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Kimner v. Stoney

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Nov 16, 2022
C/A 2:22-2943-CMC-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2022)

Opinion

C/A 2:22-2943-CMC-SVH

11-16-2022

Audrey L. Kimner, Plaintiff, v. Lori D. Stoney; Alex B. Cash; Suzanne Groft; Jerry N. Theos; Margaret Theos Guerry; Paul E. Tinkler; Michael J. Kimner; and J. Todd Manley, Defendants.


REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Shiva V. Hodges, United States Magistrate Judge

Audrey L. Kimner (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this complaint against South Carolina attorneys Lori D. Stoney, Alex B. Cash, Suzanne Groft, Jerry N. Theos, Margaret Theos Guerry, Paul E. Tinkler, and Todd Manley (“Attorney Defendants”) and Michael J. Kimner (collectively “Defendants”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge.

Contrary to Plaintiff's assertions, the undersigned is not exercising jurisdiction over final judgments in this case, but makes recommendations to the presiding district judge pursuant to the governing statute and local rules.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff was provided an opportunity to amend her complaint [ECF No. 10], but she failed to do so.

It appears from a liberal reading of Plaintiff's complaint that she believes her rights were violated by the state family court's handling of child visitation issues and child support orders as they relate to her ex-husband Michael Kimner. For example, Plaintiff alleges “The plaintiff stood up for herself and defendants retaliated by changing the case numbers, using judge[]s by judge shopping and using spyware tainted emails against the plaintiff for over ten years.” [ECF No. 1 at 8]. She further alleges “The two now grown children are missing and not allowed to reach plaintiff at all, as we three are wiretapped, which has been forensically proven.” Id. All of the Attorney Defendants were involved with Plaintiff in some capacity in family court.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

Plaintiff filed her complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dept of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).

B. Analysis

1. Vague and Conclusory Allegations

While “a pro se plaintiff is general[ly] given more leeway than a party represented by counsel . . . a district court is not obligated to ferret through a [c]omplaint . . . that is so confused, ambiguous, vague or otherwise unintelligible that its true substance, if any, is well disguised.” Bell v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. 1:13-cv-00478-RDB, 2013 WL 6528966, at *1 (D. Md. Dec. 11, 2013) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Green v. Sumter Court, No. 3:07-cv-JFA-BM, 2007 WL 2022199, at *2 (D.S.C. July 9, 2007) (noting that federal courts cannot serve as “mind readers” or “advocates” for pro se litigants). A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint's factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.

Here, despite a lengthy complaint, Plaintiff has failed to provide sufficient factual allegations showing she is entitled to relief. For example, Plaintiff's complaint states “This case involves violating the plaintiff's ADA laws under Title II and III, which the plaintiff can not be blocked access to our public courts with assets pending against the Fourteenth Amendment” [ECF No. 1 at 11]. Plaintiff fails to provide any factual background as to how Defendants violated the ADA. Therefore, the undersigned recommends the complaint be summarily dismissed.

2. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court may not review findings or rulings made by state courts. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983) (holding that a federal district court lacks authority to review final determinations of state or local courts); Jordahl v. Democratic Party, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th Cir. 1997). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court, but also to those that are “inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.” Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997). A federal claim is “inextricably intertwined” with a state court decision if “success on the federal claim depends upon a determination that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it.” Safety-Kleen, Inc. (Pinewood) v. Wyche, 274 F.3d 846, 857-58 (4th Cir. 2001). This prohibition includes constitutional challenges. See Curley v. Adams Creek Associates, 409 Fed.Appx. 678 (4th Cir. 2011).

The Supreme Court clarified the scope of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005):

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine . . . is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by statecourt losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.
Id. at 284; see also Davani v. Va. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 713 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Exxon requires us to examine whether the state-court loser who files suit in federal district court seeks redress for an injury caused by the statecourt decision itself. If he is not challenging the state-court decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.”). Implicit in the doctrine is the recognition that only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction over appeals from final state court judgments. Exxon, 544 U.S. at 283; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. To the extent the claims in Plaintiff's complaint challenge rulings made by a South Carolina state court, these claims should be summarily dismissed. See Kimner v. Kimner, No. 2015-2051, 2017 WL 6032656 (S.C. Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2017) (denying Plaintiff's appeal challenging the lower court's suspension of her contact with her two minor children, refusal to lift her bench warrant, and awarding Michael Kimner attorneys' fees).

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed without prejudice.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).

Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).


Summaries of

Kimner v. Stoney

United States District Court, D. South Carolina
Nov 16, 2022
C/A 2:22-2943-CMC-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2022)
Case details for

Kimner v. Stoney

Case Details

Full title:Audrey L. Kimner, Plaintiff, v. Lori D. Stoney; Alex B. Cash; Suzanne…

Court:United States District Court, D. South Carolina

Date published: Nov 16, 2022

Citations

C/A 2:22-2943-CMC-SVH (D.S.C. Nov. 16, 2022)