Opinion
FA030127742S
06-06-2018
Laurence KIMPAN, Jr. v. Tracy S. BLAUSER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Shluger, J.
The question presented is whether a stepparent who neither adopted the child nor was awarded guardianship of the child can be compelled to provide child support.
FACTS
‘The plaintiff, Laurence Kimpan and the defendant, Tracy Blauser, are the parents of one child, Elizabeth Blauser born December 9, 1999. The child lived primarily with Kimpan and Erin Bustamante, the intervening third party in this custody action. Kimpan and Bustamante married on February 24, 2001 but divorced in December 2008 at which time Blauser was no longer part of the child’s life. The father spent a great deal of this time in the U.S. Navy and the child primarily resided with Bustamante, a non-biological stepparent. On October 19, 2010, Kimpan petitioned the court for sole custody of the child. By that time, Blauser had moved to West Virginia and demonstrated disinterest in parenting the child. On January 25, 2011, the court approved an agreement whereby Kimpan and Bustamante would share joint custody. At the time that the court ordered joint custody, the court also ordered Bustamante to pay weekly child support to Kimpan in the amount of $104. Thereafter, Bustamante did not comply with the order of support. In March of 2018, Kimpan brought a Motion for Contempt to collect the unpaid child support. Bustamante countered with a Motion to Vacate the court’s arrearage finding arguing that she was never adjudicated to be the child’s guardian, nor has she formally adopted the child and thus, the court lacked the authority to order a non-biological parent to pay child support. Moreover, she argued that the court is deprived of subject matter jurisdiction to enter a support order against a third party who is not a biological parent and that the law does not impose a duty upon third parties to support non-biological children. Additionally, Bustamante explains that the minor child resided with her, exclusively, from 2011 to 2016, and during that time the child never resided with Kimpan, although he visited with the child for one night per week. Bustamante further argues that, at no time, has Kimpan sought child support payments from her prior to filing his motion for contempt. In response, Kimpan argues that Bustamante should be estopped from avoiding her support obligations, and that he was prejudiced by the parties’ joint custody agreement since, in reliance upon the agreement, he gave up sole custody of the child, as well as pursuit of child support from Blauser.
DISCUSSION
General Statutes § 46b-1 gives the Superior Court jurisdiction over family relations matters, including custody and support. General Statutes § 46b-56 gives the Superior Court the authority to enter orders of support in any controversy before it. General Statutes § 46b-84(a) requires that "parents shall maintain the child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance (emphasis provided)." These statutes contemplate that support orders shall be entered against the legal parents of legitimate children. See Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, 180 Conn. 114, 117, 429 A.2d 833 (1980).
"The duty to support [a minor child] ... is one imposed upon parents." Id. Traditionally, in order to be recognized as a parent under the law, one must be the child’s biological parent, or adoptive parent, or adjudicated to be the child’s parent ... or formally acknowledged as the child’s parent pursuant to General Statutes 46b-172. Id. In recent years, Connecticut’s Supreme Court has expanded the legal definition of "parent" to include persons to whom a child is conceived through artificial insemination pursuant to § § 45a-771 through 45a-779; see Doe v. Doe, 244 Conn. 403, 435, 710 A.2d 1297 (1998); and parties to a valid gestational agreement without respect to their biological relationship to the child. See Raftopol v. Ramey, 299 Conn. 681, 717, 12 A.3d 783 (2011).
A. The Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
"There are two essential elements to an estoppel: the party must do or say something which is intended or calculated to induce another to believe in the existence of certain facts and to act upon that belief; and the other party, influenced thereby, must actually change his position or do something to his injury which he otherwise would not have done. Estoppel rests on the misleading conduct of one party to the prejudice of the other. In the absence of prejudice, estoppel does not exist." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Remkiewicz v. Remkiewicz, supra, 180 Conn. 119.
