Opinion
No. FST FA 05 4003907-S
November 8, 2006
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR TRANSFER TO THE CIVIL DOCKET DATED AUGUST 4, 2006 (#142.00)
This case involves two novel issues: (1) Does the Superior Court retain jurisdiction in a pending dissolution of marriage action after one party dies? and; (2) How is the transfer statute, General Statutes § 46b-2, to be interpreted, a 1976 statute that has never been used by any litigant nor ruled on by a Connecticut Judge?
General Statutes § 46b-2 states: "All proceedings involving a family relations matter shall first be placed on the family relations docket of the Superior Court; and except for juvenile matters which are providing for in section 46b-133, the judge before whom such proceeding, is brought, may transfer such matter to the criminal or civil docket of said court if he deems that such docket is more suitable for the disposition of the case. Any case so entered or transferred to either docket shall be proceeded upon as are other cases of a like nature standing on such docket." This statute was first codified as General Statutes § 51-331. In 1979 the statute was transferred to Title 46b, Family Law, Chapter 815, Court Proceeding in Family Relations Matters and recodified as General Statutes § 46b-2. Research has not revealed any trial court nor appellate court decision citing either statute. Other than recodification, the statute has not been amended.
Facts
After a hearing the court finds the following facts and legal conclusions:
The plaintiff, wife, commenced a one-count dissolution marriage action by a writ, summons and complaint dated February 23, 2005 returnable to the Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk on March 22, 2005. The summons, form Family Actions JD-FM-3, the complaint and the notice of Automatic Orders pursuant P.B. § 25-5 were served on the defendant, husband, in Connecticut and a return of service was made. The original summons, complaint and notice of automatic orders along with the return of service was returned to the Superior Court and the clerk date stamped them on March 16, 2005. The clerk of the Superior Court of the Judicial District of Stamford/Norwalk assigned docket number FST FA 05-4003907 S to the above-entitled action.
The clerk thereafter entered the standard orders for participation in the Parenting Education Program pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-69b. Both parties appeared by counsel of record. No issue as to service or jurisdiction were raised until the instant motion was filed. A Case Management Agreement was filed. Various pendente lite motions were filed by both parties. The plaintiff obtained a prejudgment remedy against the defendant in the amount of $3,100,000 in July 2005 (#109.00) and an increased prejudgment remedy against the defendant in the amount of $5,100,000 on August 19, 2005 (#123.00). These prejudgment remedies have not been released, withdrawn or discharged. The wife filed a Request For Leave To Amend by adding a second count to her original complaint in a pleading dated November 10, 2005, (#128.00). A copy of the amended complaint dated November 10, 2005 was attached to the Request For Leave to Amend (#129.00). The wife sought to amend her complaint by adding to the existing first count that sought a decree dissolving the marriage, a second count suing the husband for fraud. The Claims for Relief in the Amended Complaint sought statutory relief on the dissolution count and monetary and punitive damages on the fraud count. No objections to the Request For Leave To Amend were ever filed. P.B. 10-60(a)(3). The Amended Complaint is now coded in as #129.00
The original one-count complaint contained the usual allegations in a Connecticut dissolution action plus one unusual paragraph. Paragraph 5 claimed that the parties were the legal guardians of three minor children who are the defendant's nieces and nephew.
By a pleading dated July 11, 2005 the plaintiff sought to file an Amended Complaint by adding a second count. This July 11, 2005 Amended Complaint was not served within thirty days of the return date. There is no Request For Leave to File the Amended Complaint. The court cannot locate in the file a written consent to said Amended Complaint by the defendant who had appeared by counsel of record. This court concludes that the Amended Complaint dated July 11, 2005 was not properly filed and is not a valid effective pleading. P.B. § 10-59; P.B. § 10-60(a)(3).
