Opinion
No. 461 C.D. 2014 No. 462 C.D. 2014 No. 534 C.D. 2014 No. 592 C.D. 2014 No. 716 C.D. 2014 No. 881 C.D. 2014
04-24-2015
Daniel King, Appellant v. Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association
BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge OPINION NOT REPORTED MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE LEADBETTER
Daniel King appeals from four orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, all originating with his 2008 action against Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association. In addition, King has filed a January 2015 motion with this Court, seeking a protective order against all discovery allowable under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Pa. R.C.P.) No. 3117. We affirm common pleas' orders and remand these consolidated matters to common pleas for yet another determination of the amount of attorney's fees due and owing to the Association. Further, we deny King's motion for protective order as moot.
This Court consolidated the above-captioned appeals in light of the similar issues raised.
On February 26, 2015, this Court entered an order in the pending case of King v. Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 74 C.D. 2015), which references the above-captioned docket numbers. The order provides as follows:
[F]ollowing argument on appellee's [Association's] motion to quash appeal and appellant's answer thereto, it is hereby ordered that the matter is stayed, by request and agreement of the parties, until this Court disposes of the matters docketed at 461, 462, 534, 592, and 716 C.D. 2014, or until further order of the Court lifting the stay following an application by a party.
The relevant background is as follows. In 2008, King filed an action against the Association seeking reimbursement of costs he incurred to replace and jack up a defective steel beam in his condominium unit. After a successful arbitration, King was awarded $3,577.93. Following a non-jury trial, however, common pleas entered a June 21, 2010 verdict/judgment in favor of the Association and against King in the amount of $8,500.17. King filed a July 2, 2010 motion for post-trial relief and common pleas sustained the Association's preliminary objection seeking to strike that motion as untimely filed. In response, King filed an August 2, 2010 petition for rule to show cause why common pleas should not reconsider its order striking his post-trial motion and permit him to file it nunc pro tunc. Following a hearing, common pleas denied King's petition based on his counsel's failure to file a timely entry of appearance and counsel's admission at the hearing that he received the court's courtesy copy of the verdict on June 22, 2010, thereby putting him on notice to check the docket entries for an actual filing date. In addition, common pleas noted that counsel never represented that King himself did not receive any notices of orders or judgments. King's first appeal to this Court followed.
In King v. Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association, 27 A.3d 276 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011), appeal denied, 50 A.3d 693 (Pa. 2012), ("King I"), this Court affirmed common pleas' order denying King's motion to reconsider the dismissal of the post-trial motion filed after the June 2010 verdict/judgment and further denied his request for permission to refile the post-trial motion nunc pro tunc. Noting that common pleas had discretion to consider an untimely motion for post-trial relief, we agreed that "[t]here was a combination of factors at work here which counsel for King had within his power to remedy, especially his failure to enter his appearance in a timely manner." Id. at 280. Accordingly, we affirmed and remanded the matter to common pleas for a determination of the amount of attorney's fees due and owing to the Association.
In Carlos R. Leffler, Inc. v. Hutter, 696 A.2d 157, 166 (Pa. Super. 1997), the Court held that, in situations where a party files an untimely post-trial motion and the other party objects, common pleas must consider the nature of the derelict party's default as well as the resulting prejudice to the objecting party.
Subsequently, in King v. Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 226 C.D. 2012, filed May 8, 2013), ("King II"), this Court affirmed common pleas' order dismissing King's petition to vacate and strike the June 2010 verdict/judgment. We concluded that King waived his challenge to the propriety of common pleas entering the verdict and the judgment on the same day due to his failure to raise it in a timely filed post-trial motion. In addition, we determined that King was barred by res judicata from relitigating the prothonotary's compliance with the notice requirement under Pa. R.C.P. No. 236(a)(2).
At this time, King requests that we vacate any judgments below and remand to common pleas for disposition of all outstanding motions. He asserts that common pleas could then enter a final appealable order. In support, he presents six issues for our review:
Is there a valid judgment entered in the court below that supports a writ of execution?King's Brief at 17.
Do the doctrines of waiver, res judicata or latches [sic] prevent the appellant from challenging the jurisdiction or authority of the trial court's judgments?
Was the February 21, 2014 proceeding a trial that required post[-]trial motions?
Was there a breakdown in the lower court's operating procedures?
On the date of its June 21, 2010 order[,] did the court have jurisdiction over appellant?
Did the Commonwealth Court twice affirm the judgments entered below?
Notwithstanding the irrelevancy of most of the above issues to the subject matter of the orders from which the appeals are taken, King's ultimate goal is to have the underlying judgment reopened. King, however, appealed only common pleas' September 3, 2010 refusal 1) to reconsider the dismissal of the post-trial motion; and 2) to permit him to refile it nunc pro tunc. He failed to appeal common pleas' July 28, 2010 dismissal of the post-trial motion raising the validity of the judgment. Accordingly, as we concluded in King I and reiterated in King II: "he 'waived any further challenge to the dismissal of his post-trial motion' due to his failure to appeal the dismissal." King II, slip op. at 8 (quoting King I, 27 A.3d at 277 n.2).
