King v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. McClain v. State

    226 Ga. App. 714 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 60 times
    Finding first-tier encounter when police officer did not activate blue lights before approaching stopped vehicle and asking driver for identification

    Similarly, a police officer may approach citizens who are on foot to make inquiries without fear of intruding on constitutional rights. See Edwards v. State, 264 Ga. 615, 616 ( 449 S.E.2d 516) (1994); State v. Willis, 207 Ga. App. 76, 77 ( 427 S.E.2d 306) (1993); King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 382 (1) 383 ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). The cases cited by McClain involve officers who through the use of blue flashing lights or other means actually stopped or pulled over the defendant, and thus are not applicable. See State v. Goodman, 220 Ga. App. 169 ( 469 S.E.2d 327) (1996); State v. Jones, 214 Ga. App. 593 ( 448 S.E.2d 496) (1994); Streicher v. State, 213 Ga. App. 670 ( 445 S.E.2d 815) (1994); Jorgensen v. State, 207 Ga. App. 545 ( 428 S.E.2d 440) (1993); State v. Golden, 210 Ga. App. 800 ( 437 S.E.2d 492) (1993); Brown v. State, 188 Ga. App. 184 ( 372 S.E.2d 574) (1988); Tarwid v. State, 184 Ga. App. 853 ( 363 S.E.2d 63) (1987).

  2. Youhoing v. State

    487 S.E.2d 86 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 4 times

    An officer does not, however, actually have to see a suspect commit the act which constitutes a crime for the crime to be considered as having been committed within the officer's presence or general knowledge. See Carranza v. State, 266 Ga. 263 (1) ( 467 S.E.2d 315) (1996); King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). In the instant case, through the use of his senses, and based on his conversation with defendant, examination of her license and the location of her car, Fuller easily gained the personal knowledge and probable cause necessary to initiate an arrest pursuant to OCGA ยง 17-4-20 (a).

  3. State v. Carranza

    217 Ga. App. 431 (Ga. Ct. App. 1995)   Cited 2 times
    In State v. Carranza, 217 Ga. App. 431 (457 S.E.2d 699) (1995), we reversed the trial court's order which granted Miguel Carranza a/k/a Miguel Carranza Fonnacco's motion to suppress his statement and motion to suppress evidence.

    The words `in his presence' and `within his immediate knowledge' are synonymous, and to justify the arrest without a warrant, the officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime taking place if by any of his senses he has personal knowledge of its commission. Lynn v. State, 130 Ga. App. 646 (1) ( 204 S.E.2d 346) (1974); King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). A valid search without a warrant may be made incident to a lawful arrest or under exigent circumstances when supported by probable cause.

  4. Lufburrow v. State

    425 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 4 times

    The officer need not see the act which constitutes the crime, if by any of his senses he has personal knowledge of its commission. King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 383 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644). An offense is committed in the presence of an officer when his senses give him knowledge the offense was committed. Novak v. State, 130 Ga. App. 780, 781 ( 204 S.E.2d 491). The store cashier saw appellant driving the moving vehicle and so reported; the officers found appellant passed out at the wheel of her vehicle with its motor running and lights on, and it was apparently owing only to the fact that she was unconscious that she was not in fact driving or the vehicle was not in fact "moving."

  5. State v. Corbett

    205 Ga. App. 554 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 12 times

    However, this is not the correct test to determine whether a person has been arrested but is the test for whether a person has been seized. State v. Akinsonwon, 200 Ga. App. 287, 288, supra; Ward v. State, 193 Ga. App. 137 (1), 138 ( 387 S.E.2d 150); King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382 (1), 383 ( 288 S.E.2d 644). The correct test for determining whether a suspect has been arrested is whether a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. Scretchen v. State, 192 Ga. App. 436 (1), 437 ( 385 S.E.2d 115). It is uncontroverted that defendant Corbett was seized.

  6. State v. Bryant

    416 S.E.2d 368 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 9 times

    " (Citations and punctuation omitted.) King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). In the case at bar, we find that Officer Berardesco's approach to the car constituted a simple police-citizen communication with no restraint of liberty.

  7. State v. Akinsonwon

    407 S.E.2d 434 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a "seizure," while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices. . . [.] [A] person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' [Cit.]" King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382-383 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). Accordingly, a law enforcement officer's act of merely approaching an individual, asking to see his identification, and posing to him a few questions is not a "seizure" and need not be justified by the existence of an articulable suspicion. McShan v. State, 155 Ga. App. 518 (1) ( 271 S.E.2d 659) (1980).

  8. Brock v. State

    196 Ga. App. 605 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 16 times

    This power extends to misdemeanor offenses. King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). The language of OCGA ยง 17-4-23 (a) that an officer "may arrest" for a traffic violation by means of a citation clearly is discretionary. For the convenience of the motoring public and the police, the Code section gives the officer the option of issuing a citation rather than going through the time-consuming ordeal of a custodial arrest.

  9. Smith v. State

    369 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1988)

    " [Cit.] As long as the person to whom questions are put remains free to disregard the questions and walk away, there has been no intrusion upon that person's liberty or privacy as would under the Constitution require some particularized and objective justification. Moreover, characterizing every street encounter between a citizen and the police as a "seizure," while not enhancing any interest secured by the Fourth Amendment, would impose wholly unrealistic restrictions upon a wide variety of legitimate law enforcement practices ... (A) person has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' [Cit.] On the facts before us, we conclude there was no unlawful detention during the brief encounter prior to the arrest of the [appellant]...." King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382, 382-383 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644) (1982). The evidence also clearly authorized a finding that appellant's statement to the officer was not the product of custodial interrogation.

  10. Robinson v. State

    358 S.E.2d 318 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)

    See Alexander v. State, 166 Ga. App. 233 (2), 234 ( 303 S.E.2d 773). On the contrary, the facts in the case sub judice indicate that the information was derived by Officer Boyles as a result of a routine inquiry concerning personal identification during a permissible police-citizen encounter. See King v. State, 161 Ga. App. 382 (1) ( 288 S.E.2d 644). Consequently, in the case sub judice, since defendant's statement regarding his Social Security number was not derived from coercive interrogation which was likely to reveal incriminating information, (see Loftin v. State, 180 Ga. App. 613 (5), 617 ( 349 S.E.2d 777), a fair question as to the voluntary nature of this information did not arise which required a hearing in accordance with Jackson v. Denno, supra.