Paragraph 6 of the July 11, 2005 Amended Complaint Second Count alleged the names of various real estate and development entities. Paragraph 7 alleged that a David Parisier has filed suit seeking to wind up those entities listed in paragraph 6. Paragraph 8 alleged that David Parisier sought the appointment of a receiver for those entities. Paragraph 9 alleged that the defendant has fraudulently transferred certain business interests to David Parisier "for the purpose of defeating the interests or claims of the plaintiff to said assets." David Parisier was neither named as a party nor joined as a party in the dissolution action.
This July 11, 2005 Amended Complaint sought in addition to the usual dissolution relief, an order for David Parisier to account and an order enjoining David Parisier from engaging in certain activities in regard to the business entities mentioned in paragraph 6.
The parties were married in New York, New York on May 26, 1990. Both parties were long time Connecticut residents at the time the dissolution action commenced. On April 3, 2006 the husband, Andrew Kissel died.
The estranged widow of slain real-estate swindler Andrew M. Kissel has agreed to allow a judge to determine whether a multimillion-dollar life insurance policy should be used to pay a $16 million judgment won by two mortgage companies he defrauded, attorneys said.
Hayley Wolff, who was divorcing the prison-bound Kissel when he was killed, agreed in state Superior Court in Bridgeport with the Fidelity National Title Insurance and Chicago Title Insurance companies to freeze the $15 million life insurance payout and let the court decide how it is used, according to Rachel Lieberfarb, an attorney for the companies.
In return, the companies will delay a court proceeding to seek a ruling on the yet-to-be-paid insurance money, according to Lieberfarb. So far, no payments are anticipated in the near future.
It was agreed that the money would be held in escrow before it was released to her, Lieberfarb said.
The two mortgage companies are among several creditors vying to recover millions based on the 46-year-old real estate developer obtaining loans by forging mortgage documents.
Richard Zeisler, the Bridgeport attorney representing Hayley Wolff did not return calls for comment, and Wolff could not be reached for comment.
Kissel's body was discovered the morning of April 5 stabbed repeatedly and bound hand and foot in the basement of his 10 Dairy Road mansion.
There were no signs of forced entry, and police believe that Kissel either let the killer or killers through the security gate at the bottom of the driveway and then into the house, or that entry was gained by someone who had the code to the security gate, as well as a key to the house.
Police have not identified any suspects in the slaying.
Lindy Urso, the attorney for Kissel's driver, Carlos Trujillo, said that police continue to investigate his client in connection with the murder. Police have questioned Trujillo based on a theory that Kissel might have plotted his own murder so his wife and children would receive the hefty life insurance policy.
If authorities determined Kissel committed suicide, the insurance policy would be void.
'I don't think they have a suspect, so they have to make their theory that Carlos was involved come true.' Urso said.
Kissel was to be sentenced in federal court in White Plains, NY, the week he was found dead after pleading guilty to fraudulently obtaining bank loans.
Meanwhile, Hayley Wolff's uncle has resigned as executor of Kissel's estate, with Greenwich Probate Judge David Hopper appointing Patrick R. Gil, the attorney for Peter Wolff, Hayley Wolff's uncle, as administrator of the estate, according to court papers.
Hopper rejected a motion to appoint Kissel's father-in-law, Derish M. Wolff as executor of the estate, because of a 'potential conflict of interest,' because his daughter is the sole beneficiary of the estate.
Peter Wolff resigned last Tuesday because he was unable to spend enough time to deal with more than a dozen lawsuits against Kissel's estate, Gil said. 'As I kept investigating things for him, there were more than 12 litigations pending with more everyday,' Gil said. 'He just couldn't devote the time to it.'
Today in Greenwich Probate Court, attorneys representing creditors will seek to arrange the sale of Kissel's part ownership of two properties, in which he held a combined stake of about $15,000, Gil said. 'He only had a small ownership in those two properties, so it will only be a small amount of money which is paid out,' Gil said.
Greenwich Time, August 22, 2006.