In Remkiewicz, the court examined whether the defendant, a stepparent, should be estopped from providing child support for a child for whom he affirmatively completed an affidavit of parentage, and held her out as his own child. Id., 116. The child also regarded the defendant as her father, because the defendant had married the child’s mother when the child was but a toddler, and cared for her as his own for the following five years. Id. The court concluded that the defendant was not the child’s legal parent; id., 119; as the evidence clearly demonstrated that the defendant was neither the child’s biological father; he never adopted the child; and, he was not adjudicated to be her father. Id., 117. Therefore, the defendant was not the child’s legal parent. Id., 119. Furthermore, the Remkiewicz court declined to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in this case, holding that "no prejudice had been shown" as the evidence demonstrated that "neither the state nor ... [the] mother changed position to the injury of either one in reliance on the affidavit of parentage." Id., 119-20.
At the time the plaintiff mother commenced the action for dissolution, she was receiving state assistance for herself and the child, therefore the assistant attorney general became a party to the action, and subsequently moved for an order of support against the defendant stepfather.
Nineteen years later the court reexamined the duty of a stepparent to support a non-biological child in W. v. W., 248 Conn. 487, 728 A.2d 1076 (1999), after the defendant stepfather appealed the trial court’s pendente lite order finding a duty to support the minor child, and estopping him from denying paternity. Id., 489. It was undisputed in W. v. W., that the defendant agreed to pay pendente lite child support, yet, ten months later, the defendant moved for paternity testing while the action was still pending. It was at that time that the trial court estopped the defendant from denying paternity, determining that the defendant had induced both the plaintiff and the child to rely, to their detriment, upon his representation that he would always emotionally and financially support them. Id., 504. The court also made the following findings: at the time of the child’s birth, the parties were aware that the defendant might not be the child’s biological father, but agreed that the child would carry the defendant’s surname anyway; the defendant’s actions prevented the formation of a loving and nurturing relationship between the child and her biological father; after the child’s birth, the defendant frustrated the plaintiff’s attempts to seek financial support from both the biological father and the state when he destroyed the plaintiff’s unprocessed paternity papers; the defendant engaged in such acts, because he did not want the biological father involved in the child’s life. Id., 504-05. Consequently, the defendant was the only father who ever supported or nurtured the child. Id., 505. Additionally, the natural father’s whereabouts were unknown at the time of the proceedings. Id.
On appeal, the Supreme Court, while noting that the doctrine should be applied cautiously and sensitively, affirmed the trial court’s decision, recognizing that "equitably estopping parties from denying parenthood is an extraordinary measure because it involves a judicially created imposition of parental status and attendant responsibility." Id., 503-04. "Strong public policies have long formed the basis of the doctrine of equitable estoppel. The office of an equitable estoppel is to show what equity and good conscience require, under the particular circumstances of the case, irrespective of what might otherwise be the legal rights of the parties ... No one is ever estopped from asserting what would otherwise be his right, unless to allow its assertion would enable him to do a wrong." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 496.
"[W]hen all of the elements of estoppel are met, its application prevents an injustice ... In the context of parental responsibilities, the duty to support the child is placed fairly on the nonparental party, not solely because of his voluntary assumption of a parental role, but, also because of the misleading course of conduct that induced the child, and the biological parent as the child’s guardian, to rely detrimentally on the nonparental party’s emotional and financial support of the child ... Essentially, such a rule is designed, in part, to discourage misrepresentations by the nonbiological parent." (Citations omitted.) Id., 497-98.
"[T]he party against whom the doctrine is invoked has typically benefitted from his status as a parent ... Generally, that party has been given the gift of love and affection by a child who considers and treats him as a parent, and has enjoyed the community’s recognition of him as a parent, which often entails prestige and fulfillment." Id., 498. "Estopping parties from denying parentage under appropriate circumstances promotes our ‘oft-expressed policy of supporting the integrity of the family unit and protecting the best interests of the child ... [and the] child’s right to family identification ... Similarly, the doctrine furthers our public policy of favoring the establishment of legal parenthood with all of its accompanying responsibilities.’ " (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
The Supreme Court provided a framework to consider when determining whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to a party denying parentage and the duty to support a minor child. "[T]he equitable estoppel doctrine properly imposes a burden on the party seeking to invoke the doctrine to demonstrate representations of financial as well as emotional support. The concerns about misrepresentation and detrimental reliance are placed more appropriately on any promises of emotional and financial support, not on any misrepresentations and reliance regarding biological parentage. Requiring that children believe that the stepparent is their natural parent unjustly would deny support to some children who, nevertheless, have relied detrimentally on representations of emotional and financial support." (Footnote omitted.) Id., 502-03.
