Since Melbourne, both the supreme court and this court have acknowledged and upheld the trial court's broad discretion in ruling on the exercise of peremptory challenges. See Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1337 (1998); cert. denied, 118 S.Ct. 1582 (1998); State v. Holiday, 682 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1996); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Anderson v. State, 711 So.2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Harrison v. Emanuel, 694 So.2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Nelson v. State, 688 So.2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Where we have reversed a trial court's decision, the trial court's assessment of credibility was severely compromised by an inaccurate recollection of thequestioning during voir dire. See Brown v. State, 733 So.2d 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Michelin N. America, Inc. v. Lovett, 731 So.2d 736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); Georges v. State, 723 So.2d 399 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999).
The trial court's assessment of the credibility of the state's explanation for the strike should be "affirmed on appeal unless clearly erroneous." Melbourne v. State, 679 So.2d 759, 764-65 (Fla. 1996); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 833-34 (Fla.4th DCA 1998). Although the state accepted venire person Sapia as a juror despite the fact that her husband had been arrested, the prosecutor explained that he had not stricken the juror because of her prior jury experience and his desire to seat a jury without calling to the jury pool for additional jurors. To seat a jury was a concern of the parties at trial, since the state withdrew a challenge to a juror to seat an alternate with the agreement of all the attorneys. The trial court's ruling in this case turned on "credibility determinations which encompass the assessment of all the circumstances and dynamics of the trial setting."
We are not prepared to state that all information contained in any public document is "generally known" within the meaning of the rule. King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 835 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (emphasis supplied). Therefore, because in my opinion the definition of "generally known" is not narrowly drawn, I would reject the proposed definition of "generally known."
); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding the trial court's determination of genuineness must be respected because it was able to "see the expressions, hear the tones of voices, [and] observe the general dynamics of the courtroom.").
See Dabbs v. State, 330 So.3d 50, 54 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021) ("Because the trial court conducted a proper genuineness inquiry, we must give appropriate deference to its determination."); Hialeah Hosp., Inc. v. Hayes-Boursiquot, 316 So.3d 754, 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (affirming and finding the trial court properly exercised its discretion in sustaining a Melbourne challenge as "there is sufficient record evidence to support the trial court's credibility assessments such that they may not be disturbed under the clearly-erroneous standard."); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding the trial court's determination of genuineness must be respected because it was able to "see the expressions, hear the tones of voices, [and] observe the general dynamics of the courtroom."). Affirmed.
SeeCobb , 825 So. 2d at 1085–86. Because the trial court conducted a proper genuineness inquiry, we must give appropriate deference to its determination. Seeid. at 1086 ; see alsoKing v. Byrd , 716 So. 2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that the trial court's determination of genuineness must be respected because it was able to "see the expressions, hear the tones of voices, [and] observe the general dynamics of the courtroom"). Disqualification of Trial Judge
As the supreme court stated in Files, "we must rely on the superior vantage point of the trial judge, who is present, can consider the demeanor of those involved, and get a feel for what is going on in the jury selection process." 613 So.2d at 1305; see also King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("As appellate judges, we are not at the trial. We did not see the expressions, hear the tones of voices, or observe the general dynamics of the courtroom.
Those are race-neutral reasons for the challenge. See King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (holding as a race-neutral explanation supporting peremptory strike defendant's argument that juror, an African-American woman, was a single mother with two small children who might identify with the plaintiff) (citation omitted), rev. den., 779 So.2d 271 (Fla. 2000); Johnson v. State, 706 So.2d 401, 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (holding that juror's job as a bank teller provided a race-neutral explanation sufficient to sustain the peremptory strike). The court, rejecting Siprien's argument that the state's explanation was pretextual and finding it to be genuine, satisfied the third step by sustaining the strike.
679 So.2d at 765. See Symonette v. State, 26 Fla. L. Weekly D588, D589-90 (Fla. 3d DCA Feb. 28, 2001) (under Melbourne, the Florida Supreme Court has redefined the appellate court's role and "determined that the primary responsibility for deterring discrimination in the jury selection process would rest with Florida's trial judges"); Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 41 (Fla. 2000) (Court would not, "on a cold record, second-guess" how the venireperson responded to questions; "[t]his is exactly the type of credibility assessment that must be made by the trial court and, on this record, we cannot say that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous"); Young v. State, 744 So.2d 1077, 1082 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (providing history of evolution in the law on peremptory challenges; trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on peremptory challenges); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831, 834 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) ("As appellate judges, we are not at the trial. We did not see the expressions, hear the tones of voices, or observe the general dynamics of the courtroom.
"Since Melbourne, both the supreme court and this court have acknowledged and upheld the trial court's broad discretion in ruling on the exercise of peremptory challenges. See Franqui v. State, 699 So.2d 1332 (Fla. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1040 and 523 U.S. 1097 (1998); State v. Holiday, 682 So.2d 1092 (Fla. 1996); King v. Byrd, 716 So.2d 831 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Anderson v. State, 711 So.2d 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Harrison v. Emanuel, 694 So.2d 759 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Nelson v. State, 688 So.2d 971 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Where we have reversed a trial court's decision, the trial court's assessment of credibility was severely compromised by an inaccurate recollection of the questioning during voir dire."