Viewing the well-pleaded facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, we decide whether the plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to constitute a cause of action ( Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 182, 790 N.E.2d at 929), and in answering that question, we confine ourselves to (1) the allegations in the complaint and (2) matters of which we may take judicial notice. Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 677, 691 N.E.2d 107, 112 (1998). For purposes of section 2-615 ( 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2008)), it is improper to consider "`affidavits, affirmative factual defenses or other supporting materials.'"

Under Illinois law, to prevail on an abuse of process claim a plaintiff must show: "(1) some act in the use of the legal process not proper in the regular prosecution of such proceedings, and (2) the existence of an ulterior purpose or motive." Holly v. Boudreau, 103 Fed. App'x. 36, 39 (7th Cir. 2004) (citing Neurosurgery & Spine Surgery, S.C. v. Goldman, 339 Ill. App. 3d 177, 183, 274 Ill. Dec. 152, 790 N.E.2d 925 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)); Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 683, 229 Ill. Dec. 171, 691 N.E.2d 107 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998). "The elements are strictly construed, as the tort of abuse of process is not favored under Illinois law."

¶ 87 Many decisions have held that, to constitute defamation per se based on imputing the commission of a crime, “the crime must be an indictable one, involving moral turpitude and punishable by death or by imprisonment in [lieu of a] fine.” Doe v. Catholic Diocese of Rockford, 2015 IL App (2d) 140618, ¶ 46, 395 Ill.Dec. 483, 38 N.E.3d 1239 ; Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 680, 229 Ill.Dec. 171, 691 N.E.2d 107 (1998) ; accord Jacobson v. Gimbel, 2013 IL App (2d) 120478, ¶ 27, 369 Ill.Dec. 626, 986 N.E.2d 1262. One would not ordinarily think of verbal and physical aggression, or the grabbing of a coworker's arm to force him or her in a different direction, to be crimes of “moral turpitude.

To constitute defamation per se based on imputing the commission of a crime, "`the crime must be an indictable one, involving moral turpitude and punishable by death or by imprisonment in lieu of a fine.'" Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680 (1998), quoting Adams v. Sussman Hertzberg, Ltd., 292 Ill. App. 3d 30, 46 (1997). " `While the words charging the commission of a crime need not meet the technical requirements that are necessary for an indictment, the words must fairly impute the commission of a crime.'"

Bryson v. News America Publications, Inc., 174 Ill.2d 77, 86, 672 N.E.2d 1207 (1996). "[F]or purposes of a section 2-615 motion, a court may not consider `affidavits, affirmative factual defenses or other supporting materials.' [Citation]" Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App.3d 672, 677, 691 N.E.2d 107 (1998). We review the trial court's decision de novo. Lykowski, 299 Ill. App.3d at 162.

These activities are analogous to initiating a lawsuit and do not implicate any "process" issued by a court. See, e.g., Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 684, 691 N.E.2d 107, 117 (1st Dist. 1998) (where no court process is involved, "it is axiomatic that there can be no abuse of process"). Plaintiff concedes as much in its response, acknowledging that objections to class-action settlements are not "process."

Arnold's filing of an amended complaint is insufficient as a matter of law. See Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 683 (1998) ("The mere use of the legal process, such as the filing of a lawsuit, does not constitute abuse of process"). While Villarreal alludes to other actions by Arnold in her complaint, such as withholding child support and demanding psychiatric counseling for their minor child, these actions, at least how Villarreal has described them in her complaint, would not constitute "process" by the court and under its seal.

The innocent-construction rule is used to determine whether a statement imputes a criminal offense. See Moore, 402 Ill.App.3d at 70 (citing Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 680 (1998)). Under that rule, a term is not actionable as defamation per se if, in common usage, it has a broader, non-criminal meaning. See Kapotas, 30 N.E.3d at 590; Moore, 402 Ill.App.3d at 70 (quoting Kirchner, 294 Ill.App.3d at 680).

A false light publicity claim requires Ludlow to plead that 1) he was “placed in a false light before the public as a result of the [D]efendants' actions,” 2) that false light “would be highly offensive to a reasonable person,” and 3) Defendants “acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that the statements were false or with reckless disregard for whether the statements were true or false.” SeeKirchner v. Greene, 691 N.E.2d 107, 115–16, 294 Ill.App.3d 672, 229 Ill.Dec. 171 (1998). Ludlow may not base either his defamation or false light claims on statements that are “substantially true.” “The ‘substantial truth’ is shown where the ‘gist’ or ‘sting’ of the allegedly defamatory material is true.” Coghlan v. Beck, 368 Ill.Dec. 407, 984 N.E.2d 132, 146, 2013 IL App (1st) 120891 (2013) (quotation marks omitted).

And a claim of malicious prosecution requires not only that the defendant have acted maliciously, but have used legal process for an improper purpose. See Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App.3d 672, 683-84 691 N.E.2d 107, 116-17 (1st Dist. 1998). Merely filing a lawsuit is not abuse of process, id., and nothing suggests that the eviction action was commenced for any other purpose than gaining possession of the apartment, a proper use of legal process. The amended complaint states that the University took legal action on October 12, 2000, "long after the plaintiff vacated his home."