In 461, 462 and 534 C.D. 2014, King appeals from common pleas' February 21, 2014 order entering judgment in favor of the Association and against King in the amount of $30,179.54 for attorney's fees incurred by the Association from June 21, 2010 to February 21, 2014. In 592 C.D. 2014, he appeals from a March 5, 2014 order denying his "motion to strike that portion of the court's February 21, 2014 order which enters judgment before post-trial motions are due or could be filed." In 716 C.D. 2014, he appeals from a March 31, 2014 order denying his motion to correct record and strike judgment from judgment index. Finally, in 881 C.D. 2014, he appeals from a May 1, 2014 order granting the Association's petition to enforce sheriff's sale of motor vehicle. Supplemental Reproduced Record (S.R.R.) at 3b, 4b, 6b and 8b.
As common pleas observed in one of its supporting opinions:
[R]ecalling all of the appeals in this action from beginning to this stage of the litigation, as well as the massive compendium of issues and unrelated, irrelevant "filler" allegations submitted with each, the inescapable conclusion must be that the concerted purpose and focus for the entirety of this effort before every level of the court system of this Commonwealth has been first, last and always, to eviscerate a judgment that has repeatedly been concluded against the Plaintiff. Here again, the Court submits that all five of the Plaintiff's current appeals should be quashed due to [his] harassment and badgering of opposing counsel and the courts of this Commonwealth in hopes of achieving a different result because he lacks the legal professionalism to take no for an answer in a court of law.
King has also waived issues by virtue of his failure to comply with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Pa. R.A.P.) 1925(b)(3)(iv), providing that, the statement of errors complained of on appeal "should not be redundant or provide lengthy explanations as to any error." As we noted in King II, courts may determine that a litigant waived issues where he fails to file a "concise" statement. See Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. 2008) (waiver of issues where appellant made an incoherent, confusing, redundant, defamatory rant in a lengthy 5-page Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement); Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa. 2009) (waiver of issues where appellants attempted to overwhelm court by filing a sixteen-page Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b) statement with 76 paragraphs and exhibits). Here, the statement for 461 CD 2014, for example, is 18 pages and contains 51 paragraphs. S.R.R. at 9b-26b.
Moreover, King is barred by res judicata from challenging the June 2010 judgment and from relitigating the prothonotary's compliance with the notice requirement. As we held in King II, the judgment became final when the Supreme Court denied King's petition for allowance of appeal from this Court's decision in King I on August 22, 2012. In that regard, "[r]es judicata applies not only to issues, claims or defenses actually raised and litigated in the prior proceeding but also to those which could or should have been raised." King II, slip op. at 7 [citing Weney v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Mac Sprinkler Sys., Inc.), 960 A.2d 949 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).] We turn now to King's argument regarding subject-matter jurisdiction.
King argues that the June 2010 judgment is invalid because common pleas entered it before post-trial motions were due to be filed and acted on preliminary objections and post-trial motions after appeal divested it of jurisdiction. He maintains that, because the question of a court's jurisdiction is always open, the doctrines of waiver, res judicata and laches do not prevent him from challenging the validity of the judgment. In addition, he observes that subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised even after the Supreme Court denies allocatur. In support, he cites DeCoatsworth v. Jones, 639 A.2d 792, 796 (Pa. 1994). King's position is without merit.
In King II, King also maintained that he could attack the validity of a judgment at any time and, therefore, proceeded once again to attack common pleas' "June 2010 judgment, arguing that it [was] void and [had] no legal effect because it was entered before the filing of a post-trial motion." King II, slip op. at 5. As noted above, we rejected King's position, citing the Supreme Court's denial of allocatur. While it is true that subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised even after the Supreme Court denies allocatur and, therefore, after litigation nominally has been terminated, DeCoatsworth, 639 A.2d at 796, a litigant cannot continue to challenge a judgment in perpetuity where we already have addressed the issue. In that regard, the present appeals are distinguishable from DeCoatsworth because in DeCoatsworth, there had been no final judgment adjudicating the jurisdictional issue, so principles of claim and issue preclusion were not applicable.
Finally, we address the Association's request for attorney's fees. In view of King's persistence in pursuing multiple, groundless appeals, all stemming from the same 2008 action, we determine that such fees are warranted and, in fact, mandatory. Accordingly, we affirm common pleas' orders and remand these consolidated matters to common pleas for yet another determination of the amount of attorney's fees due and owing to the Association. Further, we deny King's motion for protective order as moot.
See Section 3315(a) of the Pennsylvania Uniform Condominium Act, providing, in pertinent part, that "[t]he association has a lien on a unit for any assessment levied against that unit or fines imposed against its unit owner from the time the assessment or fine becomes due[,]" and Section 3315(f), providing that, "[a] judgment or decree in any action or suit brought under this section shall include costs and reasonable attorney's fees for the prevailing party." 68 Pa. C.S. § 3315(a) and (f) (emphasis added). --------
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 24th day of April, 2015, the orders of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County are hereby AFFIRMED. We REMAND these matters to common pleas for a determination of attorney's fees due and owing to Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association. Further, we DENY Appellant's motion for protective order as moot.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
/s/_________
BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,
Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
I dissent. As noted, this Court's decision in King v. Riverwatch Condominium Owners Association, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 226 C.D. 2012, filed May 8, 2013), ("King II"), is one of the underlying predicates for the majority's opinion in this matter. Since I dissented in King II, I dissent for the same reasons stated in my prior dissent.
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
King v. Riverwatch Condo. Owners Ass'n, (C.C.P. Delaware County, No. 08-050227, filed July 15, 2014), slip op. at 6-7; Appendix to King's Brief at 163-64.