Opinion
22-07484 WHA
08-15-2024
AARON KING, Plaintiff, v. EQUIFAX INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC, EXPERIAN INFORMATION SOLUTIONS, INC., and TRANS UNION LLC, Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WILLIAM ALSUP UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
INTRODUCTION
In this FCRA action, plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b). For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is DENIED.
STATEMENT
Pro se plaintiff Aaron King filed suit in 2022 against four consumer reporting agencies (“CRAs”): Equifax Information Services, Experian Information Solutions, Trans Union, LLC, and LexisNexis Risk Solutions. A detailed account of events and claims lodged against each defendant are described in a previous order (Dkt. No. 65). Put briefly, plaintiff alleged that defendants included information of a different Aaron King (“Louisiana Aaron”) as part of plaintiff's consumer files maintained by each defendant. He attributes difficulties in applying for various government benefits, loans, and credit cards to these inaccuracies.
A previous order granted plaintiff leave to file his first amended complaint. In 2023, a subsequent order granted Equifax's motion to dismiss but also granted plaintiff leave to file a second amended complaint. In June 2023, plaintiff filed a second amended complaint which added new allegations, including that plaintiff had applied for credit but was denied, due in part to insufficient credit history, and that his file had been merged with that of another Aaron King (“Ohio Aaron”).
All four defendants opposed allowing plaintiff's second amended complaint. Having reviewed the second amended complaint, an order issued in November 2023 which found that all claims against Experian, Equifax, and LexisNexis were futile, and were therefore denied (Dkt. No. 68). Only a narrow set of claims against Trans Union survived defendants' motion to dismiss. Plaintiff then filed a third amended complaint against Trans Union only, which is currently the operative complaint. Since then, LexisNexis moved for entry of judgment, which was granted (Dkt. No. 80).
Plaintiff has now filed a motion for reconsideration under Rule 60(b) which is specifically directed at the previously dismissed claims against Equifax in the November 2023 order. Equifax has opposed the motion. This order follows full briefing and oral argument.
ANALYSIS
In this district, Civil Local Rule 7-9 permits the filing of motions for reconsideration only with respect to orders made prior to entry of final judgment.
Rule 60(b) permits reconsideration where one or more of the following is shown: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial; (3) fraud by the adverse party; and (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied; or (6) any other reason justifying relief. School Dist. 1J v. ACandS Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993).
Plaintiff raises five arguments as to why the November 2023 order should be set aside.
First, plaintiff argues that this Court assumed that the pleadings in his second amended complaint were the same as those in his first amended complaint. Plaintiff is mistaken. The November 2023 order did not rely on any allegations found in the first amended complaint in reaching its findings.
Second, plaintiff contests the November 2023 order's finding that his second amended complaint did not plausibly plead inaccurate reporting by Equifax, and now argues that this Court has overlooked his “concrete” injury to support Article III standing. Here, plaintiff fails to identify a new piece of evidence or fact to support a different finding with respect to plausibly pleading inaccurate reporting. Instead, plaintiff attempts to rehash the contents of the credit denial letter from Discover dated March 2020.
For context, the November 2023 order found that the second amended complaint did not make a prima facie showing of inaccurate reporting because plaintiff's allegations made an inferential leap between the denial of a credit application and inaccurate reporting. With respect to Equifax, plaintiff conceded that his identifiers of name, date of birth, social security number, and address were all correct (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 361). He nonetheless alleged that because his credit application at Discovery Bank had been denied, in part due to “insufficient identity verification” it must have been because Equifax disclosed inaccurate information to Discovery Bank. The November 2023 order, however, found that one isolated element of a denial element “does not plausibly establish inaccurate reporting here” (Dkt. No. 68). In the instant motion, plaintiff has presented nothing to change this conclusion.
Moreover, plaintiff also misses the mark because he confuses the role of Article III standing with his burden to plausibly plead claims for relief. The dismissal of plaintiff's claims against Equifax was based on his inability to plausibly plead inaccurate reporting, not his inability to demonstrate Article III standing.
Third, plaintiff now argues that he has demonstrated a “concrete” injury to support Article III standing because he was defamed by Equifax when Equifax allegedly gave an “incorrect assessment of the Plaintiff's credit character to Discover Bank” (Second Amd. Compl. ¶ 362). As stated above, plaintiff's ability to demonstrate Article III standing does not replace or satisfy his burden to plausibly plead claims of relief. Insofar as plaintiff is also attempting to resurrect his defamation claim against Equifax, this too fails. As stated in the November 2023 order, given that plaintiff's defamation claims were based on Equifax's alleged FCRA violations, which were dismissed, and “no discernible independent basis exists in the complaint,” plaintiff's amendment to add a defamation claim must also be denied.
Fourth, plaintiff argues that the November 2023 order improperly dismissed his claims against Equifax because that order improperly focused one of the reasons cited by Discovery Bank in its decision to deny plaintiff's application. In effect, plaintiff attempts to salvage his FCRA claim against Equifax. But plaintiff still has not provided any argument to support a plausible inference that Discovery Bank's denial was the result of inaccurate reporting by Equifax.
Fifth, plaintiff points to a misstatement in the November 2023 order which was corrected in the sentence immediately following it. The November 2023 order stated that plaintiff's second amended complaint alleged that the “Equifax data as provided to Discovery bank contained no inaccuracies” (Dkt. No. 68 at 5). In the next sentence, however, the November 2023 order correctly characterized plaintiff's allegation that “Equifax disclosed inaccurate information” to Discovery Bank” (ibid.). This order finds that plaintiff's attempt to throw out the entire November 2023 order unconvincing and certainly does not reach the high burden of Rule 60(b).
At its core, plaintiff is confusing the role of Article III standing with his burden to meet the Twombly/Iqbal standard in plausibly pleading claims for relief. And to be clear, plaintiff has not brought forth any new evidence or even attempted to cure the lack of factual allegations which led to the dismissal of his FCRA claims against Equifax in the first place.
CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. Only a narrow set of claims remain in this action, which are contained in the third amended complaint against Trans Union only.
IT IS SO ORDERED.