King v. Town of Lyme

10 Citing cases

  1. N. New Eng. Tel. Operations, LLC v. Town of Acworth

    173 N.H. 660 (N.H. 2020)   Cited 5 times
    Noting that "we interpret statutes in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation"

    The placement of these types of property in, under, or across municipal rights-of-way is governed by a statutory framework. See King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 283-84, 490 A.2d 1369 (1985). To erect, install, and maintain any such poles, structures, conduits, cables, or wires in, under, or across municipal rights-of-way, a permit or license is required from the relevant municipality.

  2. Stevens v. Town of Goshen

    683 A.2d 814 (N.H. 1996)   Cited 5 times

    For example, both are "public ways, " RSA 229:5, VII, and as such they are "full public highways that the public has the right to pass over." Glick, 130 N.H. at 646, 547 A.2d at 233; see also King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 283, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985). Moreover, municipalities have no duty of care with respect to maintenance or repair of any kind of Class VI highway, see RSA 229:5, VI, VII (1993); RSA 231:93 (1993); Glick, 130 N.H. at 646, 547 A.2d at 233, and the town's planning board regulations do not allow subdivision on Class VI highways, regardless of type.

  3. Whispering Springs Tenant Assoc. v. Barrett

    624 A.2d 1345 (N.H. 1993)   Cited 5 times

    [8, 9] We have long held "that the meaning of a statute is determined from its construction as a whole and not by construction of isolated words and phrases." King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (quotations omitted). The defendants focus on the language stating that the award "shall not exceed" $10,000 or 10 percent.

  4. Maciejczyk v. Maciejczyk

    134 N.H. 343 (N.H. 1991)   Cited 7 times
    Permitting modification of support order as of the filing of the petition to modify

    The meaning of a statute is determined from a construction of the statute as a whole, not from piecemeal analysis of words and phrases. King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (citation omitted); see Theresa S. v. Superintendent of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985). RSA 458:32 provides that "[u]pon . . . a new petition by either party . . . the court may modify or revise its orders and decree.

  5. Appeal of N.H. Catholic Charities

    546 A.2d 1085 (N.H. 1988)   Cited 5 times
    Meaning of statute is determined from its construction as a whole

    "[T]he meaning of a statute is determined from its construction as a whole and not by the construction of isolated words and phrases." In re John Kevin B., 129 N.H. 286, 288, 525 A.2d 281, 283 (1987) (quoting King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985)); Theresa S. v. Sup't of YDC, 126 N.H. 53, 55, 489 A.2d 592, 593 (1985). All of the sections of a statute must be construed together, Blue Mountain Forest Ass'n v. Town of Croydon, 119 N.H. 202, 204, 400 A.2d 55, 57 (1979), and "not viewed separately in isolation," Arsenault v. Keene, 104 N.H. 356, 358, 187 A.2d 60, 62 (1962).

  6. Glick v. Town of Ossipee

    547 A.2d 231 (N.H. 1988)   Cited 8 times

    [4, 5] The legislature's construction recognizes that many highways that have attained class VI status by virtue of having been formally discontinued subject to gates and bars are nevertheless "traveled," if only occasionally by hunters and fishermen. This construction also recognizes that class VI highways are full public highways that the public has the right to pass over, King v. Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 283, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (citing Brown v. Brown, 50 N.H. 538, 550-51 (1871)); Proctor v. Andover, 42 N.H. 348, 351 (1861), even though such highways are not "approved public street[s]" for zoning purposes, RSA 231:45. Only a formal discontinuance can legally terminate the public's right to travel on any public way. Marrone v. Town of Hampton, 123 N.H. 729, 734, 466 A.2d 907, 910 (1983) (citing Hartford v. Gilmanton, 101 N.H. 424, 426, 146 A.2d 851, 853 (1958)) (citation omitted).

  7. State v. Denney

    130 N.H. 217 (N.H. 1987)   Cited 9 times

    Instead, however, of trying to make sense of "consequences" by applying this unworkable dichotomy between the "direct" and the "collateral," we can follow a far simpler course for determining what "consequences" the legislature had in mind, by looking to the statute as a whole. See King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (meaning of a statute is to be determined from its construction as a whole). One immediately sees that the requirement to give advice about the "consequences" of refusing, RSA 265:87, was enacted at the same time as the original version of RSA 265:92 (Supp.

  8. Jaswell Drill Corp. v. General Motors Corp.

    129 N.H. 341 (N.H. 1987)   Cited 27 times
    In Jaswell Drill Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 129 N.H. 341, 529 A.2d 875 (1987), we were asked to consider the meaning of the phrase "causes of action," as used in the newly enacted tort reform statute, Laws 1986, 227:2, to determine whether the case would be governed by the statute or the common law.

    However, "the meaning of a statute is to be determined from its construction as a whole and not by construction of isolated words and phrases." In re John Kevin B., 129 N.H. 286, 288, 525 A.2d 281, 283 (1987) (quoting King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985)). When considered in conjunction with section 2 of the Act, codified as RSA 507:7-d to -i, it becomes clear that "causes of action" refers to causes of action sounding in tort.

  9. In re John Kevin B

    129 N.H. 286 (N.H. 1987)   Cited 7 times

    [2, 3] Furthermore, "the meaning of a statute `is to be determined from its construction as a whole and not by construction of isolated words and phrases.'" King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 284, 490 A.2d 1369, 1372 (1985) (quoting State v. Smith, 124 N.H. 509, 512, 474 A.2d 987, 989 (1984)); Theresa S. v. Sup't. of YDC supra. RSA 170-C:1 must be read in conjunction with the other provisions of RSA chapter 170-C. RSA 170-C:11, III is particularly relevant to the issue before us. As originally enacted RSA 170-C:11, III provided, in part: "The parent-child relationship may be terminated with respect to one parent without affecting the relationship between the child and the other parent."

  10. DeForge v. Balint

    514 A.2d 827 (N.H. 1986)   Cited 1 times

    The plain language of the easement does not support this interpretation. Moreover, it is a violation of the "reasonable use" standard, which requires a determination of the parties' rights under an easement in light of the surrounding circumstances and in consideration of the disadvantages to one party created by the other party's use. Delaney v. Gurrieri, 122 N.H. 819, 821, 451 A.2d 394, 395-96 (1982); see also King v. Town of Lyme, 126 N.H. 279, 285, 490 A.2d 1369, 1373 (1985). The advantage to the plaintiff of requiring the defendants to supply her with water from the well on their property would place the defendants at an economic disadvantage.