King Estate Winery v. Department of Revenue

16 Citing cases

  1. Farmers Direct, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue

    TC 5328 (Or. T.C. Sep. 6, 2023)

    In King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or. 414, 988 P.2d 369 (1999), the Oregon Supreme Court construed the predecessor of paragraph (d) of ORS 307.394(1), as well as the term "[f]arm machinery and equipment," which appears in both paragraphs (d) and (a).Accordingly

  2. Dinsdale v. Marion County Assessor

    TC-MD 110891N (Or. T.C. Apr. 13, 2012)

    However, the Oregon Supreme Court in King Estate Winery Inc. v. Dept. of Rev (King Estate) has defined it as “machinery and equipment used to cultivate farm land or to raise animals.” 329 Or. 414, 419, 988 P.2d 369 (1999). The court stated that the exemption is allowed for machinery and equipment “used primarily in the natural progression of crop cultivation, ” which includes “the preparation of land, planting, raising, cultivating, irrigating, harvesting or placing in storage of farm crops.”

  3. Hansen v. Morrow Cnty. Assessor

    TC-MD 220032G (Or. T.C. Dec. 19, 2022)

    It is also possible that farm modifies only machinery, but not equipment. That was the view of the dissent in King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue, 329 Or. 414, 424-26, 988 P.2d 369 (1999) (Riggs, J., dissenting): "The failure to insert the word 'farm' before 'equipment' evinces a legislative intent for a broader exemption than the majority contemplates." That interpretation appears less likely when it is considered that "machinery and equipment" is a phrase commonly used in property assessment.

  4. Farmers Direct, Inc. v. Yamhill Cnty. Assessor

    TC-MD 160389R (Or. T.C. Mar. 20, 2018)

    The Oregon Supreme Court clarified that ORS 307.394's "list of uses does not include the processing of farm crops; neither does it include the sale of farm crops or the sale of processed farm crops." King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or. 414, 419-420, 988 P.2d 369 (1999). "Processing" is defined in OAR 150-307-0460(1)(b): "altering the crop in any way such as: washing, icing, sorting, grading, waxing, boxing, slicing, or cutting."

  5. Pollock & Sons, Inc. v. Umatilla Cnty. Assessor

    TC-MD 120842N (Or. T.C. Jul. 18, 2013)

    ]" The Oregon Supreme Court in King Estate Winery Inc. v. Dept. of Rev (King Estate) held that "farm machinery and equipment" is "machinery and equipment used to cultivate farm land or to raise animals." 329 Or 414, 419, 988 P2d 369 (1999). The Court in King Estate held that only farm machinery and equipment used for activities that "pertain to cultivating crops on land * * *" were meant to be included under ORS 307.394 and found "no legislative intent to include machinery and equipment used in fruit processing and fruit-product selling as part of the definition of 'farm machinery and equipment.' "Id. at 421.

  6. Pollock and Sons, Inc. v. Umatilla County Assessor

    TC-MD 120842N (Or. T.C. Jul. 18, 2013)

    The Oregon Supreme Court in King Estate Winery Inc. v. Dept. of Rev (King Estate) held that “farm machinery and equipment” is “machinery and equipment used to cultivate farm land or to raise animals.” 329 Or. 414, 419, 988 P.2d 369 (1999). The Court in King Estate held that only farm machinery and equipment used for activities that “pertain to cultivating crops on land * * *” were meant to be included under ORS 307.394 and found “no legislative intent to include machinery and equipment used in fruit processing and fruit-product selling as part of the definition of ‘farm machinery and equipment.'

  7. Reynolds v. Concordia Univ., St. Paul

    21-cv-2560 (ECT/DTS) (D. Minn. May. 3, 2022)

    (“Ordinarily, when the legislature includes an express provision in one statute, but omits such a provision in another statute, it may be inferred that such an omission was deliberate.”); King Est. Winery, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 988 P.2d 369, 373 (Or. 1999) (“If the legislature had intended to include machinery and equipment used to process fruit and to sell the fruit product, it easily could have included those uses in subparagraph (a), as it did in subparagraph (b) for dairy products.”).

  8. Bert Brundige, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue

    368 Or. 1 (Or. 2021)   Cited 2 times

    The legislature could reasonably choose to include logging road work among the activities that can be regulated under the FPA without also choosing to grant tax exemptions for all equipment used in logging road work. See King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev. , 329 Or. 414, 421-22, 988 P.2d 369 (1999) (rejecting taxpayer's argument that, because using land as a winery constitutes a "farm use" for purposes of certain land use statutes, equipment used to make and sell wine qualified as "farm machinery and equipment" for the purposes of a tax exemption statute). Plaintiff makes a third and final argument to support its claim that subparagraph (2)(b)(A) should be read broadly to cover all equipment used in logging road work.

  9. AAA Or./Idaho Auto Source, LLC v. State

    363 Or. 411 (Or. 2018)   Cited 7 times
    Stating that, when interpreting the text of a constitutional provision imported from a previous version of the provision, this court's task is to determine the intent underlying the previous version

    The fact that paragraph (1)(a) of Article IX, section 3a, refers to taxes levied on sales, but paragraph (1)(b) does not, indicates that paragraph (1)(b) does not include taxes levied on sales. See generally Springfield Utility Board v. Emerald PUD , 339 Or. 631, 642, 125 P.3d 740 (2005) (generally, when a term is used in one provision and excluded from another, courts assume that exclusion was purposeful and meant to indicate a distinction between the two provisions); Perlenfein and Perlenfein , 316 Or. 16, 22, 848 P.2d 604 (1993) (when a legislature or agency uses a particular term in one provision of a statute or regulation, but omits that same term in a parallel and related provision, this court infers that the enacting or promulgating body did not intend that the term apply in the provision from which the term is omitted); see also King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev. , 329 Or. 414, 422, 988 P.2d 369 (1999) (in statute exempting certain categories of farm machinery from ad valorem taxation, the legislature's reference to machines for processing and selling farm products in the subsection relating to animal farming, but not in the subsection relating to crop farming, indicated that the legislature did not intend to exempt machines for processing and selling crops); Hughes v. State of Oregon , 314 Or. 1, 28, 838 P.2d 1018 (1992) (statute that referred to past and present retirement benefits did not apply to future retirement benefits, given that drafters "knew how to refer to the future," as evidenced by their reference to future taxes). In other words, the text of Article IX, section 3a, shows that the drafters knew how to refer to taxes levied on, or measured by, sales, and they did so in paragraph (1)(a), with respect to motor vehicle fuels, but not in paragraph (1)(b), with respect to motor vehicles.

  10. State v. Tate

    220 P.3d 1176 (Or. 2009)   Cited 2 times

    Indeed, the legislature expressly stated that "`[s]taff member' means * * * [a] corrections officer as defined in ORS 181.610," ORS 163.208(4)(b) (emphasis added), but it did not similarly provide that the term "corrections officer," as used in ORS 163.208(1), should be so defined. That indicates — if it indicates anything at all — that the legislature did not intend corrections officer, as used in ORS 163.208( 1), to be defined by ORS 181.610. See King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev., 329 Or 414, 422, 988 P2d 369 (1999) ("[U]se of a term in one section and not in another section of the same statute indicates a purposeful omission."). The legislature did not use "identical terms" in two separate provisions of ORS 163.208, as defendant argues.