Opinion
CV 14-04492 RSWL (Ex)
11-25-2015
KINGDOM OF SWEDEN, Plaintiff, v. MARTIN CHRISTIAN MELIUS, Defendant.
ORDER re: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS [37]
Currently before the Court is Defendant Martin Christian Melius' ("Defendant") Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37], filed September 25, 2015. Plaintiff Kingdom of Sweden ("Plaintiff") filed this Action on behalf of The Swedish Board for Study Support ("CSN"), against Defendant for: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Common Count For Money Lent; and (3) Common Count For Money Had And Received [1]. Plaintiff is seeking to collect amounts owed in unpaid student loans made by CSN to Defendant. For the reasons discussed below, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37].
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
On or about January 1990, Defendant submitted an application for student financial aid ("Application for Student Aid") to CSN. Compl. 2:17-19 [1]; See Compl., Ex. A. As part of the application process, Defendant allegedly agreed to "repay all student loans which he received in accordance with, and to otherwise be bound by, the Repayment Regulations for Student Loans" ("Repayment Regulations") set forth by CSN. Id. at 2:21-24; See Compl., Ex. B. Pursuant to the terms of the Application for Student Aid and the Repayment Regulations, CSN agreed to make certain student loans to Defendant, which Defendant agreed to repay "no later than one year after he no longer received student aid from CSN." Id. at 3:1-5. A contractual relationship was thereby formed between CSN and Defendant. Id.
Pursuant to the terms of the contract, CSN made several student loans to Defendant in the aggregate amount of 617,677 Swedish Crowns, or $95,027.23 U.S. Dollars. Id. at 3:6-9. Plaintiff contends that Defendant breached the terms of their contract by repaying only 108,000 Swedish Crowns ($16,615.38 U.S. Dollars), leaving 1,199,640 Swedish Crowns ($184,560.00 U.S. Dollars) unpaid. Id. at 3:10-14. B. Procedural Background
Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1] on June 11, 2014 [1], seeking $184,560.00 in compensatory damages, interest as provided by law, reasonable attorneys' fees, and costs of suit. Id. at 4:12-16.
On September 25, 2015, Defendant filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37], alleging that (1) this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, (2) Plaintiff fails to state a claim for breach of contract, (3) the breach of contract claim is time-barred, and (4) since the breach of contract claim should fail, so too should the common count claims. Mot. 1:19-2:1, 9:25-10:12. On October 6, 2015, Plaintiff filed its Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [39]. A hearing for this Motion was scheduled for October 27, 2015. This Motion was taken under submission on October 22, 2015.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standards
1. Local Rule 7-3
Local Rule 7-3 provides that before any motion is filed, counsel for the moving party must "first contact opposing counsel to discuss thoroughly, preferably in person, the substance of the contemplated motion and any potential resolution." L.R. 7-3. The Rule further provides that "[t]he conference shall take place at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the motion." Id.
2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial—a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). A motion for judgment on the pleadings must be timely.
If a party engages in excessive delay before filing a motion, the court may refuse to hear the motion on the ground that its consideration will delay or interfere with the commencement of the trial. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 3d § 1367.
"Judgment on the pleadings is properly granted when, taking all allegations in the pleadings as true, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," Knappenberger v. City of Phx., 566 F.3d 936, 939 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Merchants Home Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 50 F.3d 1486, 1488 (9th Cir. 1995)), as "there is no issue of material fact in dispute." Fleming v. Pickard, 581 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir. 2009).
On a Rule 12(c) motion, the court must accept as true all the material facts alleged in the complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Id. The Ninth Circuit has evaluated motions for judgment on the pleadings under the same standard as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, when ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may consider the pleadings, documents attached to the pleadings, documents incorporated by reference in the pleadings, and matters of judicial notice. United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 907-08 (9th Cir. 2003).
