Opinion
2017–10610 2017–10611 Index No. 703491/14
03-27-2019
YOUNG WO KIM, appellant, v. Kyle THOMAS, et al., respondents.
Andrew Park, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Steve J. Park of counsel), for appellant. Richard T. Lau, Jericho, N.Y. (Christine A. Hilcken of counsel), for respondents.
Andrew Park, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Steve J. Park of counsel), for appellant.
Richard T. Lau, Jericho, N.Y. (Christine A. Hilcken of counsel), for respondents.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., HECTOR D. LASALLE, BETSY BARROS, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ORDERED that the appeal from the order is dismissed; and it is further,
ORDERED that the judgment is reversed, on the law, the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint is denied, the complaint is reinstated, and the order is modified accordingly; and it is further,
ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the plaintiff.
The appeal from the order must be dismissed because the right of direct appeal therefrom terminated with the entry of judgment in the action (see Matter of Aho, 39 N.Y.2d 241, 383 N.Y.S.2d 285, 347 N.E.2d 647 ). The issues raised on the appeal from the order are brought up for review and have been considered on the appeal from the judgment (see CPLR 5501[a][1] ).
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that he allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the motion, and subsequently entered a judgment in favor of the defendants and against the plaintiff, dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the plaintiff's right ankle did not constitute a serious injury under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to his right ankle under the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Perl v. Meher, 18 N.Y.3d 208, 218–219, 936 N.Y.S.2d 655, 960 N.E.2d 424 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
MASTRO, J.P., LASALLE, BARROS and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur.