It is an elemental principle of law in this State that attorney's fees may be awarded a prevailing party only under three circumstances, viz: (1) where authorized by contract; (2) where authorized by a constitutional legislative enactment; and (3) where awarded for services performed by an attorney in creating or bringing into the court a fund or other property.Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 (Fla. 1968). See also Allstate Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Systems, Inc., 465 F.2d 710, 716 (5th Cir. 1972); Estate of Hampton v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Campbell v. Maze, 339 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1976); Rivera v. Deauville Hotel, Employers Service Corp., 277 So.2d 265 (Fla. 1973); Stone v. Jeffres, 208 So.2d 827 (Fla. 1968); DeGarcia v. Seiglie, 230 So.2d 37 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. — 4th Dist. 1970).

Therefore, such statutes must be strictly construed. Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968). As a prerequisite to an award of attorney's fees under section 57.105, the court must find "a complete absence of a justiciable issue of either law or fact raised by the losing party."

In affirming this error, the district court of appeal created conflict with numerous appellate court decisions announcing the settled law of Florida on this question. In general, the recovery of attorneys' fees as damages or costs by the prevailing party to an action is allowed only when provided for by statute or contract or when a fund has been created and brought into court. See, e.g., Hampton's Estate v. Fairchild-Florida Construction Co., 341 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1976); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1967); Codomo v. Emmanuel, 91 So.2d 653 (Fla. 1956); Dorner v. Red Top Cab Baggage Co., 160 Fla. 882, 37 So.2d 160 (1948); Brite v. Orange Belt Security Co., 133 Fla. 266, 182 So. 892 (1938); Webb v. Scott, 129 Fla. 111, 176 So. 442 (1937); Duncan v. Pullum, 198 So.2d 658 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967). Attorneys' fees may be a proper element of damages when they are incurred in litigation or for legal services other than that involved in the main action, which litigation or other legal services were made necessary by the breach or violation being sued upon. See, e.g., Susman v. Schuyler, 328 So.2d 30 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Glusman v. Lieberman, 285 So.2d 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Milohnich v. First National Bank, 224 So.2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1969).

Thus, the statute awarding attorney's fees must be strictly construed. Nathan v. Bates, 998 So.2d 1178, 1179 (citing Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1, 3 n.7 (Fla. 1968) ). The primary purpose of section 57.105's safe harbor provision is to provide the recipient of the motion with notice and the opportunity to withdraw or abandon a frivolous claim before sanctions are sought. HFC Collection Ctr., Inc. v. Alexander, 190 So.3d 1114, 1119 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Maxwell Bldg. Corp. v. Euro Concepts, LLC, 874 So.2d 709, 711 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004) ).

By the mere filing of a general denial, defendant in this case raised no issues of any kind. Thus the pleading asserted no baseless claims or stonewall defenses. It therefore cannot be said that defendant's position was "clearly devoid of merit" or entirely lacking in arguable substance. Whitten, 410 So.2d at 506 (not every prevailing party on summary judgment, dismissal for failure to state cause of action, judgment on the pleadings, evidentiary hearing or trial is automatically entitled to attorney's fees under section 57.105); Kittel v. Kittel, 210 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1968) (statutes authorizing award of attorney's fees in derogation of common law must be strictly construed); Stevenson v. Rutherford, 440 So.2d 28 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (purpose of section 57.105 is to discourage baseless claims, not to cast a chilling effect on the use of the courts). Moreover, we recognize that counsel retained to defend against a claim shortly before the response is due can often be placed in a tenuous position. Counsel may be called upon in the shortness of time to do something to protect a client's interests yet not take frivolous litigation positions.