . ."). Therefore, pursuant to controlling authority, the Prices are only entitled to attorneys' fees if a statute or contract provides for such fees.

It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property.Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1968). See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., 465 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Service Corp., 277 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1973); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968); DeGarcia v. Seiglie, 230 So.2d 37 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. — 4th Dist. 1970).

439 So.2d at 319. See Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Const. Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956). In Leitman, as in this case, the entitlement to fees is predicated solely on a contract provision which was part of a contract that was never formed.

In another line of cases on this subject, the supreme court has held that attorney's fees are recoverable from another party only when the parties have so agreed in advance or when the legislature has so provided in an applicable statute. See Hampton's Estate v. Fairchild-Florida Const. Inc., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Campbell v. Maze 339 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968); Larson v. Warren, 132 So.2d 177, appeal dism'd, 369 U.S. 427, 82 S.Ct. 879, 8 L.Ed.2d 7 (1962), State ex rel. Hartford Acc. Indemn. Co. v. Johnson, 118 So.2d 223 (Fla. 1960); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Shavers v. Duval County, 73 So.2d 684 (Fla. 1954); Phoenix Indemn. Co. v. Union Finance Co., 54 So.2d 188 (Fla. 1951); Dorner v. Red Top Cab Baggage Co., 160 Fla. 882, 37 So.2d 160 (Fla.); Ex parte Graham, 136 Fla. 20, 186 So. 202 (1939); Webb v. Scott, 129 Fla. 111, 176 So. 442 (1937). As the court explained in Riviera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Service Corp., 277 So.2d 265, 266 (Fla. 1973), "[a]n award of an attorney fee to any litigant is in derogation of the common law, and it is allowed only when provided for by contract or statute."

It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property. Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967) (on rehearing 1968) (citation omitted) There is no contract here nor any equitable fund or estate, but appellee argues that Section 73.091, Florida Statutes (1975), authorizes the award of attorneys' fees in proceedings to establish statutory ways of necessity.

It is well established that attorneys' fees may not be awarded unless authorized by a contract or, not pertinent here, a statute, or for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property. See Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968); Codomo v. Emanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Rader v. Recarey, 352 So.2d 550 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See also Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, 277 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1973); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968).

We have previously stated that "[i]t is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property." Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1967). Having reviewed the Florida Statutes and applicable case law, we conclude that the award of attorney's fees incurred in discharging a lis pendens is statutorily authorized.

Statutes authorizing the award of attorneys' fees are considered in derogation of common law so as to require strict construction. Kittel v. Kittel, Fla. 1967, 210 So.2d 1. The Legislature has seen fit for the prevailing party in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action to be awarded his attorney's fees. It would constitute an undue extension of legislative intent to hold that simply because one portion of a lawsuit involved the foreclosure of a mechanic's lien, the prevailing party should be entitled to collect his attorney's fees for all aspects of the case. See Houdaille-Duval-Wright Co. v. Charldon Construction Co., Fla.App.3rd, 1972, 266 So.2d 106.

In general, the principle of "comity' is that the courts of one state or jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation, but out of deference and mutual respect. Kittel v. Kittel, 194 So.2d 640 (Fla.App. 1967) rev'd on other grounds 210 So.2d 1 (Fla.); Jacobsen v. Saner, 247 Iowa 191, 72 N.W.2d 900 (1955); Jackson v. Shuttleworth, 42 Ill. App.2d 257, 192 N.E.2d 217 (1963). In Begay v. Miller, supra, the Arizona Supreme Court specifically held that the recognition of a Navajo Tribal Court divorce decree was not based upon the principles of comity.