RUDD, Circuit Judge. This cause is before the Court on petition for writ of certiorari based on an alleged conflict with the decisions in King v. King, 271 So.2d 159 (Fla.App.1st, 1973); Eaton v. Eaton, 238 So.2d 166 (Fla.App. 4th, 1970), and Perla v. Perla, 58 So.2d 689 (Fla. 1952). Pursuant to Fla. Const., art. V, § 3(b)(3), F.S.A., we have jurisdiction.
00 per month was a reasonable amount of child support based upon the evidence presented before him and after giving due consideration to the needs of the child and the extent of the parents' ability to meet these needs. See King v. King, 271 So.2d 159 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973). Therefore, the court did not abuse it's discretion in setting the amount of child support.
Such a judgment makes a mockery of both the "no-fault" dissolution law and of justice for male divorcees in general. My concern that leads to a separate opinion is the basic principle of law set forth in King v. King, 271 So.2d 159, at page 160 (Fla.App.1st 1973): "It is well-settled that matters of alimony, child support and other monetary considerations lie within the sound judicial discretion of the trial judge, based upon the evidence presented before him and due consideration of the needs of the recipients and the extent of the obligor's ability to meet these needs.
While the increase in earnings above that anticipated at the time of the entry of the order of modification after the husband retired may be temporary, it does indicate a change in circumstances to the extent that it shows the former husband had an ability to earn if he so desired. Under these circumstances, the small amount of increase is justified. See King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159. Affirmed.
It is the appellant's burden on this appeal challenging the alimony provisions of the judgment to clearly demonstrate that the trial court's findings and conclusions are incorrect and that the court abused his discretion by entry of the alimony awards. E.g., Linares v. Linares, Fla. App. 1974, 292 So.2d 63; Maroun v. Maroun, Fla.App. 1973, 277 So.2d 572; King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159; Fishman v. Fishman, Fla.App. 1971, 245 So.2d 258. Our review of the record convinces us that the trial judge's findings are supported by substantial competent evidence. The findings include a full description of the husband's financial situation.
The award of alimony is a factual question based upon the needs of the appellee and the ability of the appellant to pay. It appears the record sustains the trial court's award and that there was no abuse of judicial discretion. Mufson v. Mufson, Fla.App. 1971, 245 So.2d 110; King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159. The award to the appellee of her father's home would be sustainable under Walton v. Walton, Fla.App. 1974, 290 So.2d 110, wherein this court affirmed a similar type award.
We have reviewed the award with regard to the record and the advices of counsel. It is our conclusion from the appellate level that there has been no demonstration of an abuse of discretion so as to merit a reversal. Lang v. Lang, 280 So.2d 11 (3d D.C.A.Fla. 1973); Scott v. Scott, 285 So.2d 423 (2d D.C.A.Fla. 1973); Fishman v. Fishman, 245 So.2d 258 (3d D.C.A.Fla. 1971); see Doane v. Doane, 279 So.2d 46 (4th D.C.A.Fla. 1973); King v. King, 271 So.2d 159 (1st D.C.A.Fla. 1973); Swain v. Swain, 270 So.2d 747 (2d D.C.A.Fla. 1972); Ray v. Ray, 247 So.2d 473 (3d D.C.A.Fla. 1971). We are mindful that the wife has the right to apply for modification if there should be a change in the circumstances of the parties. Fla. Stat. 61.14, F.S.A., (1971); see Carmel v. Carmel, 282 So.2d 6 (3d D. C.A.Fla. 1973); Wilson v. Wilson, 279 So.2d 893 (4th D.C.A.Fla. 1973).
Alimony, if allowed, and support, when properly provided, must be in accord with the needs of the party receiving the alimony or support and must be measured against the standard of living maintained during the marriage and the needs after the dissolution. See Dash v. Dash, Fla.App. 1973, 284 So.2d 407; Christianson v. Christianson, Fla.App. 1973, 274 So.2d 562; King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159; Sharpe v. Sharpe, Fla. App. 1972, 267 So.2d 665; Royal v. Royal, Fla.App. 1972, 263 So.2d 277; Meltzer v. Meltzer, Fla.App. 1972, 262 So.2d 470. Accordingly, the final order appealed which is dated the sixth day of December, 1972 and is recorded in the circuit court official record book on the eighth day of December, 1972, is reversed.
Under these circumstances, we do not think that it can be said that the trial judge has abused the discretion granted him in such matters. See King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159. Since we find no reversible error under the assignments or the cross-assignments of error, the judgment is affirmed.
Affirmed. See Christianson v. Christianson, Fla.App. 1973, 274 So.2d 562; King v. King, Fla.App. 1973, 271 So.2d 159; Stamm v. Stamm, Fla.App. 1972, 266 So.2d 413; Gunter v. Gunter, Fla.App. 1969, 219 So.2d 743; Black v. Miller, Fla.App. 1969, 219 So.2d 106.