Aside from his ex post facto claims, Conley argues that, when the language in a trial court's sentencing order revokes parole eligibility without the lawful authority to do so, the parole board may disregard that portion of a sentencing order as mere surplusage. See Brown, 731 So.2d at 598–99 ; Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss.1998) ; Temple v. State, 671 So.2d 58, 59 (Miss.1996) ; Cain v. State, 337 So.2d 935, 936 (Miss.1976). However, Conley misinterprets the Court's holdings in the above referenced cases.
¶ 15. A valid guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects to an indictment. Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (¶ 19) (Miss. 1998). It does not waive the failure to charge a criminal offense or subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at (¶ 20).
The same robbery cannot be used for a separate conviction for which a separate sentence is imposed. Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (Miss. 1998). For that robbery a defendant would have been given two convictions. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to twice be put in jeopardy" is what the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution specifically prohibits.
Our law is well settled in that "[a] valid guilty plea . . . admits all elements of a formal charge and operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects contained in an indictment [or information] against a defendant." Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (¶ 19) (Miss. 1998) (quoting Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153, 1156 (Miss. 1992)).
¶6. Aside from his ex post facto claims, Conley argues that, when the language in a trial court's sentencing order revokes parole eligibility without the lawful authority to do so, the parole board may disregard that portion of a sentencing order as mere surplusage. See Brown, 731 So. 2d at 598-99; Kincaid v. State, 711 So. 2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1998); Temple v. State, 671 So. 2d 58, 59 (Miss. 1996); Cain v. State, 337 So. 2d 935, 936 (Miss. 1976). However, Conley misinterprets the Court's holdings in the above referenced cases.
We have, on many occasions, upheld cases where amendments have been made to indictments to change the date of the offense charged. See, e.g.,Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (Miss. 1998); Eakes v.State, 665 So.2d 852, 860 (Miss. 1995); Baine v. State, 604 So.2d 258, 260-61 (Miss.
Cain v.State, 337 So.2d 935, 936 (Miss. 1976). See alsoKincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1998); Gardnerv. State, 514 So.2d 292, 294 (Miss.
Pinkney was allowed to plead guilty to murder (less than capital) and burglary in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty. See Kincaidv. State, 711 So. 2d 873, 877 (¶18) (Miss. 1998) (holding that there was no double-jeopardy violation by sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment for simple murder and an additional forty years for armed robbery). Pinkney was not subjected to double jeopardy.
Pinkney was allowed to plead guilty to murder (less than capital) and burglary in exchange for the State not seeking the death penalty. See Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (¶ 18) (Miss.1998) (holding that there was no double-jeopardy violation by sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment for simple murder and an additional forty years for armed robbery). Pinkney was not subjected to double jeopardy.
“The only exceptions to this waiver are if the indictment fails to charge an essential element of the crime or the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.” Whatley v. State, 123 So.3d 461, 467 (¶ 14) (Miss.Ct.App.2013) (citing Kincaid v. State, 711 So.2d 873, 877 (¶ 20) (Miss.1998)). It is clear from the record that these exceptions do not apply in the present case. Williams also argues that he was denied bail and his right to a speedy trial.