King v. Aramark Servs.

30 Citing cases

  1. Troeger v. Jetblue Airways Corp.

    23-CV-10859 (JPO) (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024)

    However, the “continuing violation doctrine” makes actionable “specific and related instances of discrimination [that] are permitted by the employer to continue unremedied for so long as to amount to a discriminatory policy or practice.” King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 708, 713 (2d Cir. 1996)).

  2. Olivieri v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co.

    112 F.4th 74 (2d Cir. 2024)   Cited 2 times

    It is this "constellation of events" that gives rise to a hostile work environment claim. King v. Aramark Services, Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 560 (2d Cir. 2024). As a result, the continuing violation doctrine provides that such claims do not accrue—and the statute of limitations period does not begin to run—"until the last discriminatory act in furtherance of" the hostile work environment.

  3. Morris v. NYS Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

    1:23-CV-89 (LEK/ML) (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 20, 2024)

    National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002). “Because a discrete discriminatory act is individually actionable and ‘occurs' on the day it ‘happened,' the 300-day limitations period begins running on the day of each occurrence, meaning each discrete act claim carries its own 300-day limitations period.” King v. Aramark Services Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559 (2d Cir. 2024). a. Failure to Promote

  4. Stinson v. Morningstar Credit Ratings, LLC

    1:22-cv-06164 (JLR) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024)   Cited 4 times

    “Because a discrete discriminatory act is individually actionable and ‘occurs' on the day that it ‘happened,' the 300-day limitations period begins running on the day of each occurrence, meaning each discrete act claim carries its own 300-day limitations period.” King v. Aramark Servs., Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559 (2d Cir. 2024) (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 110 (2002)). “Claims concerning discrete acts outside this window will be time barred,” Buon v. Spindler, 65 F.4th 64, 77 (2d Cir. 2023), but untimely events may be used “as background evidence in support of a timely claim,” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113.

  5. Ortiz v. Univ. of Conn.

    CIVIL 3:24-CV-00350 (JCH) (D. Conn. Nov. 22, 2024)

    Ms. Ortiz need not prove that the individuals to whom she compares herself were identical to her in all aspects. See King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 563 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[W]e [have] made it clear that this rule does not require a precise identicality between comparators and the plaintiff.” (quoting Matusick v. Erie County Water Auth., 757 F.3d 31,54 (2d Cir. 2014)).

  6. Gandhi v. N.Y. State Unified Court Sys.

    1:20-cv-00120 (AMN/DJS) (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2024)

    For purposes of summary judgment, the Court (Kahn, J.) analyzed Plaintiff's Title VII claim under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). Because this analysis was performed without the benefit of the Second Circuit's subsequent decisions in Bart v. Golub Corp., 96 F.4th 566, 575 (2d Cir. 2024) (“We take this opportunity to demystify the third-stage burden under McDonnell Douglas, which has admittedly not always been articulated in our case with the utmost clarity[.]”) and King v. Aramark Services Inc., 96 F.4th 546 (2d Cir. 2024), on July 11, 2024, the Court directed the parties, pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to file supplemental briefing addressing the issue and to file any necessary motion papers in compliance with Rules 7.1 and 56.1 of the Local Rules of the Northern District of New York.

  7. Mitchel v. Planned Parenthood of Greater N.Y., Inc.

    1:23-cv-01932 (JLR) (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 16, 2024)   Cited 3 times

    A plaintiff “must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days or, in states like New York that have local administrative mechanisms for pursuing discrimination claims, 300 days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred.” King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559 (2d Cir. 2024) (brackets, quotation marks, and citation omitted) (Title VII); accord Holowecki, 440 F.3d at 562 & n.1 (ADEA); Purcell v. N.Y. Inst. of Tech. - Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 931 F.3d 59, 63 n.16 (2d Cir. 2019) (

  8. Dagenais v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P.

    3:23-cv-241 (SVN) (D. Conn. Jul. 23, 2024)   Cited 1 times

    Hostile work environment claims, however, are not analyzed under the familiar burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See King v. Aramark Servs. Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 559-63 (2d Cir. 2024); see also Ferrando-Dehtiar v. Anesthesia Grp. of Albany, P.C., No. 1:20-cv-01373 (AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 1345345, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2024) (collecting cases).

  9. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co. v. Mayzenberg

    No. 22-2537 (2d Cir. Nov. 12, 2024)

    In light of H &H, New Wave Massage, and Harvey, there's a persuasive argument that the district court should not have entered declaratory judgment for GEICO-especially because New Wave Massage is a decision from the First Department of the Appellate Division. See King v. Aramark Services, Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 558 (2d Cir. 2024) ("Absent persuasive evidence that the New York Court of Appeals would reach a different conclusion, we are bound to apply [the statute] as interpreted by the First Department.").

  10. McNeal v. City of Blue Ash

    117 F.4th 887 (6th Cir. 2024)   Cited 5 times
    Applying the Muldrow standard to an ADEA claim

    Our sister circuits have reached similar conclusions. See King v. Aramark Services, Inc., 96 F.4th 546, 560 (2d Cir. 2024) (holding that "the same discrete act" can "support both" an individual adverse-employment-action claim and a hostile-work-environment claim); Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 223 (4th Cir. 2016) ("So long as the act is part of the pattern of discriminatory treatment against the employee," it may be included in a hostile-work-environment claim, "even if the act would otherwise qualify as a discrete act that is independently actionable."); Baird v. Gotbaum, 662 F.3d 1246, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (finding "no authority for the idea that particular acts cannot as a matter of law simultaneously" be independently actionable and support a hostile-work-environment claim); Chambless v. La.-Pac. Corp., 481 F.3d 1345, 1350 (11th Cir. 2007) (an independently-actionable discrete act may be considered as part of a hostile-work-environment claim "[w]here the discrete act is sufficiently related" to the alleged environment of harassment); but see Porter v. Cal. Dep't of Corr., 419 F