No formal notice of that death was contained in this court file until August 4, 2006 when the wife filed a pleading entitled Suggestion of Death (#143.00). On July 13, 2006 she withdrew the first count seeking a dissolution of marriage (#137.55) stating that the following was withdrawn: "Count I of the Amended Complaint dated November 10, 2005 claiming dissolution only." The wife was aware of General Statutes § 46b-40(a) which states: "A marriage is dissolved only by (1) the death of one of the parties or (2) a decree of annulment or dissolution of the marriage by a court of competent jurisdiction." As of April 3, 2006, the date of Andrew Kissel's death, no decree of annulment or dissolution of marriage had entered. The defendant's counsel has argued that by operation of law the marriage was dissolved on April 3, 2006 by the death of Andrew Kissel. This claim, no doubt, prompted the wife to file the withdrawal of the first count on July 13, 2006. That left the second count of fraud in the Amended Complaint as the only remaining allegation.
The wife argues that this case is no longer a family relations matter and is now a civil claim for money damages. She requests the transfer of this fraud action to the civil docket under General Statutes § 46b-2. The defendant had been represented by counsel of record and that counsel appeared before this court and opposed the motion. Defendant's counsel argues that his client's April 3, 2006 death deprived this court of jurisdiction of all matters, the Amended Complaint of November 10, 2005 was not properly filed and nothing remains to be litigated. Numerous other legal issues were raised by both counsel at the hearing held by this court on the plaintiff's Motion For Transfer to the Civil Docket (#142.00).
Discussion of Law
The Superior Court is a Constitutional court. Adams v. Rubinow, 157 Conn. 150, 153-54 (1968). (Recitation of history of the Superior Court.) On July 1, 1978 all Connecticut trial courts were merged into the Superior Court. The Superior Court is a unified court of original trial jurisdiction. General Statutes § 51-164s. "The Superior Court is one court for the whole State . . . The Superior Court shall be the sole court of original jurisdiction for all causes of action . . ." Allis v. Hall, 76 Conn. 322, 327 (1904); Mower v. State Department of Health, 108 Conn. 74, 77 (1928). "Subsequent to the enactment of § 51-164s, both our Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly stated that this state's unified court system, all 'civil matters' including juvenile matters, fall within the subject matter jurisdiction of the Superior Court." State v. Ledbetter, 263 Conn. 1, 4, fn. 9 (2003); In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 253 (2003).
It is apparent that the defendant has confused the issue of "subject matter jurisdiction" with the Superior Court "authority to act." Amodio v. Amodio, 247 Conn. 724, 727-29 (1999). A dissolution of marriage action filed by Connecticut residents furnishes this court with subject matter jurisdiction over that marriage and the parties to that marriage. Monroe v. Monroe, 177 Conn. 173, 185 (1979). The statutes confer power in the Superior Court with respect to marriages. The legal effect of Andrew Kissel's death on April 3, 2006 in accordance with General Statutes § 46b-40, is to dissolve the marriage. This Court had subject matter jurisdiction over the parties from February 2005 until at least April 3, 2006. It had the authority to act over the Kissel marriage. The dissolution count was withdrawn on July 13, 2006 and the defendant died on April 3, 2006. Either event is sufficient to terminate the dissolution of marriage first count. If the second count sounding in fraud was properly filed, the Superior Court would continue to have jurisdiction over the fraud count after April 3, 2006.
General Statutes § 52-97 permits a complaint to contain both legal and equitable remedies. Litigants in a dissolution of marriage action are entitled to join other forms of civil relief in the existing dissolution actions and also are permitted to add parties to dissolution actions. Tessitore v. Tessitore, 31 Conn.App. 40, 42 (1993) (Accounting and fraudulent conveyance under General Statutes § 52-552 was permitted in the trial of a dissolution of marriage); Gaudio v. Gaudio, 23 Conn.App. 287, 308 (1990); Molitor v. Molitor, 184 Conn. 530, 532 (1981); Derderian v. Derderian, 3 Conn.App. 522, 527 (1985). Buckley v. Buckley, 3 Conn.Sup. 168, 169 (1935); Price v. Price, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, docket number 289076, (Mihalakos, J., March 15, 1991); Hutchings v. Hutchings, Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, docket number 05449S, (Dranginnis, J., February 22, 1993) ( 8 Conn. L. Rptr. 433).
