Decided March 12, 1986 The defendant's petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 5 Conn. App. 484, is denied. Penelope Kinney, pro se, in support of the petition.

We are not persuaded. The plaintiff's claim asks us to reexamine and reweigh the evidence, which this court is prohibited from doing, for “[t]he trier of facts [is] free to accept or reject any portion of the evidence of either party.” Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn.App. 484, 486, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 33 (1986). There is nothing in the plaintiff's claim or the record that would warrant a deviation from this well established principle in this matter.

The Supreme Court has been "especially hesitant to find abuse of discretion where the court has denied a motion for continuance made on the day of trial." Thode v. Thode, 190 Conn. 694, 697, 462 A.2d 4 (1983); Vossbrinck v. Vossbrinck, 194 Conn. 229, 232, 478 A.2d 1011 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 2048, 85 L.Ed.2d 311 (1985); Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 485, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 33 (1986). "There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process.

Where, as here, it is apparent that the trial court considered all mandatory factors in fashioning its orders, we are not permitted to vary the weight that the trial court placed upon the statutory criteria in reaching its decision. Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 487, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 33 (1986). The defendant appears to relate his dissatisfaction with the trial court's orders to some veiled claim that earning capacity represents a cap on weekly orders.

A motion for continuance is addressed to the discretion of the trial court; the court's ruling on such a motion will not be disturbed unless a clear abuse of that discretion is shown. Vossbrinck v. Vossbrinck, 194 Conn. 229, 232, 478 A.2d 1011 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1020, 105 S.Ct. 2048, 85 L.Ed.2d 311 (1985); Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 485, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 818, 107 S.Ct. 78, 93 L.Ed.2d 33 (1986). In addition, in determining the reasonableness of the trial court's ruling, "every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of its action."

Where, as here, the trial, court considered all mandatory factors in reaching its decision, this court on appeal may not vary the weight which the trial court placed upon various factors in reaching its determination. Kinney v. Kinney, S Conn. App. 484, 487, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146 (1986)." Debowsky v. Debowsky, supra, 526-27.

Where, as here, the trial court considered all mandatory factors in reaching its decision, this court on appeal may not vary the weight which the trial court placed upon the various factors in reaching its determination. Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 487, 500 A.2d 569 (1985), cert. denied, 199 Conn. 804, 506 A.2d 146 (1986).

Moreover, in determining the reasonableness of the trial court's rulings, this court has noted that "every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of its action." Id., 635, quoting Leo v. Leo, 197 Conn. 1, 4, 495 A.2d 704 (1985); see also Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 485, 500 A.2d 569 (1985). We conclude that the trial court's interpretation of the stipulation did not constitute an abuse of discretion, but rather was a reasonable resolution of the controversy.

"In determining whether the trial court could reasonably conclude as it did on the evidence before it, every reasonable presumption should be given in favor of the correctness of its action. "Id.; Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 485, 500 A.2d 569 (1985). The trial court properly corrected the original memorandum of decision deleting the joint ownership reference.

The transcripts and the oral memorandum of decision indicate that the court was aware of the true status of the credit union account, and we find that its application of General Statutes 46b-81 was not an abuse of its discretion. Kinney v. Kinney, 5 Conn. App. 484, 500 A.2d 569 (1985). Such misstatements may expose one to criminal liability; General Statutes 53a-157 (a) (imposing criminal sanctions for false statements made under oath); as well as provide grounds for a motion to open the judgment.