Opinion
Case Number 01-10050-BC
May 14, 2002
OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
The petitioner, Anthony Kipen, is a state prisoner presently confined at the Mid-Michigan Correctional Facility in St. Louis, Michigan. He has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The petitioner claims that respondent is holding him in custody beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence in violation of state and federal law, that respondent is violating his plea agreement, and that respondent is violating his right to have special disciplinary credits added to his regular disciplinary credits. For the reasons stated below, the petition for a writ of habeas corpus will be denied.
I.
The petitioner was initially convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to three to fifteen years imprisonment by the Kalamazoo County Circuit Court in 1987. He was released on parole in October 1990. While on parole, the petitioner committed another offense and pleaded guilty to possession with intent to deliver marijuana, habitual offender second offense, and was sentenced to a term of four to eight years imprisonment by the Barry County Circuit Court in 1992. This sentence was to run consecutive to the 1987 sentence.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus in state court claiming that his discharge date had been improperly calculated; the petition was dismissed. Kipen v. Kapture, No. 99-4543-AH (Chippewa County Cir. Ct. Jan. 10, 2000).
The petitioner then filed a complaint for a writ of habeas corpus with the Michigan Court of Appeals raising the same claim, which was denied. Kipen v. Dep't of Corr., No. 226539 (Mich.Ct.App. July 3, 2000). The petitioner also filed a complaint for superintending control with the Michigan Supreme Court raising the same claim, which likewise was denied. Kipen v. Court of Appeals, No. 116993 (Mich. Oct. 30, 2000).
This Court received the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus, dated January 22, 2001, on January 29, 2001, and the petition was filed on February 8, 2001. The petitioner raises the following claims as grounds for relief:
I. Respondent is unconstitutionally depriving him of his liberty after expiration of his valid eight-year maximum sentence that was set by the legislature and imposed by the sentencing judge under a plea agreement with the state.
II. Respondent is violating the terms of both of his plea agreements by not terminating and discharging his "A" and "B" prefix sentences respectively.
III. Respondent is violating his right to have his special disciplinary credits added "in addition to" his regular disciplinary credits, as the statute specifically dictates the procedure for calculating all disciplinary credits.
The respondent filed an answer to the petition on August 9, 2001 asserting that it should be denied for lack of merit. The petitioner filed a reply to that answer on August 22, 2001.
II.
The provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (April 24, 1996), govern this case because the petitioner filed this habeas petition after the AEDPA's effective date. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997). The AEDPA provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —
(1) or resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1996).
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), the Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of the correct standard of review under the AEDPA. According to the Supreme Court:
Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied — the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.Id. at 412-13 (O'Connor, J., delivering the opinion of the Court on this issue).
In evaluating a state court decision under the "unreasonable application" clause, the Supreme Court further stated that a federal habeas court "should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable." Id. at 409. "Under § 2254(d)(1)'s `unreasonable application' clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because the court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable." Id. at 411.
The Supreme Court also clarified that the phrase "clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," refers only to "the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Id. at 412. In determining what constitutes clearly established federal law, therefore, a federal habeas court must look to pertinent United States Supreme Court precedent.
Lastly, a federal habeas court must presume that state court factual determinations are correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A habeas petitioner may rebut this presumption only with clear and convincing evidence. See Warren v. Smith, 161 F.3d 358, 360-61 (6th Cir. 1998).
In this case, the Chippewa County Circuit Court found that the petitioner's continued detention is in accordance with state law, but did not address any federal law issues. The Michigan appellate courts denied the petitioner's additional requests for relief without discussing the substance of his claims. Accordingly, this Court must conduct an independent review of the state court's decision. See, e.g., Harris v. Stovall, 212 F.3d 940, 943 (6th Cir. 2000). This independent review requires the federal court to "review the record and applicable law to determine whether the state court decision is contrary to federal law, unreasonably applies clearly established law, or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented." Id. at 943. This independent review "is not a full, de novo review of the claims, but remains deferential because the court cannot grant relief unless the state court's result is not in keeping with the strictures of the AEDPA." Id.
III. A.
The petitioner first claims that he is entitled to habeas relief because he is being held beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence. Specifically, the petitioner asserts that his eight-year maximum sentence on his drug conviction began to run on August 11, 1992 and, with good time credits, expired on or about March 17, 1999.
Holding a prisoner under an expired sentence may constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-40 (1979); Campbell v. Peters, 256 F.3d 695, 700 (7th Cir. 2001); Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). Such an action also results in a due process violation. Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee state prisoners a particular method of calculating prison sentences, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557 (1974), a state must follow minimum due process to ensure that liberty is not arbitrarily abrogated when the state creates a statutory right to release from prison. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488-89 (1980); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 226 (1976); see also Haygood v. Younger, 769 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1985).
