Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, "there is a complete absence of fact to support the verdict, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party." Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1999)). Michigan law governs the substance of BPI's breach-of-contract claim.
To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff must show that he is disabled and otherwise qualified for the position, either with or without reasonable accommodation. Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir.2001). Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that accommodating the plaintiff would impose an undue hardship on the operation of its business.
“A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position.” Mosby-Meachem, 883 F.3d at 603 (quoting Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2001). “Put another way, essential functions are the core job duties, not the marginal ones.”
"A job function is essential if its removal would fundamentally alter the position." Denman, 266 Fed. Appx. at 380 (citing Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F. 3d 573, 584 (6th Cir. 2001)). Marginal functions of a position are not considered "essential."
Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "'there is a complete absence of fact to support the verdict, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party.'" Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1999)). The Court does not "weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury."
Stated another way, judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only when, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, "there is a complete absence of fact to support the verdict, so that no reasonable juror could have found for the nonmoving party." Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Moore v. KUKA Welding Sys. & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073, 1078 (6th Cir. 1999)). Under Rule 59, "[t]he court may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues—and to any party—after a jury trial, for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.
Once a plaintiff shows that she is disabled and otherwise qualified for a position, with or without reasonable accommodation, the burden shifts to the defendant to show an undue hardship imposed by accommodating the plaintiff. Id. (citing Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (6th Cir. 2001)). "Otherwise qualified" means capable of performing the position's "essential functions."
An impairment substantially limits an individual if it renders him "(i) [u]nable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or (ii) [s]ignificantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which [he] can perform a particular major life activity." Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 582 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2000)). Major life activities include "those basic activities that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty," such as walking, seeing, hearing, lifting, caring for oneself, and working, among others.
Appx., at 456–457. Quoting Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 581 (C.A.6 2001), she observed that appellate courts "do not weigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or substitute our own judgment for that of the jury." 316 Fed
"Whether a job function is essential is a question of fact," making it "typically not suitable for resolution on a motion for summary judgment." Keith v. County of Oakland, 703 F.3d 918, 926 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Kiphart v. Saturn Corp., 251 F.3d 573, 585 (6th Cir. 2001)). The rule is not "that whatever the employer says is essential necessarily becomes essential."