We have recognized in an analogous context that the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be treated as suspending the finality of judgment when the effect of a ruling on the motion can affect the substantive rights of the parties. See Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 525-27, 600 A.2d 752 (1991); see also Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270, 284-85, 107 S.Ct. 2360, 96 L.Ed.2d 222 (1987) (concluding that pending reconsideration had stayed appeal period and had rendered agency's original order "nonfinal" until decision on reconsideration was issued). Such a result is consistent with the rule that the filing of a motion that seeks an alteration, rather than a clarification, of the judgment suspends the appeal period.

See, e.g., Practice Book § 63–1(c)(1) (new appeal period triggered “[i]f a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment ... ineffective” but not if motion seeks “clarification or articulation, as opposed to alteration, of the terms of the judgment” [emphasis added] ). We followed this same approach in Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 671, 882 A.2d 53, and Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 600 A.2d 752 (1991), wherein we were asked to determine the point at which a decision became final in varying contexts. In Weinstein, we held that a motion for reconsideration suspended the finality of a judgment of dissolution until the trial court decided such motion, even though that court ultimately denied it. Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, at 698, 882 A.2d 53. Likewise, in Killingly, we rejected the plaintiff's argument that a request for a rehearing suspended the finality of the underlying administrative agency decision because the rehearing “sought to clarify a portion of the [agency's] decision, and would not, if granted, have redetermined the rights of the parties.”

See, e.g., Practice Book § 63-1 (c) (1) (new appeal period triggered ''[i]f a motion is filed within the appeal period that, if granted, would render the judgment . . . ineffective'' but not if motion seeks ''clarification or articulation, as opposed to alteration, of the terms of the judgment'' [emphasis added]). We followed this same approach in Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 275 Conn. 671, and Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 600 A.2d 752 (1991), wherein we were asked to determine the point at which a decision became final in varying contexts. In Weinstein, we held that a motion for reconsideration suspended the finality of a judgment of dissolution until the trial court decided such motion, even though that court ultimately denied it. Weinstein v. Weinstein, supra, 698. Likewise, in Killingly, we rejected the plaintiff's argument that a request for a rehearing suspended the finality of the underlying administrative agency decision because the rehearing ''sought to clarify a portion of the [agency's] decision, and would not, if granted, have redetermined the rights of the parties.

Greco v. Keenan, 115 Conn. 704, 705, 161 A. 100 [1932]. Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 166 Conn. 102, 111, 347 A.2d 53 (1974); see Andover Ltd. Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 400, 655 A.2d 759 (1995) (claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction). For that reason, [a] trial court should make every effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it . . . and, whe[n] practicable, should decide a procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal. Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 522, 600 A.2d 752 (1991)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 522, 600 A.2d 752 (1991). We conclude that because the final decision was mailed on September 27, the date when the commission issued its decision, along with the standard cover letter indicating that the decision was final and informing the parties of their appeal rights, the plaintiff's appeal was timely.

For that reason, "[a] trial court should make every effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it, and, where practicable, should decide a procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal." Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 522, 600 A.2d 752 (1991). In the present case, the plaintiff filed a complaint sounding in negligence.

See Ahern v. State Employees Retirement Commission, 48 Conn. App. 482, 487, 710 A.2d 1366 ("[t]he right to appeal from a decision of an administrative agency to the Superior Court is a creature of statute"), cert. denied, 245 Conn. 911, 718 A.2d 16 (1998). If the legislature has not created statutory authority for an appeal, then the Superior Court does not have jurisdiction to hear the appeal. See Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 521, 600 A.2d 752 (1991). Moreover, the legislature has not authorized a right of appeal to the Superior Court from every determination of an administrative agency.

There was thus no prejudice to the defendants, no risk of piecemeal appeals, no risk that the agency and the court would each modify the same decision, and no likelihood that judicial review would disrupt the orderly process of administrative decisionmaking. As the Supreme Court of Connecticut reasoned in quite similar circumstances in Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Counsel, 220 Conn. 516, 526 (1991): "We decline . . . to adopt a rigid application of the rule which would result in denying jurisdiction on the facts of the present case.

" Johnson v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 166 Conn. 102, 111, 347 A.2d 53 (1974); see Andover Ltd. Partnership I v. Board of Tax Review, 232 Conn. 392, 400, 655 A.2d 759 (1995) (claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction). "A trial court should make every effort to adjudicate the substantive controversy before it, and, where practicable, should decide a procedural issue so as not to preclude hearing the merits of an appeal." Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 522, 600 A.2d 752 (1991) (claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction). Section 52-72, as construed by our Supreme Court in Concept Associates, not only furthers this policy but illuminates our analysis in the present case.

"Where a decision as to whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is required, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." Killingly v. Connecticut Siting Council, 220 Conn. 516, 522, 600 A.2d 752 (1991). "Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is the power [of the court] to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong. . . . A court has subject matter jurisdiction if it has the authority to adjudicate a particular type of legal controversy. . . ."