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Kips Bay Towers Associates v. Yuceoglu

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Nov 10, 1987
134 A.D.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)

Opinion

November 10, 1987

Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Alfred M. Ascione, J.).


The action is brought by a landlord and seeks, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the tenants are not entitled to a renewal lease under the Rent Stabilization Law, the subject apartment not having been occupied by them as their primary residence. IAS correctly declared that the tenants are entitled to a renewal lease since the landlord did not give notice of its intention to renew or not to renew the lease between 150 and 120 days prior to the end of the lease term on August 31, 1983 (Golub v. Frank, 65 N.Y.2d 900; Crow v. 83rd St. Assocs., 68 N.Y.2d 796; 525 Park Ave. Assocs. v. De Hoyas, 69 N.Y.2d 692). IAS's order then proceeded to direct the landlord to furnish the tenants, at their option, with a 1-, 2- or 3-year renewal lease, such lease to provide for a rental in accordance with the rent guidelines that were in effect for leases commencing on September 1, 1983. The order notes that the guidelines provided for a 10% increase for three-year leases, a 7% increase for two-year leases, and a 4% increase for one-year leases.

Given more than 20 years' occupancy of the apartment by the tenants, and not having been advised otherwise as to their preference, IAS should have simply assumed that the tenants would have opted for a three-year renewal term had a renewal lease been offered to them, as it should have been, and deemed the tenants' post-August 31, 1983 occupancy of the apartment to have been pursuant to a lease commencing on September 1, 1983, terminating on August 31, 1986, and providing for a total rental of $19,634.76. This figure is arrived at by taking the monthly rental provided for in the lease that expired on August 31, 1983 ($495.83), increasing that amount by the rent guideline in effect for three-year leases commencing on September 1, 1983 (10%), and multiplying the latter figure ($545.41) by the number of months of the renewal lease (36). We deny interest to the landlord on this sum because, having rejected the tenants' tender of rent out of concern that acceptance thereof might prejudice its claim that the tenants were not entitled to a renewal lease, the landlord waited three years before making a motion for permission to accept such payments without prejudice. We see no equities so strongly favoring the tenants as to warrant that the renewal lease commence prospectively, i.e. when tendered by the landlord, rather than upon the termination of the former lease (see, Matter of Lewin v. Conciliation Appeals Bd., 88 A.D.2d 516, affd 57 N.Y.2d 760).

Our affirmance of that part of IAS's order holding that the tenants are entitled to a renewal lease terminating, at the latest, on August 31, 1986, is not meant to suggest that the tenants are not entitled, or should not be deemed entitled, to a second renewal lease commencing on September 1, 1986 at a rental in accordance with the rent guidelines for leases commencing on that date. We note only that the question of whether the tenants are entitled to such a second renewal lease is a matter not raised by the pleadings.

We disagree with IAS's holding that the tenants are entitled to counsel fees under Real Property Law § 234 since the landlord would have been so entitled under paragraph 19 of the lease had it prevailed on the question of primary residence. Paragraph 19 of the lease permits the landlord to incur an expense "for the account of Tenant" by performing an act that should be performed by the tenants under the lease, in which event the expense so incurred, including, but not limited to, attorney's fees, is to be deemed additional rent and paid on the first day of the calendar month following the incurring of such expense. Clearly, primary residence does not fall within this rubric. Rather, the provision seems intended to apply in situations where, for instance, a landlord incurs an expense because a tenant causes damage to the premises and, in violation of the lease, fails to make repairs (see, Cuyler Realty Co. v Teneo Co., 196 App. Div. 440, affd 233 N.Y. 647). Since the landlord would not have been able to recover counsel fees under paragraph 19 of the lease, the tenant cannot recover them under Real Property Law § 234.

Concur — Kupferman, J.P., Ross, Asch, Rosenberger and Wallach, JJ.


Summaries of

Kips Bay Towers Associates v. Yuceoglu

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department
Nov 10, 1987
134 A.D.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)
Case details for

Kips Bay Towers Associates v. Yuceoglu

Case Details

Full title:KIPS BAY TOWERS ASSOCIATES, Appellant-Respondent, v. Z. YUCEOGLU, Also…

Court:Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department

Date published: Nov 10, 1987

Citations

134 A.D.2d 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987)

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