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2)
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) states that a federal pleading need only consist of "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). A claim need only be "stated with sufficient particularity to 'give the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" ExxonMobil Oil Corp. v. Gasprom, Inc., No. 10-55610, 2011 WL 6396415, at * 1 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a complaint must be dismissed if the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Defects in subject matter jurisdiction are not waivable and may be raised at any time. Detabali v. St. Luke's Hosp., 482 F.3d 1199, 1202 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Ins. Corp. Of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)). For a court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction over an action, the Plaintiff must establish: "a (1) legally recognized injury, (2) caused by the named defendant, that is (3) capable of legal or equitable redress" by the court. Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002). B. Analysis
1. Defendant's Motion is Denied Because There Was No Conference of Counsel Under Local Rule 7-3.
Notably, Local Rule 7-3 requires that the parties discuss "thoroughly ...the substance" of the issues contained in the Motion. Id. (emphasis added). A district court may, in its discretion, refuse to consider a motion when Rule 7-3 is violated. See Reed v. Sandstone Properties, L.P., No. CV 12-05021 MMM (VBKx), 2013 WL 1344912, at *6 (C.D. Cal. April 2, 2013).
Defendant filed the present Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on September 25, 2015 [37]. Plaintiff notes in its Opposition that "[t]he only conference of counsel which can even arguably be traced to the instant Motion took place on February 4, 2015, over seven and one-half months before the Motion was filed." Opp'n 4:10-11. Upon review of the Declaration of W. Ernest Mooney in Opposition to Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings ("Mooney Declaration")[39-1], this Court finds that the most recent conference between the parties took place on February 4, 2015, which was in fact seven and one-half months prior to the filing of the present Motion. Mooney Decl. ¶ 2. In this conference, the parties discussed the issue of the applicable statute of limitations, but did not raise the remaining issues in the present Motion. Id. at ¶ 3. Accordingly, the parties could not have discussed any potential resolution of the remaining issues.
As such, the parties' conference did not sufficiently address the substance of the present Motion. Further, although the parties did in fact meet "at least seven (7) days prior to the filing of the [M]otion," Defendant confounds the purpose of the Rule by holding the conference of counsel seven and one-half months prior to the filing of his Motion, at a time where many of the issues were undeveloped and, as such, not discussed. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] is DENIED on these grounds. Nonetheless, this Court elects to consider the Motion on its merits.
2. Alternatively, Defendant's Motion is Denied on the Merits.
a. This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the "Revenue Rule" is inapplicable.
Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims because the action is not an action on a contract, but rather an action to recover a municipal liability from the Swedish government. Mot. 4:23-5:16. Defendant contends that, in applying the Revenue Rule, the district court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the matter. Id.
Defendant misconstrues the applicability of the Revenue Rule in his Motion. "[T]he revenue rule merely provides that the courts of one jurisdiction do not recognize the revenue laws of another jurisdiction." Her Majesty the Queen in Right of the Province of British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 1979). This means, as the Ninth Circuit discussed in Her Majesty, that the common law Revenue Rule "prevents a foreign jurisdiction from either instituting a suit to recover taxes, or bringing a suit to enforce its own court's judgment for taxes." Id. at 1163 n.1. The Revenue Rule does not, however, prohibit a foreign sovereign from bringing a claim for loan repayment, but rather is a discretionary rule that allows federal courts to decline to apply the tax law of foreign sovereigns. The Supreme Court has noted: the "principal evil against which the revenue rule was traditionally thought to guard [is] judicial evaluation of the policy-laden enactments of other sovereigns." Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 368. Thus, the spirit of the Revenue Rule is not to prevent foreign governments from bringing debt collection actions in United States district courts, but rather to allow district courts to refuse to enforce the revenue laws of foreign sovereigns, out of concern for comity.
See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 352 (2005) ("At common law, the revenue rule generally barred courts from enforcing the tax laws of foreign sovereigns."); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964)(White, J., dissenting); United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 (2d Cir. 1997), cert denied, 525 U.S. 812 (1998)("courts will normally not enforce foreign tax judgments."); European Cmty. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that the Revenue Rule did not preclude exercise of subject matter jurisdiction over suits because "'[t]he revenue rule is discretionary rather than jurisdictional.'")
See also City of Phila v. Cohen, 11 N.Y.2d 401, 406 (1962) (noting comity concerns and concluding that to act as "collectors of taxes for another State...would be an intrusion into the public affairs of another State").
