King v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.

3 Citing cases

  1. Davis ex rel. Davis v. CMS Continental Natural Gas, Inc.

    2001 OK 33 (Okla. 2001)   Cited 22 times
    Explaining the statutory comparative negligence scheme authorized party who was not more than fifty percent negligent to recover a percentage of damages sustained

    ];Merritt v. Shuttle, Inc., 13 F. Supp.2d 371, 386 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) [Workers' compensation statute covering negligent acts could not be circumvented absent allegations of deliberate intent to injure.]; King v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 763 F. Supp. 1014-15 (W.D.Ark. 1991) [Applying Arkansas law, where compensation act covered "accidental" injuries, tort action would lie only where there was a showing of actual, specific and deliberate intent by employer to injure employee.]; McGreevy v. Racal-Dana Instruments, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 468, 472 (E.D.Va. 1988) [Applying Virginia law, intentional intent to induce emotional distress outside parameters of "accident" within workers' compensation statute.

  2. Estate of Underwood v. Natl. Credit Union

    665 A.2d 621 (D.C. 1995)   Cited 51 times
    Holding that intentional infliction of emotional distress claim premised entirely on claims of sexual harassment fell outside the scope of the Worker's Compensation Act because “sexual harassment is not a risk involved in or incidental to employment”

    ")See King v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (W.D.Ark. 1991) ("claims of sexual harassment fall outside the purpose and intent of the workers' compensation law [because] sexual harassment . . . cannot be recognized as a risk inherent in any work environment."); Harrison v. Edison Bros. Apparel Stores, 724 F. Supp. 1185, 1191 (M.D.N.C. 1989) (alleged injuries of "severe mental and emotional distress" resulting from sexual harassment are not a "natural risk" of employment and are not covered by the exclusivity provisions of the North Carolina WCA), aff'd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 530 (4th Cir. 1991); Byrd v. Richardson-Greenshields Sec., Inc., 552 So.2d 1099, 1104 n. 7 (Fla. 1989) (concluding that "as a matter of public policy, sexual harassment should not and cannot be recognized as a 'risk' inherent in any work environment."); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C. App. 483, 340 S.E.2d 116, 124 (1986) ("Sexual harassment is not a risk to which an employee is exposed because of the nature of the employment . . . [and,

  3. Phillips v. Ark. St. Hwy. Trans. D

    916 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. Ct. App. 1996)   Cited 4 times
    In Phillips v. Arkansas State Hwy. Transp. Dep't, 916 S.W.2d 128 (Ark. App. 1996), the claimant, a state employee, alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed her, causing her to suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome.

    The United States District Court for the Western District of Arkansas addressed the issue applying Arkansas law and stated that it believed that the Arkansas courts would hold that sexual harassment does not fall within the purpose and intent of the workers' compensation law. King v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1014, 1017 (W.D. Ark. 1991). Despite the well-reasoned opinion in King, supra, we find that Arkansas Workers' Compensation statutes do not exclude sexual harassment claims.[2, 3] Arkansas Workers' Compensation laws provide a remedy to workers injured or killed from an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of employment.