Kiker v. Nassau County

28 Citing cases

  1. Clinton v. Brown & Williamson Holdings, Inc.

    No. 05-CV-9907 (CS) (S.D.N.Y. Jun. 20, 2013)   Cited 4 times
    Holding that $20,000 loss of consortium award did not materially deviate from reasonable compensation where "[p]laintiff's testimony focused on how [spouse's] illness forced her to take on roles he traditionally performed for the family, and she also noted in conclusory fashion that their intimacy changed after his [cancer] diagnosis"

    Plaintiff cites several cases in which children and grandchildren of decedents received damages awards. See Gonzalez v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 663, 666 (1991) (affirming recovery of $100,000 in damages for financially independent surviving grandchildren, ages twenty-one and nineteen, following murder of grandmother); Bennett v. Henry, 833 N.Y.S.2d 619, 621 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2007) (upholding damages of $133,000 to twenty year-old grandson and $43,000 to adult daughter of decedent killed by driver while attempting to cross street); Kiker v. Nassau Cnty., 571 N.Y.S.2d 804, 805-06 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 1991) (upholding $325,000 damages for medical malpractice to decedent's five children ages fifteen, nineteen, twenty-three, twenty-seven, and thirty-two). ATC correctly argues that Plaintiff's cases only show that adult children may recover for the loss of parental care and guidance, not that they must recover, citing Motelson v. Ford Motor Co., 957 N.Y.S.2d 341, 346-47 (App. Div. 2d Dep't 2012), where the jury made no award to the adult children of decedent in automobile accident.

  2. TVT RECORDS TVT MUSIC v. ISLAND DEF JAM MUSIC GR

    02 Civ. 6644 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003)

    This approach has since been reflected in the decisions of every department of the Appellate Division including the Third Department (on the prior cases of which Defendants' position purportedly rests). See, e.g., Garcia v. The City of New York, 569 N.Y.S.2d 28, 29 (App.Div. 1st Dep't 1991); Kiker v. Nassau County, 571 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (App.Div. 2nd Dep't 1991); Baker v. Shepard, 715 N.Y.S.2d 83, 86-87 (App.Div. 3rd Dep't 2000); Restey v. Nabisco, Inc., 512 N.Y.S.2d 938, 938 (App.Div. 4th Dep't 1987). The Second Circuit's view of New York law concerning this issue also accords with this approach.

  3. Hamilton v. Garlock, Inc.

    96 F. Supp. 2d 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)   Cited 13 times

    The instant verdict of over $4 million (rendered in 1998), when submitted to the same "totality of the circumstances approach," id. at 312, is certainly sustainable. Consorti was 51 years old at death; Hamilton was 54. Consorti's period of suffering was 32 months, as was Hamilton's. Furthermore, and most significantly, Hamilton was survived by a wife that was 32 years old and four dependent children under the age of seven — the youngest, David, being less than two years old when Hamilton died. Damages for the loss of parental care and guidance are compensable. Garcia v. New York Health and Hospitals Corp., 646 N.Y.S.2d 694 (N.Y.App.Div. 1996); Milbrandt v. A.P. Green Refractories Co., 588 N.E.2d 45 (N Y 1992), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Shue v. Red Creek Cent. School Dist., 676 N.Y.S.2d 742 (N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1998); Gonzalez v. NYC Housing Authority, 569 N.Y.S.2d 915 (N Y 1991); Kiker v. Nassau County, 571 N.Y.S.2d 804 (N.Y.App.Div. 1991); Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc. v. Richardson, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961); Rogow v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1095). The record set forth fully the pain and suffering of Hamilton, and its effect on his wife and his children, and their loss of care and guidance. It would be difficult to imagine a more painful descent into death.

  4. Lamarca v. U.S.

    31 F. Supp. 2d 110 (E.D.N.Y. 1999)   Cited 61 times
    Holding that the "duty to disclose information concerning expert testimony is intended to allow opposing parties to have a reasonable opportunity [to] prepare for effective cross examination and, perhaps, arrange for expert testimony from other witnesses."

    Pecuniary injury may be claimed by adult children for loss of "parental guidance and advice as well as nurture and care." Kiker v. Nassau County, 175 A.D.2d 99, 101, 571 N.Y.S.2d 804, 806 (2d Dep't 1991) (citations omitted). 1. Funeral Expenses

  5. Kiker v. Nassau County

    85 N.Y.2d 879 (N.Y. 1995)   Cited 115 times
    Holding that amending the interest rate on a judgment to reflect a lower interest rate did not substantially affect the right the plaintiff

    Apparently the error was not discovered by the County until November 1991. However, the judgment against the County had already been affirmed by the Appellate Division ( 175 A.D.2d 99), and the appeals process was over. The County then sought, by order to show cause, correction of the judgment pursuant to CPLR 2001 and 5019 (a), to reflect the statutory rate.

