That interpretation has since been adhered to. King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, 141 (1915). King v. Dolan, 255 Mass. 236, 237 (1926).
Ed.) c. 191, § 20, in behalf of a child or the issue of a deceased child unintentionally omitted from a will does not aid an illegitimate child or the illegitimate issue of a deceased child. Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray, 535. King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140. King v. Dolan, 255 Mass. 236. Illegitimate children are not within the description "children" in the workmen's compensation law. Gritta's Case, 236 Mass. 204. Di Clavio's Case, 293 Mass. 259, 263.
Black's Law Dictionary gives the construction of the word "issue" as follows: "The word `issue' in a will is generally a word of limitation," citing Ford v. McBrayer, 171 N.C. 420, 88 S.E. 736, and other cases. "The word is commonly held to include only legitimate issue. Page v. Roddie, 92 Okla. 236, 218 P. 1092; King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, 109 N.E. 880; Hardesty v. Mitchell, 302 Ill. 369, 134 N.E. 745, 24 A.L.R., 565; Love v. Love, 179 N.C. 115, 101 S.E. 562."
Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray, 535, held that an illegitimate child unintentionally omitted to be provided for in the will of its mother was not entitled under Rev. Sts. c. 62, § 21, to the share of her estate which it would have taken under Rev. Sts. c. 61, § 2, if she had died intestate. It was held in King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, 141, that the words "issue of a deceased child" in R.L.c. 135, § 19 (now G.L. [Ter. Ed.] c. 191, § 20), should be construed to mean legitimate issue of any legitimate deceased child.
There is no diversity of interest on the latter ground because an illegitimate child is not included within the meaning of G.L.c. 191, § 20, giving a child omitted from the will of a parent the same share in the estate as if the parent had died intestate unless the facts there stated appear. Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray, 535. King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140. The will of the mother having been allowed, it would be utterly unwarranted for a guardian of the infant to prosecute litigation under G.L.c. 190, § 5; c. 191, § 20. The evidence is not reported. The findings of the judge, without reciting them, disclose careful consideration of all aspects of the interests of the infant in reaching his conclusion and fail to indicate any misuse of judicial discretion.
Accordingly, appellant has no interest in the real estate involved, and her bill was properly dismissed. Baker v. Stucker, 248 S.W. 1003, approving: Kent v. Barker, 2 Gray (Mass.) 535; King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140; Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah, 258, 269. (2) Whenever the words "child" or "children" are used in a statute, will or deed, they are held by the prevalent rule of construction to mean legitimate child or children only. That is the law in this State, so that in construing Sec. 514, R.S. 1919, the words child or children do not include illegitimate offspring. Cases, supra; Bent's Administrator v. St. Vrain, 30 Mo. 268; Gates v. Seibert, 157 Mo. 254, 272; 7 C.J. p. 959; Blacklaws v. Milne, 82 Ill. 505; Robinson v. Georgia Railroad Banking Co., 117 Ga. 168; Hicks v. Smith, 94 Ga. 809; Peerless Pacific Co. v. Burchard, 90 Wn. 224; Bell v. Burnstead, 14 N.Y.S. 697, 698. (3) Sec. 311, R.S. 1919, merely permits an illegitimate child and its mother to inherit from one another. It does not change the status of the child.
Welch v. Boston, 211 Mass. 178, 185. King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, 141. This body of statutory and common law regarding a matter of universal interest and profound importance to the public weal was established and widely known before the budget law came into existence.
Bottomed upon the ancient concept that an illegitimate child was indeed "filius nullius", i.e., a child of nobody, thus without legal status (New-Haven v Newtown, 12 Conn. 165; Dickinson's Appeal from Probate, 42 Conn. 491), many jurisdictions, like New York, held the word "issue" to mean only legitimate issue (Page v Roddie, 92 Okla. 236; King v Thissell, 222 Mass. 140; Hardesty v Mitchell, 302 Ill. 369). Courts thus denied "illegitimate" claimants the right to share under provisions of wills not unlike the one before us.
The court did give "another suggestion" as being "quite conclusive," namely, that under the last clause of that statute a bastard could not claim by representation through his mother, and, therefore, under the section corresponding to our section 514, if the bastard's contention were to prevail, he could take if the ancestor of the deceased mother of an illegitimate child died leaving a will, but could not take if the ancestor did not leave one. This additional consideration, however, does not destroy the force of the other ground of the decision. In King v. Thissell, 222 Mass. 140, the court refused to re-examine or disturb the holding in the Kent case. The case of Estate of Wardell, 57 Cal. 484, 491, is the only case we have been able to find which holds that a pretermitted illegitimate child of its mother was entitled to take the same as a legitimate child, the court saying, at page 491, that the words "child" or "children" relate to status and not to origin and have "a statutory and not a common-law meaning" and include all children upon whom has been conferred by law the capacity of inheritance.