Opinion
2013-06-6
Justina KIM, Petitioner–Appellant, v. NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, Respondent, D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., Respondent–Respondent.
Justina Kim, appellant pro se. Jones Day, New York (Terri L. Chase of counsel), for D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., respondent.
Justina Kim, appellant pro se. Jones Day, New York (Terri L. Chase of counsel), for D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P., respondent.
GONZALEZ, P.J., SWEENY, RICHTER, CLARK, JJ.
Judgment, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered August 16, 2011, denying the petition to annul the determination of respondent New York State Division of Human Rights (DHR), dated January 28, 2011, which dismissed petitioner's complaint against respondent D.E. Shaw & Co., L.P. (DESCO), and dismissing the proceeding brought pursuant to CPLR article 78, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
DHR's determination that there was no probable cause to find that DESCO engaged in unlawful discrimination against petitioner was rational and not arbitrary and capricious ( seeCPLR 7803[3] ). The record demonstrates that petitioner had a full and fair opportunity to present her case and that DHR's investigation was neither abbreviated nor one-sided ( see Matter of Block v. Gatling, 84 A.D.3d 445, 922 N.Y.S.2d 327 [1st Dept. 2011], lv. denied17 N.Y.3d 709, 2011 WL 4089761 [2011] ).
Petitioner was laid off by DESCO on June 9, 2009; she filed her administrative complaint with DHR on June 9, 2010. To the extent her claims are premised upon alleged adverse action by DESCO, that action must have occurred before June 9, 2009. Those claims therefore are untimely ( seeExecutive Law § 297[5] ). To the extent petitioner's retaliation claim is premised upon being laid off, that claim fails because the activity for which petitioner alleges she was retaliated against was not a protected activity ( seeExecutive Law § 296[7]; Forrest v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 3 N.Y.3d 295, 312–313, 786 N.Y.S.2d 382, 819 N.E.2d 998 [2004];Asabor v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 102 A.D.3d 524, 528, 961 N.Y.S.2d 17 [1st Dept. 2013] ). Further, the alleged protected activity occurred nearly three years before petitioner was laid off and therefore was “not temporally proximate enough” to establish a causal connection to the layoff ( see Baldwin v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 65 A.D.3d 961, 967, 888 N.Y.S.2d 1 [1st Dept. 2009], lv. denied14 N.Y.3d 701, 2010 WL 456884 [2010] ).
We have considered petitioner's remaining contentions and find them unavailing.