If, on the other hand, the deed reserves a fraction of the minerals under the land described, the deed reserves a fraction of the minerals under the entire physical tract, regardless of the part of the mineral estate actually conveyed. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946). In King, the grantor conveyed all of his undivided one-half interest in the described land.
See also Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So.2d 430, 4 A.L.R.2d 483. It is also well established that an interest or estate in land excepted from a grant is excluded from the grant and does not pass to the grantee. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262, 163 A.L.R. 1128; Reynolds v. McMan Oil Gas Co., Tex.Com.App., 11 S.W.2d 778, 781, motion for rehearing overruled, 14 S.W.2d 819; 14 Tex.Jur. 958, Deeds, sec. 175. There is no patent ambiguity in the Howard and Sharp deeds.
Graham v. Prochaska , 429 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (quoting Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. , 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956) ). "Property 'excepted' or 'reserved' under a deed is 'never included in the grant' and is 'something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant.' " Id. (quoting King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946) ). Therefore, "[r]eservations must be made by 'clear language,' and courts do not favor reservations by implication."
It will be remembered that in our paragraph 'NINTH', supra, the 1/64 royalty interest conveyed was 'to All of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced and saved from all of the above described Land and premises.' This interpretation of the contract is realistic when considered along with the statement from King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1946): '. . . since oil or other minerals would necessarily be produced from the whole land irrespective of the ownership of undivided shares thereof.' The Broussard-Middleton deed consistently uses the words 'above described', 'described', and 'description.'
Actually, we have said that any "reservation" must be "by clear language" and cannot be implied, and a reservation is a form of "exception" through which the grantor excludes for itself a portion of that which would otherwise fall within the deed's description of the interest granted. Perryman , 546 S.W.3d at 119 ; Sharp , 252 S.W.2d at 154 ; see alsoKing v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946) (explaining that reservations and exceptions both describe "something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant"). This rule does not address language that describes the interest granted, but language that excludes from the grant a portion of the interest described.
A deed conveys all it purports to convey less what is excepted. SeeCockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur , 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956) ; King v. First Nat'l Bank , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946). Here, the deeds granted, conveyed, and warranted all of the First Tract, including all of the surface, mineral, and royalty interests, less the excepted interests, and thus conveyed everything except 1/2 of the interest the grantors then owned.
Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986) (citing 1 Thompson on Real Property § 51 (1939)).SeeKing v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1946) ("looking forward from the granting clause and backward from the reservation clause it seems evident that the terms ‘following described land’, ‘hereinabove described land’, ‘said land’, and ‘premises', refer not to the one-half interest actually conveyed," but instead "refers to the entire land").The stakeholders, relying on Exhibit A referenced in the granting clause, assert "the leased premises" refers not to the total acreage of "all that certain land" but to the stakeholders' net mineral acreage.
First, in spite of their differences, we have confirmed that both a reservation and an exception are "deducted from the thing granted , narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant." King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946). Here, by subjecting the grant to both the "Reservation from Conveyance " and the "Exception from Conveyance and Warranty," the deed's language confirms that this rule applies.
First, in spite of their differences, we have confirmed that both a reservation and an exception are "deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant." King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 1946). Here, by subjecting the grant to both the "Reservation from Conveyance" and the "Exception from Conveyance and Warranty," the deed's language confirms that this rule applies.
The grantors by their Paragraph Ninth in the deed state that the royalty grant is 'An undivided one-sixty-fourth (1/64) royalty interest in and to All of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced and saved from All of the above described land and premises . . ..' We conclude under the Hooks rule that the grantors conveyed the one-sixth-fourth royalty to all of the lands described. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946); McElmurray v. McElmurray, 270 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Civ.App. 1954, writ ref'd); Spell v. Hanes, 139 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt. cor.).