King v. Natl. Bank of Wichita Falls

36 Citing cases

  1. Averyt v. Grande, Inc.

    717 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. 1986)   Cited 46 times
    Holding "that a ‘subject[-]to’ clause that excepts a fractional mineral interest conveyed does not form part of the description of the land."

    If, on the other hand, the deed reserves a fraction of the minerals under the land described, the deed reserves a fraction of the minerals under the entire physical tract, regardless of the part of the mineral estate actually conveyed. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946). In King, the grantor conveyed all of his undivided one-half interest in the described land.

  2. Pich v. Lankford

    157 Tex. 335 (Tex. 1957)   Cited 38 times
    Determining the former types of cases were not controlling when a grantor fails to convey part of the estate he owns through an exception

    See also Palmer v. Crews, 203 Miss. 806, 35 So.2d 430, 4 A.L.R.2d 483. It is also well established that an interest or estate in land excepted from a grant is excluded from the grant and does not pass to the grantee. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262, 163 A.L.R. 1128; Reynolds v. McMan Oil Gas Co., Tex.Com.App., 11 S.W.2d 778, 781, motion for rehearing overruled, 14 S.W.2d 819; 14 Tex.Jur. 958, Deeds, sec. 175. There is no patent ambiguity in the Howard and Sharp deeds.

  3. Combest v. Mustang Minerals, LLC

    502 S.W.3d 173 (Tex. App. 2016)   Cited 12 times

    Graham v. Prochaska , 429 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex.App.–San Antonio 2013, pet. denied) (quoting Cockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co. , 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956) ). "Property 'excepted' or 'reserved' under a deed is 'never included in the grant' and is 'something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant.' " Id. (quoting King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946) ). Therefore, "[r]eservations must be made by 'clear language,' and courts do not favor reservations by implication."

  4. Broussard v. Middleton

    496 S.W.2d 766 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973)   Cited 1 times

    It will be remembered that in our paragraph 'NINTH', supra, the 1/64 royalty interest conveyed was 'to All of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced and saved from all of the above described Land and premises.' This interpretation of the contract is realistic when considered along with the statement from King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 263 (1946): '. . . since oil or other minerals would necessarily be produced from the whole land irrespective of the ownership of undivided shares thereof.' The Broussard-Middleton deed consistently uses the words 'above described', 'described', and 'description.'

  5. Piranha Partners v. Neuhoff

    596 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. 2020)   Cited 91 times
    Holding that whether a contract is ambiguous is a preliminary matter that must be decided before an appellate court interprets the language of the contract

    Actually, we have said that any "reservation" must be "by clear language" and cannot be implied, and a reservation is a form of "exception" through which the grantor excludes for itself a portion of that which would otherwise fall within the deed's description of the interest granted. Perryman , 546 S.W.3d at 119 ; Sharp , 252 S.W.2d at 154 ; see alsoKing v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946) (explaining that reservations and exceptions both describe "something to be deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant"). This rule does not address language that describes the interest granted, but language that excludes from the grant a portion of the interest described.

  6. Perryman v. Spartan Tex. Six Capital Partners, Ltd.

    546 S.W.3d 110 (Tex. 2018)   Cited 66 times
    Holding that the court will not find a "reservation by implication"

    A deed conveys all it purports to convey less what is excepted. SeeCockrell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur , 157 Tex. 10, 299 S.W.2d 672, 675 (1956) ; King v. First Nat'l Bank , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946). Here, the deeds granted, conveyed, and warranted all of the First Tract, including all of the surface, mineral, and royalty interests, less the excepted interests, and thus conveyed everything except 1/2 of the interest the grantors then owned.

  7. Samson Exploration, LLC v. T.S. Reed Props., Inc.

    521 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2017)   Cited 96 times
    Holding parties’ acceptance of royalty payments on one well was not inconsistent with demand for royalty payments on that well and another

    Averyt v. Grande, Inc., 717 S.W.2d 891, 894 (Tex. 1986) (citing 1 Thompson on Real Property § 51 (1939)).SeeKing v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (1946) ("looking forward from the granting clause and backward from the reservation clause it seems evident that the terms ‘following described land’, ‘hereinabove described land’, ‘said land’, and ‘premises', refer not to the one-half interest actually conveyed," but instead "refers to the entire land").The stakeholders, relying on Exhibit A referenced in the granting clause, assert "the leased premises" refers not to the total acreage of "all that certain land" but to the stakeholders' net mineral acreage.

  8. Wenske v. Ealy

    521 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. 2017)   Cited 82 times
    Rejecting mechanical rules of construction, such as giving priority to certain clauses over others, or requiring the use of so-called "magic words"

    First, in spite of their differences, we have confirmed that both a reservation and an exception are "deducted from the thing granted , narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant." King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls , 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (1946). Here, by subjecting the grant to both the "Reservation from Conveyance " and the "Exception from Conveyance and Warranty," the deed's language confirms that this rule applies.

  9. Wenske v. Ealy

    No. 16-0353 (Tex. Jun. 23, 2017)

    First, in spite of their differences, we have confirmed that both a reservation and an exception are "deducted from the thing granted, narrowing and limiting what would otherwise pass by the general words of the grant." King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262 (Tex. 1946). Here, by subjecting the grant to both the "Reservation from Conveyance" and the "Exception from Conveyance and Warranty," the deed's language confirms that this rule applies.

  10. Middleton v. Broussard

    504 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. 1974)   Cited 15 times
    Holding that a conveyance of 1/64 royalty interest in minerals under "all of the above described land and premises" operated to convey 1/64 royalty interest from all lands described, not just the fractional interest conveyed

    The grantors by their Paragraph Ninth in the deed state that the royalty grant is 'An undivided one-sixty-fourth (1/64) royalty interest in and to All of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced and saved from All of the above described land and premises . . ..' We conclude under the Hooks rule that the grantors conveyed the one-sixth-fourth royalty to all of the lands described. King v. First National Bank of Wichita Falls, 144 Tex. 583, 192 S.W.2d 260 (1946); McElmurray v. McElmurray, 270 S.W.2d 880 (Tex.Civ.App. 1954, writ ref'd); Spell v. Hanes, 139 S.W.2d 229 (Tex.Civ.App. 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt. cor.).