In the present action, CSN is seeking repayment of a student loan that Plaintiff alleges was memorialized in Defendant's Applications For Student Aid and the Repayment Regulations for Student Loans promulgated by CSN. Compl. ¶ 5; see Compl. Ex. A, Ex. B. This Court finds that the present Action is not, as Defendant contends, an action to recover Swedish revenue within the meaning of the Revenue Rule. Rather, the present Action is predicated on sufficiently plausible claims of the breach of a valid contract between CSN and Defendant. Accordingly, this Court finds that it has subject matter jurisdiction over the Action. This Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] on the grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Additionally, this Court should find that, upon review of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff has established "a (1) legally recognized injury, (2) caused by the named defendant that is (3) capable of legal or equitable redress," as is required for this Court to exercise subject matter jurisdiction. Schmier v. U.S. Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 279 F.3d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 2002).
b. Plaintiff states cognizable claims in its Complaint.
i. Plaintiff plausibly alleges a breach of contract claim.
To state a plausible claim for breach of contract under California law, a plaintiff must allege "(1) the existence of a contract; (2) that he has performed or that his nonperformance is excused; (3) defendant's breach of the contract; and (4) damages resulting from the breach." Greenwich Ins. Co. v. Rodgers, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1158, 1163 (C.D. Cal. July 23, 2010) (citing Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc., 90 Cal.Rptr.3d 589 (2009)). A plaintiff must be able to identify the provision of the contract breached by the defendant. Progressive West Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 37 Cal.Rptr.3d 434, 449 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
In Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that "beginning in or about January 1990, and for several years thereafter, [Defendant] submitted written Applications for Student Aid to CSN." Compl. ¶ 5; see Compl., Ex. A. Plaintiff alleges that "as part of his Applications for Student Aid, [Defendant] agreed to repay all student loans which he received in accordance with, and to otherwise be bound by, the Repayment Regulations for Student Loans promulgated by CSN." Id.; see Compl., Ex. B. Plaintiff then alleges that, pursuant to these agreements, "CSN agreed to make certain student loans to [Defendant] and that a contractual relationship was thereby formed...between CSN and [Defendant]." Id. at ¶ 6. Upon review of these allegations, this Court finds that Plaintiff has plausibly alleged the first element of its breach of contract claim, the existence of a contract, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
This Court further finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleges the remaining elements of a breach of contract claim. Plaintiff alleges that he performed on the contract, specifically, that "pursuant to the terms of the contract, CSN made several student loans to [Defendant] in the aggregate amount of 617,677 Swedish Crowns, the equivalent in U.S. dollars of $95,027.23." Id. at ¶ 7. Plaintiff then alleges that "[Defendant] breached the terms of the contract by repaying only 108,000 Swedish Crowns to CSN, the equivalent in U.S. dollars of $16,615.38." Id. at ¶ 8. Finally, Plaintiff alleges damages: "As a result of the foregoing, CSN has sustained damages in the current amount of $184,560.00, on which interest and administrative fees continue to accrue." Id. at ¶ 9.
Plaintiff need not lay out the terms of the alleged agreement in its Complaint. Plaintiff need only plead a "short and plain statement of the claim," Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), that "give[s] the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley, 355 U.S. at 47. Further, "when a number of writings dovetail so as to show a meeting of the minds for the accomplishment of the same object, the contract is as well established as though it had been signed by all parties and executed with conventional formalities." Twining v. Thompson, 156 P.2d 29, 33 (Cal. 1945).
Upon review of the Complaint, this Court finds that Plaintiff did, in fact, provide sufficient factual support for its allegations that a contract was created between the parties and subsequently breached. Based on the foregoing, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] as to this claim.
ii. Plaintiff plausibly alleges claims for common count for money lent and common count for money had and received.
Common count claims are "based on express or implied promises to pay money." Moya v. Northrup, 10 Cal.App.3d 276, 281 (1970). To plausibly plead a common count claim, the plaintiff must allege "(1) the statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, (2) the consideration, i.e., goods sold, work done, etc., and (3) nonpayment." Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Zerin, 53 Cal. App. 4th 445, 460 (1997) (citations omitted). A common count claim is "proper whenever the plaintiff claims a sum of money due." Kawasho Int'l, USA v. Lakewood Pipe Serv., 152 Cal.App.3d 785, 793 (1983).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's common count claims fail because "[u]nder California law, '[a] common count is not a specific cause of action....'" Mot. 9:25-28 (quoting McBride v. Boughton, 123 Cal. App. 4th 379, 394 (2004)). Defendant contends: "'California courts [have] held that when a common count is used as an alternative claim seeking the same recovery demanded in a specific cause of action based on the same facts, the common count may be dismissed if the cause of action is dismissed.'" Id. at 10:1-15 (quoting In re Apply In-App Puchase Litig., 855 F.Supp.2d 1030, 1042 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2012)). Defendant argues that Plaintiff's breach of contract claim should be dismissed, and thus pursuant to California law, so should Plaintiff's common count claims.
