The Louisiana Supreme Court again refused to hear the case. Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 597 F. Supp. 1562 (E.D.La. 1984).Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 777 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1178, 106 S.Ct. 2907, 90 L.Ed.2d 993 (1986).
After staying Kirkpatrick's execution and conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the writ, but subsequently granted Kirkpatrick a certificate of probable cause authorizing appeal and another stay of execution. Kirkpatrick v. Blackburn, 597 F. Supp. 1562 (E.D.La. 1984). On appeal, this court affirmed the judgment of the district court "insofar as it denie[d] relief on all of the grounds asserted except the alleged ineffectiveness of counsel, particularly in failing to seek suppression of the evidence seized in Mississippi."
PER CURIAM. A prisoner condemned to death for first degree murder committed in the course of a robbery and under conditions that the jury found to be especially heinous seeks habeas corpus relief. The district court, 597 F. Supp. 1562, denied the writ but issued a stay of execution and a certificate of probable cause. Having reviewed the record of the trial, the state post-conviction proceedings, and the federal evidentiary hearing with care, we conclude that, as to all issues on which the district court made findings of fact, the findings are supported by the record.
Other courts have generally upheld the constitutionality of prohibiting parole as a sentencing consideration. Peterson v. Murray, 904 F.2d 882 (4th Cir. 1990); Turner v. Bass, 753 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Turner v.Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986); Andrade v.McCotter, 805 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1986); O'Bryan v. Estelle, 714 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1983); Johnson v. Thigpen, 623 F. Supp. 1121 (S.D. Miss. 1985), aff'd, 806 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. 1986); Kirkpatrick v.Blackburn, 597 F. Supp. 1562 (E.D. La. 1984), vacated in part on othergrounds, 777 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1985); State v. Robbins, 319 N.C. 465, 356 S.E.2d 279 (1987). These two recent decisions reaffirm the principle, uniformly followed prior to Atkins, that parole is irrelevant to the determination of a capital sentence.