Under Illinois law, to prevail on an abuse of process claim a plaintiff must show: "(1) some act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of such proceedings, and (2) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive." Holly v. Boudreau, 103 Fed. App'x. 36, 39 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Neurosurgery & Spine Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 183, 274 Ill. Dec. 152, 790 N.E.2d 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)); Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 683, 229 Ill. Dec. 171, 691 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). "The elements are strictly construed, as the tort of abuse of process is not favored under Illinois law."

The three elements required to establish a cause of action for false light invasion of privacy include: (1) the plaintiff was placed in a false light before the public as a result of the defendant's actions; (2) the false light in which the plaintiff was placed would be highly offensive to a reasonable person; and (3) the defendant acted with actual malice, meaning "with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether the statements were true or false." Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 682 (1998) (citing Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 17-18). In addition, if a false light invasion of privacy claim is based on statements that are not defamatory per se, a plaintiff must allege that he or she suffered special damages.

We review the grant of a motion to dismiss de novo. Doe v. University of Illinois, Nos. 96-3511 96-4148, ___ F.3d ___, 1998 WL 88341 at * 7 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 1998). Under Illinois law, an abuse of process claim requires proof of two elements: (1) existence of an ulterior motive or purpose; and (2) some act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Kirchner v. Greene, 691 N.E.2d 107, 116 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998). Alma/Equinox urges us to reverse the lower court's holding that there is no cause of action for abuse of process under Illinois law based upon the alleged wrongful filing of lis pendens notices.

Under Illinois law, an abuse of process claim requires proof of two elements: (1) the existence of an ulterior motive or purpose; and, (2) some act in the use of legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Podolsky v. Alma Energy Corp., 143 F.3d 364, 372 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Kirchner v. Greene, 691 N.E.2d 107, 116 (Ill.App.Ct. 1988).

A false light publicity claim requires Kilborn to plead that (1) he was “placed in a false light before the public as a result of the [D]efendants' actions,” (2) that false light “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and (3) Defendants “acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether the statements were true or false.” See Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 682 (1998). Although a plaintiff may allege malice generally, “the bare conclusory claim of malice, unaccompanied by allegations from which the required subjective element of malice might be inferred, is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”

"Absent some allegation as to what specific statement was false, a claim based on false light simply fails to satisfy the most basic element of the cause of action." Mitchell v. Plano Police Dep't, No. 16-cv-07227, 2017 WL 4340118, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2017) (emphasis in original) (citing Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 683 (1998); see also Raveling, 2005 WL 900232, at *3 (noting that a "substantially true" statement cannot support a false light claim under Illinois law); Madison, 539 F.3d at 659; Muzikowski, 477 F.3d at 907. As discussed above, a reasonable fact finder could decide that the statements in Abramson's review were substantially true.

Under Illinois law, an abuse of process claim requires proof of two elements: (1) the existence of an ulterior motive or purpose in bringing the action; and (2) some act in the use of legal process that is not proper in the regular prosecution of the proceedings. Kirchner v. Greene, 691 N.E.2d 107 (Ill.App.Ct. 1998). Stanley does not properly plead either element of the claim.

( Complaint, at ¶ 5). Plaintiff characterizes this as defamation per se, in that the letter purportedly imputes a lack of ability in plaintiff's trade, profession, or business. Damages are presumed when a statement is defamatory per se. Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App.3d 672, 679, 691 N.E.2d 107, 114 (1st Dist. 1998). Even statements that constitute defamation per se, however are not actionable where they are reasonably capable of an innocent construction.

¶ 72 "Although the causes of action of false light and defamation overlap ***, they are different." Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 682 (1998). Our supreme court noted that the existence of defamation is not a requirement for false light claims.

For purposes of a section 2-615 motion, a court may not consider "affidavits, affirmative factual defenses or other supporting materials," except exhibits attached to and part of the complaint. Oravek v. Community School District 146, 264 Ill. App. 3d 895, 898 (1994); see also Kirchner v. Green, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 676-77 (1998). "Unlike a section 2-619 motion or a section 2-1005 summary judgment motion (735 ILCS 5/2-619, 2-1005 (West 2014)), a section 2-615 motion relies solely on the pleadings rather than on the underlying facts."