Opinion
23-cv-04272-DMR
08-28-2023
KITEJET INVESTMENTS, INC., Plaintiff, v. AMANDA MIKLUSCAK, Defendant.
ORDER REASSIGNING CASE TO DISTRICT JUDGE; REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO GRANT IFP APPLICATION AND REMAND CASE TO SUPERIOR COURT
Donna M. Ryu, Chief Magistrate Judge
Defendant Amanda Mikluscak removed this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 from Superior Court of California, County of Alameda, where it was pending as a complaint for unlawful detainer against Defendants Mikluscak and William Fletcher II. The Notice of Removal states one ground for removal: that the Complaint presents a federal question such that the case could have originally been filed in this Court. [Docket No. 1 (Notice of Removal) ¶¶ 1-4.] Defendant Mikluscak also filed an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or other defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “If the district court at any time determines that it lacks jurisdiction over the removed action, it must remedy the improvident grant of removal by remanding the action to state court.” Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. Dynegy, Inc., 375 F.3d 831, 838 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 387 F.3d 966 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447). “The removal statute is strictly construed against removal jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction falls to the party invoking the statute.” Id. The parties have not yet filed a declination or consent to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Therefore, the court issues this Report and Recommendation and reassigns this case to a District Judge for final disposition, with the recommendation that the IFP application be granted and that summary remand be ordered.
I. IFP APPLICATION
Having evaluated Defendant Mikluscak's financial affidavit, the court finds that she has satisfied the economic eligibility requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) and therefore recommends that the IFP application be granted. The court next turns to the issue of subject matter jurisdiction.
II. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and a “federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v. Confederated Tribes, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). “[T]he presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,' which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint.” Rivet v. Regions Bank of La., 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987)). That rule applies equally to evaluating the existence of federal questions in cases brought initially in federal court and in removed cases. See Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 830 n.2 (2002). Relevant for purposes here, a federal question exists only when it is presented by what is or should have been alleged in the complaint. Id. at 830. The implication of a federal question through issues raised by an answer or counterclaim does not suffice to establish federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 831; see also ARCO Envtl. Remediation, LLC v. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Quality of Mont., 213 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A] case may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense, . . . even if the defense is anticipated in the plaintiff's complaint, and even if both parties admit that the defense is the only question truly at issue in the case.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (brackets in original)).
According to the Notice of Removal, a federal question arises because “Defendant claims violations of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) . . . and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,” and “[t]hese federal statutes are directly implicated in the present case, thereby establishing grounds for federal jurisdiction.” Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 2. The complaint that Plaintiff filed in Alameda County Superior Court, however, simply alleges a state cause of action under unlawful detainer. See Compl. Whatever Defendants intend to argue in response to this allegation does not give rise to removal jurisdiction. See Holmes Group, 535 U.S. at 831; see also Nguyen v. Bui, No. 12-501 HRL, 2012 WL 762156, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012), report and recommendation adopted, 2012 WL 762152 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2012) (holding that affirmative defenses based upon Federal Truth in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act do not confer federal jurisdiction upon state unlawful detainer claim).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the court recommends that Defendant Mikluscak's IFP application be granted and that this action be remanded to the Alameda County Superior Court. The Clerk is directed to reassign this case to a District Judge.
Any party may file objections to this report and recommendation with the district judge within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 72-2.
IT IS SO ORDERED.