Opinion
No. 60742-1-I.
November 17, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 07-2-00932-9, Joan B. Allison, J. Pro. Tem., entered October 30, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Janet Obrien challenges the trial court's protective order restraining her from contact with Dorothy Grega under the Abuse of Vulnerable Adults Act (AVA), chapter 74.34 RCW. Obrien waived notice and other due process issues she raises here by appearing, participating in the hearings, and agreeing through counsel to issuance of a limited restraining order. Obrien lacks standing to assert the interests of the petitioner and various trusts, estates, and other entities whose rights she claims were also violated by the proceedings. The trial court did not err in dismissing Obrien's cross-petition for relief because Obrien failed to state a prima facie claim that could justify an injunction. We reject Obrien's additional claims, affirm and award fees under the AVA.
FACTS
Dorothy Grega was married to Dr. Stephen Grega. After Dr. Grega died in 2003, Grega continued to live in the family's Mercer Island home. Grega's daughter, Donna Kirley, lived in California.
In September 2007, Kirley filed a petition for a restraining order and order of protection on behalf of Grega under chapter 74.34 RCW in King County Superior Court. Kirley also filed a petition for appointment of a guardian for Grega. Attorney Sally Lanham represented Kirley in both proceedings.
In the petition for the restraining order, Kirley alleged that Grega, then 86 years old, was vulnerable due to health issues and was being exploited by the respondent, Janet Obrien. According to Kirley, Grega had hired Obrien, a private detective, to investigate whether Grega's lawyers or others were taking advantage of her, but Obrien had exceeded the legitimate scope of her employment by moving into Grega's home, taking her to new doctors, withdrawing large sums from Grega's bank account, and contacting real estate professionals to effectuate the sale of Grega's main financial asset, her house. Kirley also alleged that Obrien had interfered with investigations by police and the Adult Protective Services. The petition requested entry of an order of protection that would, among other things, exclude Obrien from the Grega home, forbid her from having further contact with Grega, and prohibit her from conducting any further transfers or dispositions of Grega's property.
Kirley received a temporary ex parte order. The order set a return date for October 11, 2007. On October 9, Obrien filed her own pro se petition for a restraining order in the AVA proceeding. Obrien claimed that Kirley and her attorney Lanham had violated Obrien's rights under unspecified federal banking laws by obtaining copies of documents apparently showing transfers of funds from Grega to Obrien's private detective agency. Obrien sought a restraining order requiring Lanham to return all such records and forbidding U.S. Bank from releasing any records pertaining to Obrien or her business in the future.
On October 11, Obrien, representing herself, and Lanham appeared in superior court before Commissioner Prochnau. Also present was attorney Deborah Cochelin, who had been appointed guardian ad litem for Dorothy in the guardianship proceeding. After learning that Obrien had not been personally served but had actually received a copy of the petition, the commissioner offered Obrien the choice of proceeding to address the one-year order of protection at that time or having a continuance. Obrien elected to have the matter continued. The court authorized personal service of the pleadings on Obrien in the courtroom and then considered whether the temporary order should remain in place until the next hearing.
Lanham and Cochelin asked the court to extend the temporary order until the next hearing. Obrien agreed that Grega had serious health concerns but told the court she believed Kirley was the actual threat to Grega's well-being. She also felt that other attorneys who had been involved with Dr. Stephen Grega's estate should have notice of the proceedings and argued that one of Grega's step-children should be appointed guardian. Obrien offered to stay away from Grega voluntarily if the court did not extend the order.
The commissioner found that Grega met the definition of a vulnerable adult under the statute and found good cause to extend the order until the next hearing date.
Obrien thereafter filed additional motions and pleadings.
On October 25, the parties again appeared before the court, this time before Commissioner Velategui. Obrien was present, now represented by counsel Donna Johnston. Lanham and Cochelin were present again. Grega and Kirley were both present and attorney Michael Longyear appeared for Grega. A Mercer Island city attorney and police detective were also present to respond to some of Obrien's allegations that Mercer Island police had acted improperly.
Commissioner Velategui first noted he had received eleven different sets of working papers from Obrien and three or four from Lanham's firm. Because the materials were too voluminous for him address everything in them at that time, he directed counsel to focus the issues for resolution that day. After discussing each counsel's position, the commissioner proposed issuance of a limited restraining order simply prohibiting further contact between Grega and Obrien while reserving the issue of improper actions or expenditures by Obrien for a trial, which would only be set upon joint application by Longyear and Johnston. All counsel, including Johnston, agreed to that approach. The court then considered, and dismissed, Obrien's request for a restraining order against Lanham, Kirley, and U.S. Bank.
On October 30, the commissioner signed a one-year order of protection Lanham presented, which was signed by the other attorneys, including Obrien's counsel Johnston, as waiving notice of presentation.
Shortly thereafter, Obrien began representing herself again, filing additional motions and other pleadings. These included motions for reconsideration and revision, which were denied.