Ultimately, the court determined that to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in circumstances where emotional detriment, alone, is present would not only be difficult for courts to apply, but would also create "enormous policy difficulties." Id., 503. The Court noted that the majority of jurisdictions have concluded that, by itself, emotional detriment is an insufficient basis for invoking the doctrine, and cited favorably to a New Jersey decision; Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 167, 478 A.2d 351 (1984); which "most succinctly describes the three components to equitable estoppel- representation, reliance, and detriment- cloaking all three in financial garb." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 501.
Following the reasoning in Miller, the Court concluded that the nonbiological parent must have made "some representation of support to the child or natural parent" and if the nonbiological parent were not estopped, future financial detriment would result from the nonbiological parent’s active interference. Id., 501-02. A significant factor in determining whether the doctrine should be applied is whether the nonbiological parent took "positive steps of interference with the natural parent’s support obligations." Id., 502. Thus, the party seeking to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel in circumstances where one party denies paternity carries the burden to demonstrate both emotional and financial detriment in order for the court to bind the nonbiological parent. Id. Hence, the trial court’s findings provided ample support to estop the defendant, leading the Supreme Court to affirm its decision to invoke the doctrine.
The defendant later appealed from the trial court’s final judgment in W. v. W., 256 Conn. 657, 779 A.2d 716 (2001), claiming that equitably estopping him from denying paternity was inappropriate because he had located the child’s natural father, and, therefore, the financial detriment previously caused to the plaintiff no longer existed. Id., 658.
The Supreme Court, once again, affirmed the trial court’s decision, and took the opportunity to expand its earlier holding after concluding that locating the child’s natural father did not alter the trial court’s application of equitable estoppel against the defendant. Id., 662. The court emphasized that, in Connecticut, the party alleging equitable estoppel has the burden to prove that the nonbiological parent’s conduct established the three prerequisites to equitable estoppel: representation, reliance and detriment. Id. In this case, the defendant’s representation of himself as the child’s father, the plaintiff’s rightful reliance, and the resulting future financial detriment were "unaltered," regardless of the fact that the natural father’s whereabouts were finally known. Id., 662-63.
Additionally, the court emphasize d that Connecticut applies a "stringent standard" in determining whether to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel against a nonbiological parent in child support cases. Because "the natural parent should always be considered the primary recourse for child support ... it is only when a stepparent by his or her conduct actively interferes with the children’s support from their natural parent that he or she may be equitably estopped from denying his or her duty to support the children." (Emphasis added.) Id., 664-65.
"The nonbiological parent must have done some positive act ... to estrange the child from her biological parent, thereby enabling the child to place her reliance on only the nonbiological parent himself. Here, the defendant did ‘actively interfere’ with the potential support from the natural father by destroying the paternity documents ... [T]he defendant cannot discard his own, self-created duties to the child he raised as his own. Therefore, he is properly estopped from doing so." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 665.
B. Analysis
(1) Does the Superior Court Have the Authority to Enter a Child Support Order Against a Nonbiological Parent?
In the present case, contrary to Bustamante’s assertion, the court is not deprived of subject matter jurisdiction simply because the minor child is neither "issue of the marriage," nor a legitimated child. See W. v. W., supra, 248 Conn. 494; Doe v. Doe, supra, 244 Conn. 422. The Superior Court has jurisdiction over family relations matters, including matters of child support, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-1. General Statutes § 46b-56 authorizes the Superior Court to enter an order of support in any controversy before it. General Statutes § 46b-84(a) imposes a duty upon parents to "maintain the minor child according to their respective abilities, if the child is in need of maintenance." As a general matter, however, the law does not impose a duty of support upon a nonbiological parent, except in circumstances where a nonbiological parent engages in a positive act, and actively interferes with a child’s support from a natural parent. See W. v. W., supra, 256 Conn. 664.