The petitioner, however, has not established that he is being held beyond the expiration of his maximum sentence. Under Michigan law, a prison sentence for a crime committed while on parole must be served consecutive to the sentence for which the prisoner was on parole. Mich. Comp. L. § 768.7a. As to the manner of calculating sentences imposed consecutively, Michigan law provides as follows:
If a prisoner other than a prisoner subject to disciplinary time is sentenced for consecutive terms, whether received at the same time or at any time during the life of the original sentence, the parole board has jurisdiction over the prisoner for purposes of parole when the prisoner has served the total time of the added minimum terms, less the good time and disciplinary credits allowed by statute. The maximum terms of the sentences shall be added to compute the new maximum term under this subsection, and discharge shall be issued only after the total of the maximum sentences have been served less good time and disciplinary credits, unless the prisoner is paroled and discharged upon satisfactory completion of the parole.
Mich. Comp. L. § 791.234(3) (emphasis added).
The petitioner was sentenced properly under Michigan law to consecutive terms of imprisonment. As discussed by the Chippewa County Circuit Court, the petitioner was sentenced to three to fifteen years imprisonment on his criminal sexual conduct conviction on December 2, 1987. He was paroled on October 15, 1990. While on parole, the petitioner pleaded guilty to a drug charge and habitual offender second offense and was sentenced to a consecutive term of four to eight years imprisonment on November 20, 1992. The petitioner began serving his four-year minimum sentence on the drug conviction on November 20, 1992 since he had completed his minimum three-year sentence on the criminal sexual conduct charge prior to being paroled. However, the petitioner has a combined maximum sentence of 23 years imprisonment on his convictions. Because he was returned to prison on his criminal sexual conduct conviction, the petitioner will not begin serving his eight-year maximum sentence on the drug conviction until he has completed his fifteen-year maximum sentence on his criminal sexual conduct conviction. According to the Michigan Department of Corrections Offender Tracking Information System (OTIS), petitioner's maximum discharge date, accounting for appropriate credits, is November 2, 2006.
The petitioner's claim that his 8-year maximum sentence on his drug conviction began to run on November 20, 1992 is erroneous.
Since the petitioner did not satisfactory complete parole on his criminal sexual conduct conviction, he is required to serve his maximum sentences for both convictions, minus disciplinary and good time credits, unless he is again released on parole as provided by state law. The Michigan Parole Board's decision not to forfeit the petitioner's good time or disciplinary credits from his initial incarceration upon his parole revocation does not excuse him from serving his maximum sentences, minus any earned credits. The petitioner has failed to establish that he is being held beyond the expiration of his maximum sentences. He is thus not entitled to habeas relief on this claim.
B.
The petitioner also claims that he is being held in violation of his plea agreement because the state has not terminated or discharged his sentences as required by law. For the reasons discussed above, this contention is likewise without merit. The petitioner was sentenced to consecutive sentences on his convictions in accordance with Michigan law (and his plea agreement) and he is not being held in custody beyond the expiration of his maximum sentences. He is therefore not entitled to relief on this claim. oC.
Lastly, the petitioner contests the calculation of his disciplinary credits, asserting that his special disciplinary credits have not been added to his regular disciplinary credits in violation of state law. The petitioner states that he has been awarded special credits properly, but that those credits have been improperly calculated. The petitioner does not indicate how many days of credit he believes he has been denied.
Habeas petitioners must fairly present the substance of each federal constitutional claim in state court before raising a claim in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) and (c); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275-78 (1971). A prisoner confined pursuant to a Michigan conviction must raise each habeas issue in the Michigan Court of Appeals and in the Michigan Supreme Court before seeking federal habeas corpus relief. Hafley v. Sowders, 902 F.2d 480, 483 (6th Cir. 1990). From the record before the Court, it does not appear that the petitioner has exhausted his state remedies with respect to this claim. Although a district court generally must dismiss a habeas petition containing claims that were not exhausted in state court, Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 510 (1982), the exhaustion rule is not a jurisdictional requirement. Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989) (citing Granberry v. Greer, 481 U.S. 129 (1987)). A federal court may deny a habeas petition on the merits notwithstanding the applicant's failure to exhaust available state court remedies. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). Because this claim does not warrant habeas relief, the Court will address it despite petitioner's lack of exhaustion.
As noted, the petitioner asserts that his special disciplinary credits are being improperly calculated as a matter of state law.
It is well-settled, however, that errors on matters of state law are not cognizable on habeas review. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); Branan v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) ("federal courts can not review a state's alleged failure to adhere to its own sentencing procedures."). The Michigan Department of Corrections has discretion to award and calculate a prisoner's disciplinary credits under state law. The petitioner has neither alleged nor established a violation of federal law with respect to this issue.
He is thus not entitled to relief on this claim.
IV.
For the reasons stated, the Court concludes that the petitioner is not entitled to federal habeas relief on the claims presented.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the petitioner's motion to compel the Court to issue a writ of habeas corpus [dkt #10], petitioner's motion to strike respondent's pleadings [dkt #13], and petitioner's motion to strike answer [dkt #20] are DENIED.