The Supreme Court has held that a separate tort action arising out of a marriage has the purpose of redressing a legal wrong by the award of money damages and survives dissolution of the marriage. Delahunty v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Co., 236 Conn. 582, 592 (1996).
In Delahunty the parties' marriage was dissolved in a 1990 decree. In 1992 the plaintiff, wife, sued her former husband and the other defendants in fraud seeking money damages in connection with a $100,000 life insurance policy insuring the life of her former husband of which the plaintiff was both the owner and beneficiary. In overruling the defendants' claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel, the Supreme Court held:
A tort action, the purpose of which is to redress a legal wrong by an award of damages, is not based on the same underlying claim as an action for dissolution, the purpose of which is to sever the marital relationship, to fix the rights of the parties with respect to alimony and child support, and to divide the marital estate. Although in a dissolution action, the trial court must consider the conduct of the parties, the judgment in a dissolution action does not provide direct compensation as such to a party for injuries suffered during the marriage. Alimony is intended to provide economic support for a dependent spouse, and the division of marital property is intended to recognize and equitably recompense the contributions of the parties to the marital partnership. Tort actions and dissolution actions lack the duplication that the doctrine of res judicata was aimed at preventing. Additionally, a dissolution action is equitable in nature and requires a trial to the court, while a civil trial of a claim for damages based upon conduct occurring during the marriage is legal in nature, may involve the right to punitive damages and may, as in this case, involve the right to a jury trial. Furthermore, a dissolution action generally will involve few witnesses, while a civil action may involve numerous witnesses as well as other parties, such as insurance carriers. Id., 592-93.
General Statutes § 52-599(a) permits the continuation of civil actions against a decedent.
(a) A cause of right of action shall not be lost or destroyed by the death of any person, but shall survive in favor of or against the executor or administrator of the deceased person.
(b) A civil action or proceeding shall not abate by reason of the death of any party thereto, but may be continued by or against the executor or administrator of the decedent. If a party plaintiff dies, his executor or administrator may enter within six months of the plaintiff's death or at anytime prior to the action commencing trial and prosecute the action in the same manner as his testator or intestate might have done if he had lived. If a party defendant dies, the plaintiff, within one year after receiving written notification of the defendant's death, may apply to the court in which the action is pending for an order to substitute the decedent's executor or administrator in the place of the decedent, and, upon due service and return of the order, the action may proceed.
(c) The provisions of this section shall not apply: (1) To any cause or right of action or to any civil action or proceeding the purpose or object of which is defeated or rendered useless by the death of any party thereto, (2) to any civil action or proceeding whose prosecution or defense depends upon the continued existence of the persons who are plaintiffs or defendants, or 3) to any civil action upon a penal statute.
General Statutes § 52-599.
"At common law every suit, whether founded on contract or tort, abated on the death of the plaintiff or the defendant before judgment. Merwin v. Merwin, 75 Conn. 8, 10 (1902) . . . It was not until 1903 that our survival statutes were amended in such a manner as to permit the plaintiff to maintain her suit against the defendant administrator. Public Act 1903, c. 193, p. 149." Stein v. Katz, 213 Conn. 282, 288 (1989). Public Acts 1903, c. 193, p. 149 is now codified as General Statutes § 52-599.
Upon information and belief, the last will and testimony of Andrew Kissel has been submitted to the Probate Court for the District of Greenwich and an executor d/b/n was appointed. The executor hired an attorney and that attorney Patrick R. Gil, was sitting in the courtroom during the hearing on this instant motion. Upon information and belief that executor has since resigned and Attorney Patrick R. Gil has now been appointed as Administrator of the Estate of Andrew Kissel. A representative of the estate of Andrew Kissel has not been substituted as a party defendant in this case and the attorney, acting as and/or for the Administrator of the Estate of Andrew Kissel, has not filed an appearance for any party in the case.
