" Id. Thereafter, we granted the plaintiffs' petition for certification to appeal limited to the following issue: "Whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the attorney trial referee incorrectly ruled that the defendant was personally liable to the plaintiffs for the claimed bonuses?" Killion v. Davis, 254 Conn. 948, 762 A.2d 902 (2000). We conclude that the facts found in the report support the attorney trial referee's conclusion that the defendant was under a personal obligation to pay the employment bonuses.
The defendant also could not be characterized as a “taker, obtainer or withholder” of another's property under § 53a–118 (a)(5) instead of as the “owner” when he retained a “general property interest” in the $294 at all times relevant to the present case. The present case, thus, is factually and legally distinguishable from State v. Marsala, 59 Conn.App. 135, 140, 755 A.2d 965, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 948, 762 A.2d 905 (2000), in which this court held that the bailor defendant committed larceny when he took his vehicle from the bailee repair shop's premises after a dispute over repair costs because the bailee's “continued right of possession ... became superior to that of the defendant” when the bailee registered a statutory lien on the vehicle. Here, there is no authority that recognizes the complainant's right of possession to the specific bills totaling the $294 as superior to the defendant's right deriving from his ownership of those bills under the present circumstances, nor is there evidence of any conduct by the complainant after her receipt of the specific bills that would establish her superior right of possession to them.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, 59 Conn. App. 135, 144-45, 755 A.2d 965, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 948, 762 A.2d 905 (2000). Moreover, a defendant does not possess the right to demand the appointment of alternate counsel simply on the ground of a breakdown of communication, which the defendant induced.
" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Marsala, 59 Conn. App. 135, 144, 755 A.2d 965, cert. denied, 254 Conn. 948, 762 A.2d 905 (2000). "While a criminal defendant's right to be represented by counsel implies a degree of freedom to be represented by counsel of [the] defendant's choice . . . this guarantee does not grant a defendant an unlimited opportunity to obtain alternate counsel on the eve of trial."