(2) Is Bustamante’s Motion to Vacate an Impermissible Collateral Attack on the Judgment?
Bustamante’s motion to vacate may be considered a collateral attack on the judgment, but, in this case, the attack is permissible. "Although challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, it is well settled that [f]inal judgments are ... presumptively valid ... and collateral attacks on their validity are disfavored ... The reason for the rule against collateral attack is well stated in these words: The law aims to invest judicial transactions with the utmost permanency consistent with justice ... Public policy requires that a term be put to litigation and that judgments, as solemn records upon which valuable rights rest, should not lightly be disturbed or overthrown ... [T]he law has established appropriate proceedings to which a judgment party may always resort when he deems himself wronged by the court’s decision ... If he omits or neglects to test the soundness of the judgment by these or other direct methods available for that purpose, he is in no position to urge its defective or erroneous character when it is pleaded or produced in evidence against him in subsequent proceedings. Unless it is entirely invalid and that fact is disclosed by an inspection of the record itself the judgment is invulnerable to indirect assaults upon it." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Sousa v. Sousa, 322 Conn. 757, 771, 143 A.3d 578 (2016).
Bustamante’s motion to vacate the court’s arrearage finding can reasonably be considered a collateral attack on the judgment because she failed to appeal from the order of support dated January 25, 2011, coupled with the fact that she now argues the erroneous character of the order once Kimpan attempted to enforce it. In the present case, an inspection of the record demonstrates that an order of support was entered against a nonbiological parent who never adopted the child, and was not adjudicated to be the child’s legal parent. According to Connecticut’s family relations statutes and case law, Bustamante does not have a legal duty to support the child. As a result, Bustamante’s motion to vacate would be permissible, because, the court lacked the authority to enter an order of support against her.
(3) Is There Support for Kimpan’s Argument that Bustamante may be Judicially Estopped from Denying a Duty to Support?
In order for the court to successfully apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel in the present case, Kimpan carries the burden to prove that Bustamante’s conduct established the three prerequisites to equitable estoppel: representation, reliance and detriment. The court must find that Bustamante’s conduct was intended or calculated to mislead Kimpan into relying upon her emotional and financial support, to his, and the child’s, detriment.
In the present case, the facts do not support such a conclusion. Bustamante did not induce Kimpan to alienate Blauser. Rather, Blauser effectively abandoned the child causing Kimpan and Bustamante to raise the child together. While it is likely that Bustamante benefitted from the child’s love and affection, and enjoyed community recognition as the child’s parent, Bustamante neither frustrated the child’s relationship with Blauser, nor prevented Kimpan from pursuing financial support from Blauser. Kimpan’s failure to collect child support from Blauser was not a by-product of having been induced or manipulated to rely exclusively on Bustamante’s emotional and financial support. Moreover, Bustamante’s memorandum in support demonstrates that in the years following the Kimpan-Bustamante breakup, including the years after the stipulated joint custody order, she continued to serve as the child’s full-time, primary custodian and her home served as the child’s primary residence, while Kimpan enjoyed one overnight visit per week. These allegations proffered by Bustamante remain undisputed by Kimpan, as Kimpan has failed to offer arguments or evidence to the contrary.
In the present case, as a matter of law, it would be inappropriate to invoke the doctrine of equitable estoppel imposing an order of support against Bustamante. Alternatively, even if a duty to support were remotely supported by the facts, enforcing the child support order against Bustamante and in favor of Kimpan, would be grossly inequitable given Bustamante’s continuous provision of emotional and financial support throughout the child’s life amidst circumstances emanating from both Blauser and Kimpan’s lack of engagement in raising their child.
CONCLUSION
The Motion to Vacate the Arrearage and the Order of Support entered January 25, 2011 is granted. The Motion For Contempt is denied.