This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS
An appellant proceeding pro se must comply with all procedural rules. In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527 (1993). Failure to do so may preclude review of the asserted claims. State v. Marintorres, 93 Wn. App. 442, 452, 969 P.2d 501 (1999). This court generally will not consider arguments that are unsupported by meaningful analysis. Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (arguments not supported by authority); State v. Elliott, 114 Wn.2d 6, 15, 785 P.2d 440 (1990) (insufficient argument); RAP 10.3(a). Obrien's challenges to the proceedings in the trial court suffer from many such problems including difficulties with the record, her failure to cite authority relevant to her claims, and her failure to acknowledge the actions of her attorney in the trial court that are binding on her. Nevertheless, to the extent possible, we have reviewed her assignments of error and conclude they clearly lack merit.
Obrien raises a number of claims she characterizes as jurisdictional. But her challenges to the lack of personal service were waived by her general appearances pro se and through counsel and her request for affirmative relief. See In re Estate of Little, 127 Wn. App. 915, 922, 113 P.3d 505 (2005), review denied, 156 Wn.2d 1019 (2006) ("`[T]he superior court has personal jurisdiction over the persons who appear in the proceedings whether or not they receive the requisite notices.'" (quoting In re Estate of Walker, 10 Wn. App. 925, 930, 521 P.2d 43 (1974)); In re Marriage of Peck, 82 Wn. App. 809, 814, 920 P.2d 236 (1996) (request for affirmative relief).
Obrien also appears to challenge the validity of all court proceedings in which any attorney did not file a separate written notice of appearance. But an attorney may personally appear in court on behalf of a party without filing a written notice. C.f. Morin v. Burris, 160 Wn.2d 745, 755-56, 161 P.3d 956 (2007) (citing Dlouhy v. Dlouhy, 55 Wn.2d 718, 722, 349 P.2d 1073 (1960)).
Obrien also contends that the order under appeal is invalid because of fraud and forgery. While her claims are by no means clear, it appears she is either referring to some initial confusion about which cause number was to be applied to the order in question, or is objecting to typographical discrepancies between the form of the order ultimately filed and the version her counsel approved for entry. To the extent her claim is based on the former concern, it is clear from Commissioner Velategui's discussion of the circumstances regarding the separate cause numbers for the guardianship and AVA petition at the October 25 hearing that there was no fraud. To the extent the complaint is the latter, the claim fails because Obrien relies upon an affidavit from her former counsel that is not part of the trial court record, and which she has not properly placed before this court under the applicable rules. Moreover, Obrien has not shown any material discrepancy between the form of the order the court signed and the form her counsel supposedly approved in any event.
It appears Obrien means to rely on an affidavit from her former counsel she has filed directly in this court, but because she has not properly sought and obtained the requisite permission of this court to supplement the trial court record in this fashion, the document is not considered. See Harbison v. Garden Valley Outfitters, Inc., 69 Wn. App. 590, 594-95, 849 P.2d 669 (1993).
Finally, while Obrien takes issue with the outcome of the hearings, she simply fails to acknowledge that the October 11 order became moot and that she was bound by the actions of her counsel in regards to the October 25 hearing and October 30 order.
Obrien also attempts to assert claims on behalf of Grega, the estate and children of Grega's deceased son Duanne, and trusts or other entities involved in the probate of Stephen Grega's estate following his death. But Obrien has made no showing that she has standing to assert any such claims.
After the briefing was completed, the parties filed pleadings notifying the court that Dorothy Grega has recently passed away. Neither party has argued that the proceedings have become moot as a result of this development, however, and under RCW 74.34.210, "[t]he death of the vulnerable adult shall not deprive the court of jurisdiction over a petition or claim brought under this chapter." Furthermore, Obrien seems to claim she now has the right to intervene in the probate of Grega's estate, to file a wrongful death claim in this proceeding, and to receive a restraining order against Lanham, Kirley, and U.S. Bank on remand or obtain other affirmative relief. We accordingly address the merits of the appeal.
Obrien further contends that the trial court improperly dismissed her counter-petition for a restraining order against Donna, Lanham, and U.S. Bank. Grega responds that the trial court had no authority to grant any such relief under the plain language of chapter 74.34 RCW. We need not endorse that position to affirm the trial court, however, because it is clear that even if a court could grant such relief to a respondent in an AVA proceeding in some circumstances, the trial court clearly did not err by denying Obrien's request here. Obrien cited no applicable authority and did not otherwise demonstrate that any of the records in question were obtained or disseminated unlawfully. She therefore failed to make the required showings of an invasion of a clear legal or equitable right or resulting actual and substantial injury. See Federal Way Family Physicians, Inc. v. Tacoma Stands Up for Life, 106 Wn.2d 261, 265, 721 P.2d 946 (1986); CR 65(b).
Additional claims in Obrien's briefs not specifically discussed above are too conclusory to merit further discussion other than noting that they clearly provide no basis for reversing the trial court. Likewise, Obrien's various motions filed during the pendency of this appeal that have been passed to this panel by commissioners' rulings are also denied.
Grega seeks attorney fees on appeal pursuant to RCW 74.34.130(7) and RAP 18.1. Considering the lack of colorable merit to any of Obrien's claims, we exercise our discretion under the statute to grant fees in an amount to be determined by a commissioner of this court, subject to Grega's counsel's compliance with RAP 18.1.
Affirmed.