Opinion
February 4, 1999
Appeal from the Supreme Court (Canfield, J.).
The parties were married in August 1989 and have two children, Ashley (born in 1991) and Stephanie (born in 1993). Plaintiff works for Albany International Corporation and defendant works for G.E. Plastics. From such employment, they each acquired pension and retirement benefits. The parties also had savings accounts, life insurance policies and various personal property. During their marriage, they purchased a home, incurred debt on various credit cards, obtained personal loans and became obligated to make periodic repayments on overpaid insurance proceeds.
The parties separated in July 1995 when defendant left the marital residence. Although he commenced voluntary payments of $150 per week in child support, plaintiff contends that she was forced to take a $4,000 loan against her retirement account to make payments on the mortgage, taxes, loans, credit cards and child care expenses. During this time, defendant withdrew approximately $4,800 in marital funds and cashed in a marital life insurance policy for the purpose of establishing his new residence and paying legal fees.
In May 1996, Family Court ordered defendant to pay $215 weekly for child support, moneys toward arrearages and the shared cost of child care. In December 1996, plaintiff commenced this action for divorce. Two weeks later, defendant filed for bankruptcy under chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (11 USC), listing as creditors various credit card companies to which marital debts were incurred and Chase Manhattan Bank as the mortgagee. Plaintiff was also listed as a codebtor. Plaintiff contends that defendant's action required her to file for bankruptcy in February 1997, notwithstanding her efforts subsequent to their separation to pay off over $19,000 toward their marital debt. After stipulating to all issues with respect to the custody of the children, the parties submitted the issues concerning their pensions, the reimbursement of marital debt and distribution of the tax dependency exemptions to Supreme Court.
Upon submission of the parties' Wage and Tax Statements (W-2 Forms) for 1996, plaintiff's wages were established at $34,451.93 whereas defendant's wages were $46,727.54. As of December 1996, plaintiff's pension and retirement savings account was valued at $38,322.07 whereas defendant's was valued at $21,110.33. Supreme Court determined that the parties' advances against their pensions and retirement accounts should be included in the valuation of their respective accounts and, after taking into consideration "the overall equities and background of this case, and considering the income of the plaintiff and the defendant and their respective future financial situations", that neither party was entitled to any interest in the other's pension or retirement account. With respect to plaintiff's payment of marital debt and her request for reimbursement, the court rejected defendant's contention that all the bills were paid with marital funds, concluding that plaintiff was entitled to a 50% reimbursement of certain mortgage expenses, real property taxes, insurance debt, household expenses, credit card payments and preschool expenses. Finally, Supreme Court determined that plaintiff was entitled to claim both children as tax dependency exemptions. Defendant appeals.
Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (c) provides, in part, for marital property to be distributed equitably between the parties "considering the circumstances of the case and of the respective parties". In making this determination, numerous factors must be considered, including the parties' incomes and property acquired during the marriage, the length of the marriage, their ages and health status, and tax consequences ( see, Domestic Relations Law § 236 [B] [5] [d]). In determining a distribution of pension benefits, it is beyond cavil that the benefits earned during a marriage constitute marital property ( see, Olivio v. Olivio, 82 N.Y.2d 202; Majauskas v. Majauskas, 61 N.Y.2d 481), subject to a discretionary distribution by the trial court which will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion ( see, Munson v. Munson, 250 A.D.2d 1004). Upon this basis, we find no error in the determination of Supreme Court which fully considered the duration of this marriage, the age and health of both parties, their income and respective future financial situations, and the lack of direct or indirect contributions made by each to the other's career.
Supreme Court's determination that plaintiff was entitled to a distributive award as partial reimbursement for payments she made on marital debts was properly grounded upon plaintiff's establishment of the use of her separate property, notwithstanding the later discharge of the debts through bankruptcy. As the total amount that she paid from the funds greatly exceeds the amount disbursed from the joint checking account, we decline to disturb the award. With respect to those amounts awarded in partial payment of the mortgage debt and real property taxes paid subsequent to the parties' separation and prior to the order of support, we again find no merit to defendant's contention that the tax benefits plaintiff will receive therefrom undermine the discretionary determination rendered ( see, Du Jack v. Du Jack, 243 A.D.2d 908; Hapeman v. Hapeman, 229 A.D.2d 807). Finally, in light of the support determination later incorporated into the parties' judgment of divorce, we find no error in the determination requiring the parties to share in the children's preschool expenses and, in the absence of plaintiff's written release, to allow plaintiff to claim both children as dependents for income tax purposes ( see, Gundlach v. Gundlach, 223 A.D.2d 942, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 802; Carpenter v. Carpenter, 202 A.D.2d 813).
Accordingly, the judgment of Supreme Court is affirmed in its entirety.
Mikoll, J. P., Mercure, Crew III and Yesawich Jr., JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.