We agree with defendant in both appeals that Supreme Court erred in denying those motions."To establish that a landlord is liable for a lead-paint condition, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the landlord had actual or constructive notice of, and a reasonable opportunity to remedy, the hazardous condition, and failed to do so" ( Kimball v. Normandeau, 132 A.D.3d 1340, 1341, 18 N.Y.S.3d 237 [4th Dept. 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). With respect to constructive notice, a triable issue of fact exists where "the landlord (1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment" ( Chapman v. Silber, 97 N.Y.2d 9, 15, 734 N.Y.S.2d 541, 760 N.E.2d 329 [2001] ; seeKimball, 132 A.D.3d at 1341, 18 N.Y.S.3d 237 ).
A plaintiff can establish that the landlord had constructive notice of a hazardous lead paint condition by showing that the landlord: "(1) retained a right of entry to the premises and assumed a duty to make repairs, (2) knew that the apartment was constructed at a time before lead-based interior paint was banned, (3) was aware that paint was peeling on the premises, (4) knew of the hazards of lead-based paint to young children and (5) knew that a young child lived in the apartment" (Chapman, 97 N.Y.2d at 15, 734 N.Y.S.2d 541, 760 N.E.2d 329 ). Therefore, insofar as relevant here, in order "to meet their burden on their motion[ ] for summary judgment with respect to the premises liability [claim], defendants were required to establish that they ‘had no actual or constructive notice of the hazardous lead paint condition prior to an inspection conducted by the [Monroe] County Department of Health [MCDH]’ " (Kimball v. Normandeau, 132 A.D.3d 1340, 1341, 18 N.Y.S.3d 237 ; see Stokely v. Wright, 111 A.D.3d 1382, 1382, 975 N.Y.S.2d 288 ) We agree with defendants that they met their initial burden of establishing that they did not have actual or constructive notice of a hazardous lead paint condition on the premises prior to an inspection conducted by the MCDH (see Spain, 115 A.D.3d at 1369, 983 N.Y.S.2d 192 ; Stokely, 111 A.D.3d at 1382–1383, 975 N.Y.S.2d 288 ; cf. Watson v. Priore, 104 A.D.3d 1304, 1305–1306, 961 N.Y.S.2d 696, lv. dismissed in part and denied in part 21 N.Y.3d 1052, 973 N.Y.S.2d 85, 995 N.E.2d 1157 ). Defendants submitted affidavits and deposition testimony establishing that they were not aware of any peeling or chipping paint on the premises prior to the inspection conducted by the MCDH. Defendants also established that neither plaintiff nor the relatives with whom plaintiff resided at the premises ever complained to either defendant of any peeling or chipping paint on the premises.
The record demonstrates that lead abatement in the premises owned by defendant in which plaintiff resided between the ages of one and five did not start for more than seven months after plaintiff was diagnosed with an elevated blood-lead level and the Westchester County Department of Health confirmed the existence of lead-based paint at the premises. Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that she obtained a grant and Westchester County managed the abatement, without more, does not entitle her to judgment as a matter of law (compareKimball v. Normandeau, 132 A.D.3d 1340, 1342, 18 N.Y.S.3d 237 [4th Dept. 2015] ["Defendants demonstrated that they took reasonable precautionary measures to remedy the hazardous lead condition after they received actual notice thereof"] ). Plaintiff's medical and school records demonstrate that as a child he suffered developmental delays, learning disabilities, and behavioral issues consistent with exposure to lead ( Parker v. Mobil Oil Corp. , 7 N.Y.3d 434, 448, 824 N.Y.S.2d 584, 857 N.E.2d 1114 [2006] ).