As discussed above, the Court finds that Plaintiff plausibly alleges its breach of contract claim. Accordingly, Plaintiff's common count claims are not dismissed as per the aforementioned rule in In re Apply In-App Purchase Litig.. Further, Plaintiff plausibly alleges the requisite elements for both common count claims. Plaintiff alleges a statement of indebtedness in a certain sum, specifically that Defendant owes CSN "the sum of $184,560.00, together with the interest and administrative fees thereon." Compl. ¶¶ 12, 14. Plaintiff alleges consideration, specifically the student loans provided to Defendant pursuant to the Applications for Student Aid and the Repayment Regulations. Id. at ¶ 7. Finally, Plaintiff alleges nonpayment, specifically that Defendant has only paid $16,615.38 in U.S. Dollars, and thus still owes CSN $184,560.00 in U.S. Dollars. Id. at ¶ 8. Upon consideration of the Complaint, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] as to these claims.
iii. Defendant has not sufficiently shown that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
Defendant argues that, even if this Court finds Plaintiff's claims are properly plead, the claims are time-barred by the applicable California statute of limitations, and thus the Complaint fails to plausibly state a claim. Mot. 1:28-2; 8:20-24. This Court finds that the Swedish statute of limitations applies to this action. Accordingly, Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred is DENIED.
"A federal court sitting in diversity must look to the forum state's choice of law rules to determine the controlling substantive law." Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 666 F.3d 581, 589 (9th Cir. 2012)(quoting Zinser v. Accufix Research Institute, Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1887 (9th Cir. 2001)). Since this Action was brought in California, this Court will apply California's choice of law rules to determine whether California or Swedish law applies to the statute of limitations issue. In California, the governmental interest test determines which statute of limitations applies. See McCann v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 225 P.3d 516, 527 (Cal. 2010); see also Nelson v. International Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 1983). The governmental interest test involves a three-step analysis to determine the applicable law. "Under California law, the burden is on the proponent of a foreign law to show that the foreign jurisdiction's interest in having its law apply is greater than California's interest in the application of its laws." Karoun Dairies, Inc. v. Karlacti, Inc., No. 08cv1521 AJB (WVG), 2014 WL 3340917, at *11 (S.D. Cal. July 8, 2014).
The governmental interest test requires that a court (1) determine "whether the relevant law of each of the potentially affected jurisdictions with regard to the particular issue in question is the same or different"; (2) if there is a difference, the court must "examine[] each jurisdiction's interest in the application of its own law under the circumstances of the particular case to determine whether a true conflict exists"; and (3) if there is a true conflict, the court must "carefully evaluate[] and compare[] the nature and strength of each jurisdiction in the application of its own law 'to determine which state's interest would be more impaired if its policy were subordinated to the policy of the other state' and then ultimately appl[y] 'the law of the state whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied.'" McCann, 225 P.3d at 527.
As to the first prong of the governmental interest test, this Court finds that it is clear that California and Swedish law differ on the applicable statute of limitations. California law applies a two-year statute of limitations to actions on an oral contract and a four-year statute of limitations to a written contract. See Cal Civ. Code §§ 337, 339(1). Swedish law imposes a much longer statute of limitations.
In its Notice of Intent to Raise Foreign Issues of Law [34], Plaintiff summarized, and evidenced through accompanying exhibits, the applicable Swedish statute of limitations in student loan collection actions. Pursuant to Swedish law, there is a 25-year statute of limitations for claims for repayment of student loans, unless the claim was time barred prior to July 1, 2011. SFS 1999:1395; See Pl.'s Not. Of Intent, Ex. D. Prior to July 1, 2011, a claim is time barred 10 years after it is made, unless the statute of limitation is interrupted before the ten years expire. SFS 1981:130, § 2; See Pl.'s Not. of Intent, Ex. B. "The statute of limitations is disrupted in the event (1) the borrower undertakes payment, pays interest or principal or acknowledges the debt in another manner to the creditor, [or] (2) the debtor receives a written demand or a written reminder from the creditor regarding the claim...." Id. at § 5; See Pl.'s Not. of Intent, Ex. B. "If the statute of limitations has been disrupted through acknowledgment, demand or reminder, a new statute of limitations takes effect on the day of disruption according to § 2." Id. at § 6.
