t of the trial court provided for recovery by the tax commissioner of sums inclusive of not only the taxes assessed, but penalties and interest in addition thereto, pursuant to the tax commissioner's counterclaim, to avoid any possible uncertainty as to whether in affirming and sustaining said decision and judgment we have considered such items and passed upon the validity thereof and of the counterclaim, we declare that we have done so and hold, not only that there has been failure on the part of the complainants to show error by the trial court in the allowance of said items and of the said counterclaim, but also, affirmatively, that the counterclaim was an allowable pleading and the allowance thereof and of the said items was proper under the pleadings and otherwise. (See § 10476, R.L.H. 1945; Wright v. Borthwick, 34 Haw. 245, 255; Great Northern Insurance Company v. Reed, 322 U.S. 47; Ford Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459; also Wong Nin v. City and County, 33 Haw. 379; Kinney v. Aguiar, 34 Haw. 213, 220; §§ 10087-10094 of c. 204, and §§ 10475, 10476 of c. 220, R.L.H. 1945.) The assignments of error and the contentions of the complainants have not been sustained.
Appellants recognize in their complaint that if they are to recover upon the facts pleaded, it is upon a contract implied in fact. Section 4420, Revised Laws 1935, sets forth the exclusive conditions under which the Territory has consented to be sued. ( Kinney v. Territory, 34 Haw. 213, 215.) As noted in Bush v. Territory, 13 Haw. 1, 3, section 4420 is our Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 250), along the lines of which it was modeled.
He offered proof to show that he was not in Rincon on the day of the larceny. The state offered proof to show his presence there on that day. Corroboration was held sufficient. ( Territory v. Kinney, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 143, 2 P. 357.)
The question of the credibility of Stanton, as bad as his record was, is one for the jury, and since they have elected to believe him and disbelieve appellant and Addington, we cannot say as a matter of law that there is no evidence to sustain the conviction. Territory v. Kinney, 3 N.M. 143, 2 P. 357; State v. Kidd. 34 N.M. 84, 278 P. 214. [ 2] Appellant next complains of the admission of certain evidence over his objection.
The uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice is sufficient in law to support a verdict. Territory v. Kinney, 3 N.M. 143, 2 P. 357. It is not within our province to disturb the verdict on this ground. [ 2] It is also contended that the court erred in overruling appellant's motion for a directed verdict.
Does such a condition authorize the court to vacate its order of dismissal? It is a general rule of the common law that all the judgments, decrees, or other orders of a court, however conclusive in their character are in its control during the term at which they are rendered, and may during that term be set aside, vacated or modified, by that court. Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410, 26 L.Ed. 797; United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 59 L.Ed. 129, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 16; United States v. Linnier (C.C.), 125 F. 83; Territory v. Kinney, 3 N.M. (Gild.) 656, 9 P. 599; Tiberg v. Warren, 192 F. 458, 112 C.C.A. 596. And the only limitation in Arizona is that the action must be taken within six months. Paragraph 600, Rev. Stats. Ariz. (Civ. Code) 1913; Leeker v. Leeker, 23 Ariz. 170, 202 P. 397.
special permission from the State through its Legislature [ ] — the statute limiting this right being merely a defense which the defendant may insist on or waive at his pleasure. Id. at 406 (emphasis added) (citation omitted); Cf. Kinney v. Territory of Hawaii, 34 Haw. 213, 214-15 (Haw. Terr. 1937) (holding that legislature waived statute of limitations, RLH Chapter 127 § 4424 (1935), by enacting specific legislation allowing plaintiffs to pursue lawsuit against Territory more than two years after their claim had accrued, as found by trial court). Act 26 was amended and codified as § 1534 of Chapter 98 ("Suits by and Against the Hawaiian Government") of The Civil Laws of the Hawaiian Islands (1897).