This privilege, while primarily applicable to claims of libel or slander, may also be asserted as a defense to a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. See Kitchen Hardware [Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 97(3), 421 S.E.2d 550 (1992)]. "[S]tatements made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which he is concerned are privileged.
Third, "a communication made by one corporate agent to another is not publication in the legal sense." Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga.App. 94, 421 S.E.2d 550, 553 (1992). Block cannot be held liable for the allegedly slanderous statements of its employees unless it affirmatively appears Block expressly directed or authorized its employees to slander Morris.
See n. 40, supra. See, e.g., Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, 205 Ga. App. 94, 96 (2) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992) ("an affiliated corporate branch" of a corporation). Application of this rule has never been extended to shareholders of a corporation.
Rather, each claim is based upon a different statement, made at a different time and in a different publication. See Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 97 (2) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992) (every publication of libelous matter is separate cause of action). Mosser's claims are based upon an allegedly libelous statement concerning a Georgia Real Estate Commission ruling on her fitness to act as a real estate agent.
"The particular privilege applicable here is the protection of the speaker's interest under OCGA § 51-5-7 (3). This privilege, while primarily applicable to claims of libel or slander, may also be asserted as a defense to a claim for tortious interference with contractual relations. See Kitchen Hardware [Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., [ 205 Ga. App. 94, 97 (3) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992)]. `(S)tatements made with a good faith intent on the part of the speaker to protect his interest in a matter in which he is concerned are privileged.
Dismissal of the claim was proper. (b) Moreover, it is apparent from the allegations of Willis's complaint that United's letters were privileged communications under OCGA § 51-5-7 (2) and (3). Statements made in the good faith performance of a private duty, such as reports from an independent investigator to an insurance company, are privileged. Haezebrouck v. State Farm Mut. c. Ins. Co., 216 Ga. App. 809, 813 ( 455 S.E.2d 842) (1995); see also Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 96 (2) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992). Compare Zielinski, supra, 215 Ga. App. at 98 (1) (general announcement of theft investigation to employees "without a duty and authority to control or have knowledge" constituted publication).
Although the letter also indicated that copies were sent to two other individuals within the Arrowhead corporate structure, Carter does not rely on these communications in support of his libel claim. See Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94 (2) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992) (it is well settled that a communication made by one corporate agent to another is not publication in the legal sense); Carter v. Willowrun Condominium Assn., Inc., 179 Ga. App. 257 (1) ( 345 S.E.2d 924) (1986) (certain intra-corporate communications regarding the conduct of persons subject to the corporation's authority held not to have been published). It is not disputed that publication of the allegedly libelous letter is essential to Carter's claim.
" (Citations, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne Nagle, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 97 (3) ( 421 S.E.2d 550) (1992). The particular privilege applicable here is the protection of the speaker's interest under OCGA § 51-5-7 (3). This privilege, while primarily applicable to claims of libel or slander, may also be asserted as a defense to a claim of tortious interference with contractual relations.
"The legal fiction that no publication has occurred when the above criteria are met is based on the sentiment that statements by either in the hearing of the other concerning such matters are the legal equivalent of speaking only to one's self." Saye , 295 Ga. App. at 133, 670 S.E.2d at 823 ; Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc. , 205 Ga. App. 94, 96-97, 421 S.E.2d 550 (1992) ("It is well settled that a communication made by one corporate agent to another is not publication in the legal sense"). In the event a publication is established, the next inquiry focuses on whether the communication is nevertheless privileged.
A corporation is not held responsible for defamation if the slanderous or libelous material was communicated from one corporate agent to another who has reason to receive the information because of her duty or authority. Stringfield v. IAP World Servs., 784 F. Supp. 2d 1378, 1384 (S.D. Ga. 2011); Saye v. Deloitte & Touche, LLP, 295 Ga. App. 128, 133 (2008); Kitchen Hardware, Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel, Inc., 205 Ga. App. 94, 96-97 (1992) ("It is well settled that a communication made by one corporate agent to another is not publication in the legal sense").