Nevertheless, Family Court erred in delegating authority to the father to determine whether visitation would take place under certain circumstances. The court's authority to set visitation cannot be delegated to a party (seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1335, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ; Matter of William BB. v. Susan DD., 31 A.D.3d 907, 908, 818 N.Y.S.2d 354 [2006] ). We agree that the father can choose to temporarily suspend visitation while the mother is hospitalized for a mental health condition.
Family Court, having had the opportunity to hear the father's testimony and evaluate his credibility, found the father to be untruthful and instead credited the testimony of those who were familiar with the father's appearance and behavior while he was using heroin. Considering all of the foregoing evidence, we find that there is a sound and substantial basis in the record to support Family Court's determination to direct supervised parenting time for the safety of the child (seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1335–1336, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ; Matter of Adam E. v. Heather F., 151 A.D.3d at 1214–1215, 56 N.Y.S.3d 380 ), as well as its determination to grant the father "at least two hours" of supervised parenting time per week at the Parents as Leaders Resource Center (seeMatter of Carin R. v. Seth R., 196 A.D.3d 776, 778, 151 N.Y.S.3d 498 [2021] ). Although two hours of weekly parenting time is limited, Family Court allowed for additional parenting time as the parties could agree (seeMatter of Derek KK. v. Jennifer KK., 196 A.D.3d at 768, 151 N.Y.S.3d 491 ).
The wife appeals. Initially, the wife's contention that Supreme Court erred in not permitting her to contest the ground for divorce at trial is unpreserved given that the wife did not object at trial when Supreme Court inquired as to this issue (seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1331, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ). The wife also asserts that Supreme Court erred in terminating her "lifetime" spousal support award.
Thus, "[u]nless [visitation] is inimical to the child[ ]’s welfare, the court is required to structure a schedule which results in frequent and regular access by the noncustodial parent" ( Matter ofJessica HH. v. Sean HH., 196 A.D.3d 750, 755, 151 N.Y.S.3d 449 [2021] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Matter ofTimothy D. v. Becki C., 195 A.D.3d 1081, 1082, 149 N.Y.S.3d 663 [2021] ). The court cannot delegate to anyone, including a child, its authority to do so (seeMatter of Paul JJ. v. Heather JJ., 184 A.D.3d 956, 958, 126 N.Y.S.3d 547 [2020], appeal dismissed 35 N.Y.3d 1073, 130 N.Y.S.3d 431, 154 N.E.3d 17 [2020] ; seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1335, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ), as such delegation can have "the practical effect of denying [a parent] his [or her] right to visitation with his [or her] child indefinitely without the requisite showing that visitation would be detrimental to the child's welfare" ( Matter ofMerkle v. Henry, 133 A.D.3d 1266, 1268, 20 N.Y.S.3d 774 [2015] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citation omitted]; see Matter ofHeather SS. v. Ronald SS., 173 A.D.3d 1271, 1273, 103 N.Y.S.3d 621 [2019] ). Family Court's rationale for its parenting schedule – that a teenager cannot be forced to do something that he or she does not want to do – falls far short of satisfying its obligation to provide the mother with frequent and regular access to the younger child and does nothing to support a healthy, meaningful relationship between the two.
We reach this same conclusion as to the court's award of $5,000 in counsel fees to the wife for the postjudgment proceedings, which Supreme Court found to be reasonable after a thorough examination into the other relevant factors regarding financial circumstances. Lastly, the husband's argument that Supreme Court improperly awarded the wife 50% of the pretax value of a distribution of ordinary income to the husband from his prior law firm is unpreserved as the husband made no such argument before Supreme Court (seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1331, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ). Any remaining contentions that have not been specifically addressed herein have been examined and found to be lacking in merit.
The record reflects that Supreme Court found the wife successful on the merits of her motions, determined that the wife was the less monied spouse – given her limited income and nonliquid assets as compared to the husband's guaranteed sources of income and his liquid assets – and determined that the litigation was protracted and prolonged by the husband's self-representation such that counsel fees were necessitated in defending and protecting her interests from the husband's actions and inactions. Our review reveals that due consideration was given to appropriate factors and, accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the award or amount of counsel fees (seeMatula v. Matula, 159 A.D.3d 1074, 1076, 71 N.Y.S.3d 725 [2018] ; Kimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1336, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017]. As to the husband's request for counsel fees, as he is a self-represented litigant, his application is denied (seeKay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432, 438, 111 S.Ct. 1435, 113 L.Ed.2d 486 [1991] ; Federal Natl. Mtge. Assn. v. Johnson, 177 A.D.3d 1148, 1149, 113 N.Y.S.3d 364 [2019] ).
Upon consideration of the foregoing, as well as the other record evidence, we find that a sound and substantial basis exists in the record to support Family Court's determination to grant the father supervised parenting time "at least one time per week" (see Matter of Vincente X. v Tiana Y., 154 A.D.3d 1113, 1115 [2017]). In our view, such parenting time provision satisfies Family Court's obligation to accord the noncustodial parent frequent and regular access to the child (see Kimberly C. v Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1335-1336 [2017]). Accordingly, we will not disturb Family Court's order.
Upon consideration of the foregoing, as well as the other record evidence, we find that a sound and substantial basis exists in the record to support Family Court's determination to grant the father supervised parenting time "at least one time per week" (see Matter ofVincente X. v. Tiana Y., 154 A.D.3d 1113, 1115, 61 N.Y.S.3d 742 [2017] ). In our view, such parenting time provision satisfies Family Court's obligation to accord the noncustodial parent frequent and regular access to the child (seeKimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1335–1336, 155 A.D.3d 1329 [2017] ). Accordingly, we will not disturb Family Court's order.
Here, since the defendant was the less monied spouse, the rebuttable presumption is applicable, and the plaintiff did not rebut that presumption (see Macaluso v Macaluso, 145 AD3d 1295, 1297). Further, the equitable distribution award "did not alter the [defendant's] status as the less-monied spouse," since it had no direct impact on either party's income (Kimberly C. v Christopher C., 155 AD3d 1329, 1336). Where, as here, the parties did not stipulate that an award of counsel fees could be decided solely on the basis of the parties' submissions, the defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the issue (see O'Connor v O'Connor, 89 AD3d 703, 704).
r amount through consideration of the factors set forth in paragraph (f) of [ Family Ct Act § 413(1) ] and/or the child support percentage" ( Family Ct Act § 413[1][c][3] ; seeHolterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d at 11, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765 ; Matter ofCassano v. Cassano, 85 N.Y.2d at 653, 628 N.Y.S.2d 10, 651 N.E.2d 878 ; Matter ofMarcklinger v. Liebert, 88 A.D.3d 1114, 1115, 931 N.Y.S.2d 184 [2011] ). After completing the three-step process, the court "may adjust the amount calculated only if, after examining the paragraph (f) factors, it finds that the noncustodial parent's share is unjust or inappropriate," and, where such conclusion is reached, "it must order the noncustodial parent to pay an amount it deems just and appropriate and is required to set forth in its decision the paragraph (f) factors it considered" ( Holterman v. Holterman, 3 N.Y.3d at 14, 781 N.Y.S.2d 458, 814 N.E.2d 765 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Family Ct Act § 413[1][f], [g] ; Kimberly C. v. Christopher C., 155 A.D.3d 1329, 1333, 65 N.Y.S.3d 260 [2017] ). "In calculating child support, the CSSA contains a rebuttable presumption that application of the guidelines will yield the correct amount of child support" ( Matter ofJennifer VV. v. Lawrence WW., 183 A.D.3d 1202, 1204, 124 N.Y.S.3d 474 [2020] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]).