Kinard v. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp.

6 Citing cases

  1. Dykeman v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg

    381 S.C. 333 (S.C. 2009)   Cited 5 times
    Stating payment of the mortgage is the first step in the mortgage satisfaction process set forth in section 29-3-310

    We recognize, however, that in some circumstances, the mortgagee may enlist the closing attorney to accomplish the task of ensuring that the mortgage satisfaction is properly entered. See Kinardv. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp., 319 S.C. 408, 410, 461 S.E.2d 833, 834 (Ct.App. 1995). Wells Fargo did not record the mortgage satisfaction until July 16, 2002, by filing a lost mortgage satisfaction with the Beaufort County Register of Deeds. The record discloses that the Dykemans' closing attorney wrote Wells Fargo about a month earlier on June 27, 2002, specifically citing to sections 29-3-310 and 320 and noting that Wells Fargo "may already be liable for the statutory penalty."

  2. Bostic v. American Home

    650 S.E.2d 479 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 3 times
    In Bostic, the Court of Appeals interpreted sections 29-3-310 and 320 to determine what constitutes a "request," sufficient to render the mortgagee statutorily liable.

    In his motion for summary judgment and in his brief, Bostic cites several cases from this court that he believes are significant because they discuss sections 29-3-310 and 29-3-320. See Rowell v. Whisnant, 360 S.C. 181, 186-87, 600 S.E.2d 96, 99 (Ct.App. 2004) (discussing section 29-3-310 and finding creditor was not required to satisfy note and mortgage until debtor paid appropriate amount of attorney's fees due under the note); Swindler v.Swindler, 355 S.C. 245, 254-55, 584 S.E.2d 438, 443 (Ct.App. 2003) (applying Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code to note secured by a mortgage on real property and remanding with instructions to enter satisfaction of the mortgage in accordance with section 29-3-310); Kinardv. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp., 319 S.C. 408, 412-13, 461 S.E.2d 833, 835-36 (Ct.App. 1995) (holding mortgagor's remittal of recording fees constituted "tender of the fees of office for entering satisfaction" pursuant to section 29-3-310 and affirming trial court's award of statutory penalty allowed by section 29-3-320). Although these cases are tangentially instructive, we do not believe they are dispositive given the interpretation of a "request" was not at issue. The term "request" as related to the mortgage satisfaction procedure has been defined as follows:

  3. Bryan v. Cmty. Res. Mortg., Inc.

    C/A NO: 10-08719-jw (Bankr. D.S.C. Apr. 13, 2012)

    In addition to the issue of their allocation, there is a separate factual issue as to whether the requirement of tender was waived by Defendant. See Dykeman; see also, Kinard v. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp, 319 S.C. 408, 461 S.E.2d 833 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). In the present case, having considered Defendant's motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's response, and the supporting affidavit, exhibits, and other proper summary judgment evidence, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to meet its burden of demonstrating that there is no issue of material fact as the presence of the elements of request and tender.

  4. Desert Gardens Holdings, L.L.C. v. Singh

    1 CA-CV 12-0591 (Ariz. Ct. App. Jun. 25, 2013)

    Clearly, the legislative intent in enacting these statutes was to provide an incentive for the mortgagee, once it no longer has a monetary interest in the mortgage loan, to promptly record the extinguishment of the lien." Kinard v. Fleet Real Estate Funding Corp., 461 S.E.2d 833, 835 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995). This ultimately eliminates any practical problems the mortgagor would encounter in a subsequent refinancing or sale. ΒΆ29 Based on the purpose of the statute and the generally understood consequences that might arise from a violation, we disagree with Defendants that Desert Garden's "actual damages" are limited to $39,167.51.

  5. State v. Baucom

    334 S.C. 371 (S.C. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 2 times

    "A statute is not to be read in an atmosphere of sterility, but in the context of what actually happens when human beings go about the fulfillment of its purposes." Kinard v. FleetReal Estate Funding Corp., 319 S.C. 408, 412, 461 S.E.2d 833.835 (Ct.App. 1995). In the case at bar, the repeat offender statute's language of "any conviction" must be read in light of plain language of section 24-21-940 (A).

  6. Roberts v. Gaskins

    327 S.C. 478 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 79 times
    Finding that a party seeking to modify a contract had to demonstrate that the modification was supported by all the elements of a valid contract

    As such, it is unquestionably a penal statute, and it must be strictly construed. Kinard v. Fleet Real EstateFunding Corp., 319 S.C. 408, 461 S.E.2d 833 (Ct. App. 1995). We will not extend it by implication.