On the face of the file it appears that there is a viable cause of action sounding in fraud against Andrew Kissel and the Estate of Andrew Kissel. The Amended Complaint alleging fraud was permitted. P.B. 10-60(a)(3) A motion to substitute the executor and/or administrator of the Estate of Andrew Kissel for the deceased defendant would be acted on favorably by this court. The second count, the civil cause of action for money damages for fraud, would be preserved by reason of the survival of action statute. General Statutes § 52-599.
The arguments and objections raised by the defendant do not relate to subject matter jurisdiction but merely the authority of the Superior Court to act. Amodio v. Amodio, supra, 247 Conn. 727-29. "Subject matter jurisdiction involves the authority of a court to adjudicate the type of controversy presented by the action before it . . . A court does not full lack subject matter jurisdiction if it has competence to entertain the action before it . . . Once it is determined that a tribunal has authority or competence to decide the class of cases to which the action belongs, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved in favor of entertaining the action." Id., 727-28. "Separate and distinct from the question of whether a court has jurisdictional power to hear and determine a . . . matter, however, is the question of whether a trial court . . . properly exercises its statutory authority to act." Id., 730.
The Superior Court is one unified court and is divided into four divisions. (Family, Civil, Criminal and Housing). General Statutes § 51-164t and; P.B. 1-3. The transfer from one division of' the Superior Court to another is a venue transfer. Mower v. State Department of Health, supra, 108 Conn. 77. A claim of improper venue may be waived by the parties. Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred on the court by consent and cannot be waived by the parties. Haigh v. Haigh, 50 Conn.App. 456, 465 (1998); State v. Orsini, 187 Conn. 264, 269 (19 82); Neri v. Neri, 35 Conn.App. 812, 817 (1994).
"While jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to act, venue is the place where the power to adjudicate is to be exercised, that is, the place where the suit may or should be heard. The requirements of jurisdiction are grounded in the state's inherent judicial power, while the requirements of venue are grounded in convenience to litigants. Venue does not involve a jurisdictional question but rather a procedural one, and thus is a matter that goes to process rather than substantive rights. Moreover, although a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be waived, improper venue may be waived and may be changed by the consent of the parties." Lebron v. Commissioner of Correction, 274 Conn. 507, 502 (2005).
A change of venue is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. A change of venue is reviewed on appeal under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Chapman, 103 Conn. 453, 469-70 (1925). State v. Townsend, 211 Conn. 215, 224 (1989).
State v. Chapman was a criminal case in which the accused moved for a change of venue pursuit to the statute authorizing such a change. "The judge holding any term of the Superior Court may upon motion order any criminal case pending in such court to be transferred to the Superior Court in any other county." Id., 469. In 1925 the Superior Court was divided by county, not judicial districts and geographical areas as is the current rule. The Court held that the transfer statute was declaratory of common law. The statute was silent on the standard a court must use to decide the issue of a transfer. The Chapman court held that the trial court had the right to exercise its common-law power to transfer cases, which common-law power remains regardless of the statute. "The power is one to be exercised with caution and rests in the court's sound discretion, which is final, unless it appears clearly that it has exercised its discretion unreasonably, or, as it is often expressed, abused its discretion." State v. Chapman, supra, 103 Conn. 470. Chapman remains the current rule on venue transfer. State v. Townsend, supra, 211 Conn. 224.
Venue is not a jurisdictional question, but a procedural one, and thus may be waived by the parties. The proper remedy for improper venue is transfer of the action, not dismissal. Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 263 (1990).
A transfer of venue can be likened to a continuance since there is a certain amount of delay in filing the motion, assigning it for hearing and processing and removing the file to another venue. The standards for continuances are therefore appropriate considerations by a trial court when confronted with a contested change of venue.