  6. Vasquez v. Cnty. of Nassau

    91 A.D.3d 855 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012)   Cited 29 times

    Further, the damages awarded for past and future loss of parental care and guidance did not deviate materially from what would be reasonable compensation ( see Bogen v. State of New York, 5 A.D.3d 521, 521, 772 N.Y.S.2d 869; Adderley v. City of New York, 304 A.D.2d at 486, 757 N.Y.S.2d 735; Zygmunt v. Berkowitz, 301 A.D.2d 593, 594, 754 N.Y.S.2d 313; Paccione v. Greenberg, 256 A.D.2d 559, 561, 682 N.Y.S.2d 442). Moreover, contrary to the defendants' contentions, damages for loss of household services are not duplicative of damages for loss of parental care and guidance; these types of losses are separate and distinct ( see Gonzalez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 77 N.Y.2d 663, 668, 569 N.Y.S.2d 915, 572 N.E.2d 598; Klos v. New York City Tr. Auth., 240 A.D.2d at 638, 659 N.Y.S.2d 97; Kiker v. Nassau County, 175 A.D.2d 99, 102, 571 N.Y.S.2d 804), and here the plaintiffs offered evidence in support of both ( see Allen v. New York City Tr. Auth., 148 A.D.2d at 563, 539 N.Y.S.2d 19; cf. Merola v. Catholic Med. Ctr. of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 24 A.D.3d 629, 631, 808 N.Y.S.2d 395; Zygmunt v. Berkowitz, 301 A.D.2d at 594, 754 N.Y.S.2d 313).

  7. Herrera v. Martin

    34 A.D.3d 529 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 4 times

    Contrary to the contentions raised by Vargas and Gasalberti, the jury's verdict was rational ( see Cohen v Hallmark Cards, 45 NY2d 493, 499; Robinson v City of New York, 300 AD2d 384; Cavlin v New York Med. Group, 286 AD2d 469; Simmons v East Nassau Med. Group, 260 AD2d 463, 464), and contrary to Gasalberti's contention, it was based on a fair interpretation of the evidence ( see Stewart v Olean Med. Group, P.C., 17 AD3d 1094; Kiker v Nassau County, 175 AD2d 99, 101). Contrary to St. Martin's contention, the jury verdict apportioning liability among the defendants as follows: 41.5% each to Vargas and himself, and 17% to Gasalberti, was based upon a fair interpretation of the evidence and therefore should not be set aside ( see Collins v Seligman, 276 AD2d 662).

  8. Pitera v. Winzer

    18 A.D.3d 457 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 7 times

    However, the court promptly sustained objections to these remarks, and issued curative instructions advising the jury that there was no claim for lost earnings in the case. Under these circumstances, these isolated comments did not deprive the defendant of a fair trial ( see Blanar v. Dickinson, 296 AD2d 431; Beth Israel Hosp. N. v. Castle Oil Corp., 220 AD2d 257; Kiker v. Nassau County, 175 AD2d 99). While the amount of damages to be awarded for personal injuries is primarily a question for the jury, it may be set aside if it deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation ( see CPLR 5501 [c]; Dupal v. City of New York, 300 AD2d 619; Iovine v. City of New York, 286 AD2d 372, 373).

  9. Blanar v. Dickinson

    296 A.D.2d 431 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 12 times

    Moreover, the verdict was supported by a fair interpretation of the evidence (see Bobek v. Crystal, 291 A.D.2d 521; Brezinski v. Island Med. Care, 291 A.D.2d 366; Nicastro v. Park, 113 A.D.2d 129, 132). Any error in allowing a comment made by the plaintiffs' counsel in the presence of the jury regarding the appellant's competence as a doctor and certain other derogatory remarks regarding doctors made by counsel during summation was corrected by the court's curative instructions (see Bacigalupo v. Healthshield, 231 A.D.2d 538; Lauter v. Village of Great Neck, 231 A.D.2d 553; Zipkin v. City of New York, 196 A.D.2d 865; Kiker v. Nassau County, 175 A.D.2d 99) . Furthermore, in light of the strong evidence of the appellant's negligence, these and other improper remarks made by counsel in summation were harmless (see Lauter v. Village of Great Neck, supra; Kavanaugh v. Nussbaum, 129 A.D.2d 559, 561, mod 71 N.Y.2d 535).

  10. Posin v. Russo

    276 A.D.2d 764 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 3 times

    Contrary to Matthew Russo's contention, there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the trial court's determination that he was obligated to pay $642,676.57 to the plaintiff for converted funds, and there is no basis to disturb that determination (see, Cohen v. Hallmark Cards, 45 N.Y.2d 493, 498-499; Mortensen v. Memorial Hosp., 105 A.D.2d 151, 158; Mertsaris v. 73rd Corp., 105 A.D.2d 67, 82-83; Kiker v. Nassau County, 175 A.D.2d 99). The parties' remaining contentions are without merit.