The majority of our sister courts agree with us, expressly stating that “[a]n attack of the data underlying an expert's opinion is beyond the scope of a section 74.351 challenge[,]” Peterson Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. O'Connell, 387 S.W.3d 889, 896 (Tex.App–San Antonio 2012, pet. denied), and that it is improper to consider the “quality of the evidence the experts used as the basis for their factual assumptions.” Quinones v. Pin, 298 S.W.3d 806, 813 (Tex.App.–Dallas 2009, no pet.); see alsoPisharodi v. Saldana, No. 13–09–00552–CV, 2011 WL 319810, at *3 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi Jan. 27, 2011, pet. denied)(mem.op.); Gannon v. Wyche, 321 S.W.3d 881, 891 n. 5 (Tex.App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied); Mettauer v. Noble, 326 S.W.3d 685, 690–92 (Tex.App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.); Collini v. Pustejovsky, 280 S.W.3d 456, 462 n. 4 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2009, no pet.); Kincaid v. Austin Ctr. for Outpatient Surgery, L.P., No. 03–04–00824–CV, 2005 WL 2978602, at *5 (Tex.App.–Austin Nov. 4, 2005, no. pet)(mem.op.).Appellants' points on apparent conflicts between the medical records and the assumptions Dr. Nolan makes are well-taken. But “[w]hether an expert's opinions are correct is an issue for summary judgment, not a motion to dismiss under Chapter 74.” Tenet Hospitals, Ltd. v. Boada, 304 S.W.3d 528, 542 (Tex.App.–El Paso 2009, pet. denied).

To arrive at her opinion, however, Nurse Fay necessarily had to do something she is prohibited by law from doing; that is, make a medical diagnosis concerning Tippett's condition. See Kincaid v. Austin Ctr. for Outpatient Surgery, L.P., No. 03-04-00824-CV, 2005 WL 2978602, *2 (Tex.App.-Austin Nov. 4, 2005, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Costello, 141 S.W.3d at 248-49. Because Nurse Fay is expressly prohibited from acts of medical diagnosis, we hold Fay is unqualified to give an opinion on the medical cause of Tippett's injuries in this case.