As to the second prong, this Court finds that both California and Sweden have legitimate interests in the application of their respective statute of limitations. California has an important interest in protecting its residents from "stale" litigation raised by foreign parties that have not been diligent in pursuing their claims. On the other hand, Sweden has an important interest in applying its statute of limitations to student loan collection actions. A longer statute of limitations period ensures that Sweden can feasibly collect on loans given to students abroad, and as such allows Sweden to continue to provide their citizens financial support for higher education. Accordingly, both California and Sweden have strong interests in applying their respective statutes of limitations to the present Action. This Court finds that a true conflict exists between the applicable California and Swedish statutes, and accordingly, will determine under the third prong whose interest would be more impaired if its law were not applied.
See Nelson v. Int'l Paint Co., 716 F.2d 640, 644 (9th Cir. 1983)(California's statute of limitations is applied to protect "residents and courts from the burdens associated with the prosecution of stale cases in which memories have faded and evidence has been lost.").
As to the third prong, it is Plaintiff's burden to show that Sweden's interests are greater than that of California. Karoun, 2014 WL 3340917, at In support of this proposition, Plaintiff directs the Court's attention to the 2010 "Proposal by the Government" ("Proposal") to extend the repayment time for student loans, attached as Exhibit C to its Notice of Intent to Raise Issues of Foreign Law. Opp'n 15:17-21; See Pl.'s Not. Of Intent, Ex. C.
Plaintiff further notes that Sweden's interests will be outlined by testimony of representatives at trial, but at this juncture, such testimony is "beyond the scope of appropriate consideration in resolving a motion for judgment on the pleadings." Id. at 15:11-15.
This Court finds that upon consideration of the rationale put forth in the Proposal, Plaintiff has sufficiently shown this Court, at this juncture and for the purposes of considering Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings only, that Sweden has a stronger interest in applying its statute of limitations to this Action than California. If the Court were to apply California's statute of limitations to the present Action, Sweden's interests would be significantly impaired as they would be precluded from collecting on their debts and thus their ability to provide financial aid in the future could be injured. On the other hand, it is not apparent that California's interests would be significantly impaired. Although Defendant is a California resident and received his education in California, see Compl., Ex. A, he was provided loans by a Swedish organization that were explicitly subject to Swedish Repayment Regulations. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 5; see Compl. Ex. A.
See Pl.'s Not. Of Intent, Ex. C § 6.4.3 ("CSN believes that an extended statute of limitations period would be of great benefit to the authority in the repayment process."); see also Pl.'s Not. Of Intent, Ex. C § 6.4.2 (According to estimates from CSN, more than 10,000 loans were at risk of being statute-barred after ten years, for a total debt value of 1 billion Swedish crowns.).
Upon consideration of the three factors of the governmental interest test, this Court applies the Swedish statute of limitations to the present Action. Further, Defendant made no showing in his Motion that Plaintiff's claims are time barred under Swedish law. In fact, Defendant did not even raise the issue of whether the claims would be time-barred under Swedish law. Accordingly, this Court finds that (1) Swedish law applies to the statute of limitations issue in the present Action, and for purposes of Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, (2) Defendant has not met its burden in showing this Court that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred by the Swedish statute. Whether Plaintiff's claims are time-barred by the Swedish statute is a material fact that remains in dispute, and thus Defendant is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] on the grounds that Plaintiff's claims are time-barred.
3. Defendant's Motion is Denied Because it was Filed in Violation of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c).
Alternatively, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] as an untimely filing that would delay trial. Defendant filed this Motion on September 25, 2015, over fifteen months after Plaintiff filed its Complaint [1], on June 11, 2014. Considering the nature of the Motion, that of a Judgment on the Pleadings, indicates that Defendant's delay in filing his motion was excessive under Rule 12(c). Further, this Motion was scheduled to be heard on October 27, 2015, at least one week after the parties' were to engage in the Meeting of Counsel pursuant to Local Rule 16-2. This Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37] on these additional grounds.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, this Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings [37].
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: November 25, 2015
s/ RONALD S.W. LEW
HONORABLE RONALD S.W. LEW
Senior U.S. District Judge