The matter of continuance is traditionally within the discretion of the trial judge, and it is not every denial of a request for more time that violates due process . . . There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. (Citations omitted.) Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). [I]f the reasons given for the continuance do not support any interference with [a] specific constitutional right, the [reviewing] court's analysis will revolve around whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Shaquanna M., 61 Conn.App. 592, 602, 767 A.2d 155 (2001); see also State v. Coleman, 83 Conn.App. 672, 687, 851 A.2d 329, cert. denied, 271 Conn. 910 (2004).
Decisions to grant or to deny continuances are very often matters involving judicial economy, docket management or courtroom proceedings and, therefore, are particularly within the province of a trial court . . . Whether to grant or to deny such motions clearly involves discretion, and a reviewing court should not disturb those decisions, unless there has been an abuse of that discretion, absent a showing that a specific constitutional right would be infringed. (Citation omitted.) In re Shaquanna M., supra, 61 Conn.App. 604.
Our Supreme Court has "articulated a number of factors that appropriately may enter into an appellate court's review of a trial court's exercise of its discretion in denying a motion for a continuance. Although resistant to precise cataloguing, such factors revolve around the circumstances before the trial court at the time it rendered its decision, including: the timeliness of the request for continuance; the likely length of the delay; the age and complexity of the case; the granting of other continuances in the past; the impact of delay on the litigants, witnesses, opposing counsel and the court; the perceived legitimacy of the reasons proffered in support of the request; [and] the defendant's personal responsibility for the timing of the request . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Rivera, 268 Conn. 351, 379, 844 A.2d 191 (2004);
Kelly v. Kelly, 85 Conn.App. 794, 799-800 (2004).
In changing venue in forum non conveniens motions, Connecticut has agreed that the following private interest factors that must be considered: the relative ease of access to sources of proof, the availability of compulsory process for the attendance of unwilling witnesses, the cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses; the possibility of viewing the accident scene if such viewing is appropriate to the action; the enforceability of a judgment; the relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; and all other practical problems that make the trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. Durkin v. Intevac, Inc. 258 Conn. 454, 467 (2001); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508, 67 S.Ct. 839, 91 L.Ed. 1055 (1947).
The standards for amending pleadings are also of interest to a trial court exercising its discretion in transferring venue.
While our courts have been liberal in permitting amendments . . . this liberality has limitations. Amendments should be made seasonably. Factors to be considered in passing on a motion to amend are the length of the delay, fairness to the opposing parties and the negligence, if any, of the party offering the amendment . . . The motion to amend is addressed to the trial court's discretion which may be exercised to restrain the amendment of pleadings so far as necessary to prevent unreasonable delay of the trial . . . Whether to allow an amendment is a matter left to the sound discretion of the trial court. This court will not disturb a trial court's ruling on a proposed amendment unless there has been a clear abuse of that discretion . . . It is the [plaintiff's] burden in this case to demonstrate that the trial court clearly abused its discretion.
Dow Condon, Inc. v. Brookfield Development Corp., 266 Conn. 572, 583-84 (2003); Rizzuto v. Davidson Ladders, Inc., 280 Conn. 225, 255-56 (2006).
In accordance with these venue transfer rules, the following transfer issues have been discussed: In re Shonna K., 77 Conn.App. 246, 256 (2003) (Juvenile Court part of unified Superior Court); State v. Thrall, 39 Conn.Sup. 347, 351 (1983) (Transfer of criminal charges from the geographical area to the judicial district); Savage v. Aronson, 214 Conn. 256, 262 (1990) (Transfer from the Housing Docket. In considering the authority of the housing session to hear other legal issues, the court stated: "Venue is not a jurisdictional question but a procedural one."): Great County Bank v. Pastore, 241 Conn. 423, 425 (1997) (Held proper for all foreclosures pending in a judicial district to be assigned to one designated Judge Trial Referee.)
