Opinion
No. 81-333
Decided May 17, 1982
1. Estoppel — Elements Estoppel requires words or conduct which induce another to act in reliance and to change position.
2. Quieting Title — Evidence — Particular Cases In an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff had acquired land in 1946, and in 1961 had executed a deed granting the State a strip of land, bisecting her property, for a highway, which deed described the southern boundary of her property at a point farther north than in the original 1946 deed, and where defendant, a real estate corporation, had purchased land from a third party south of plaintiff's property in 1974, and asserted that when it purchased its land it relied on the incorrect description of the southern boundary contained in the plaintiff's 1961 deed to the State, and thus claimed ownership of the disputed acreage, the defendant could not have been induced to act in reliance on the words in the 1961 deed to the State which conveyed a strip of land to the State, and the words did not purport to set a southern boundary of the plaintiff's property; therefore, plaintiff was not estopped from claiming that her southern boundary was other than as described in the 1961 deed, and the trial court properly quieted title in her.
3. Quieting Title — Evidence — Particular Cases In an action to quiet title, where the plaintiff had acquired land in 1946, and in 1961 had executed a deed granting the State a strip of land, bisecting her property, for a highway, which deed described the southern boundary of her property at a point farther north than in the original 1946 deed, and where defendant, a real estate corporation, had purchased land, from a third party, south of the plaintiff's property in 1974, and asserted that when it purchased its land it relied on the incorrect description of the southern boundary contained in the plaintiff's 1961 deed to the State, and thus claimed ownership of the disputed acreage, the plaintiff was not estopped from claiming that her southern boundary was other than as described in the 1961 deed, and the trial court properly quieted title in her, since estoppel by deed was inapplicable to the case because the plaintiff was not in a position to induce reliance, having neither conveyed the land by deed to the defendant nor expressly or impliedly represented that she possessed the title, which the deed purported to convey, and she had not stood by with any knowledge that the defendant misunderstood the correct location of her southern boundary.
Law Office of James R. Patten, of Ossipee (Mr. Patten on the brief and orally), for the plaintiff.
Cooper, Hall Walker, of Wolfeboro (Robert C. Varney on the brief and orally), for Kendall Real Estate, Inc.
The issue in this case is whether the plaintiff is estopped from asserting that the southern boundary of her property differs from the boundary described in a deed she executed in 1961 to the State of New Hampshire.
In 1961, the State relocated Route 16 in Wakefield, New Hampshire, so that it bisected land which the plaintiff had acquired in 1946. The plaintiff executed a deed, recorded at the Carroll County Registry of Deeds, granting the State the strip of land needed for the highway. The conveyed land was described as being "between land now or formerly of Gilbert Scruton on the South near Station 420 + 50 and land now or formerly of Charles Bancroft on the North. . . ." Station 420 + 50, at line A-B, however, does not mark the southern boundary of the plaintiff's property as it is described in the deed she received in 1946; the deed which the plaintiff received sets her southern boundary farther south than line A-B.
The defendant Kendall Real Estate, Inc. (Kendall) bought land south of the plaintiff's land in 1974 from a third party. Kendall now asserts that when it purchased its land it relied on the incorrect description of the southern boundary contained in the plaintiff's 1961 deed to the State. Consequently, Kendall claims ownership of the disputed acreage. When the plaintiff learned that Kendall was advertising to sell the disputed acreage, she sued to quiet title.
After examining both parties' deeds, the Master (Charles T. Gallagher, Esq.) recommended a finding, and the Superior Court (Wyman, J.) decreed, that the plaintiff's property extended south to the stone wall, at line C-D. The master explicitly rejected Kendall's argument that the plaintiff was estopped from claiming land south of the boundary incorrectly described in her 1961 deed to the State. The trial judge, by quieting title in the plaintiff, implicitly reached the same conclusion. Kendall appealed to this court.
The parties stipulated that "the historical boundary between the land of Kendall Real Estate and land of Mildred W. Kirkpatrick as derived from their respective chains of title was as the plaintiff now claims it to be and as the master found it to be. . ." The sole issue on appeal is whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming that her southern boundary is other than as described in the 1961 deed. We hold that the plaintiff is not estopped, and affirm the trial court's decision to quiet title in her.
[1, 2] Estoppel requires words or conduct which induce another to act in reliance and to change position. Rautenberg v. Munnis, 108 N.H. 20, 23, 226 A.2d 770, 772 (1967); see Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N.H. 380, 385 (1860). The plaintiff's 1961 deed stated that she granted land "between land . . . on the South near Station 420 + 50 and land . . . on the North near Station 428 + 25." These words conveyed a strip of land; they did not purport to set a southern boundary. Thus, the words could not have "induced" Kendall to act in reliance on them. See Rautenberg v. Munnis, 108 N.H. at 23, 226 A.2d at 772.
In addition, estoppel by deed is inapplicable to this case because the plaintiff was not in a position to induce reliance. She did not convey land by deed to Kendall, nor did she expressly or impliedly represent that she possessed the title which the deed purported to convey. See 5 G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY 2522, at 510 (Grimes ed. 1979). Furthermore, she did not stand by with any knowledge that Kendall misunderstood the correct location of her southern boundary. See Richardson v. Chickering, 41 N.H. at 385-86.
Affirmed.