The concept that a Superior Court may transfer a case from one division, one county, one judicial district or one geographical area to another has a statutory foundation. General Statutes § 45a-623 (Transfer of contested cases from a Probate Court to another Probate Court or to the Superior Court); General Statutes § 47a-70(a) (Transfer housing matter to the regular docket for a geographical area or judicial district); General Statutes § 51-189 (Transfer by the trial judge to another trial judge without limit to the judicial district); General Statutes § 51-344 (Establishing the judicial districts, (10) is the judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk); General Statutes § 51-345(a)(3) (Establishing venue in the judicial district where the parties reside); General Statutes § 51-346(a) (Establishes the judicial district in which the action must be commenced, (10) references the judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk requiring the action to be returnable in Stamford.) General Statutes § 51-347a(a) (Any civil action to be transferred to another judicial district); § 51-347b(a) (Transfer by a motion of a party, or the court on its own motion, to a location within the same judicial district or to another judicial district); General Statutes § 51-351 ("No case shall fail on the grounds that it has been made returnable to an improper location."); General Statutes § 51-353 (Change of venue in criminal cases to any other judicial district). This statutory authority is supported by Practice Book rules. P.B. 23-40 (Transfer by Complex Litigation Judge to the regular docket); P.B. 31a-6 (Juvenile transfers); P.B. 41-23 (Criminal transfers). "[T]he evident purpose of the statutes and rules relating to the divisions of the Superior Court was not to impose any jurisdictional limitation on judges but to achieve greater efficiency in the administration of the judicial department"; Savage v. Aronson, supra, 214 Conn. 262,; Great County Bank v. Pastore, supra, 241 Conn. 439, fn. 7.
This court has examined the Edison Program used by court clerks and the judicial branch website available to the public and finds that there are twelve civil cases seeking money damages that have been filed against Andrew Kissel in the judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk. Some of these cases are currently assigned to the complex civil litigation docket in Stamford. Two cases have been withdrawn. The other civil cases are currently pending on the regular civil docket in the Superior Court, J.D. Stamford/Norwalk. There is also one additional case on the regular civil docket in Stamford which contains the misspelled name, Kissell. There is a lawsuit pending in Bridgeport involving a $15,000,000 life insurance policy on Andrew Kissel's life. In addition, there are legal proceedings now pending in the Greenwich Probate Court in the decedent's estate of Andrew Kissel. It would appear from a quick examination of the records that in virtually every case Hayley Kissel is also a party in those matters.
Despite the fact that this Court is going to exercise its discretion under General Statutes § 46b-2, this Court notes that there is no reported case established by the standards that must be applied. This Court has applied the general standards for transfer of venue as set forth in this Memorandum of Decision and believes that this is consistent with the intent and purpose of General Statutes § 46b-2.
Therefore, this Court applying the above-stated standards, deems that the civil docket is more suitable for the disposition of this case, exercises its discretion under the authority of General Statutes § 46b-2, and transfers this matter to the civil docket. There are currently at least eight Kissel civil cases pending in Stamford. Therefore, this matter is transferred to the civil docket of the judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk at Stamford. Under the authority of P.B. § 23-15 this court further recommends in accordance with P.B. § 23-13 and General Statutes § 51-347b, that this matter be further transferred by the Presiding Judge Civil in Stamford with the consent of the Chief Court Administrator and/or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Civil Division to the Complex Litigation Docket in Stamford. There are currently four Kissel civil cases on the complex litigation docket in Stamford. Counsel may also request this case for referral to the Complex Litigation Docket using form JD-CV-39 Rev. 5-06.
The civil court in the judicial district of Stamford/Norwalk upon assigning this case a civil docket number and placing it on the civil docket is free to transfer this matter back to the family division if the civil court is of the belief that there are any outstanding dissolution of marriage issues.
There are numerous outstanding legal and factual issues that need to be resolved. This court has outlined forty-one legal and factual issues and these unresolved issues are being transferred and reserved to the Superior Court civil division. These issues are listed in an Articulation filed of even date.