This court held that in view of the witnesses' testimony that the step in question was very icy and covered with slush, the verdict in favor of plaintiff was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Kiesel v. Chicago Transit Authority (1955), 6 Ill. App.2d 13, 126 N.E.2d 170, involved an icy condition on the street rather than on the bus. In making its finding in Kiesel, this court noted that the icy condition prevailed everywhere on the street on the date of the accident in question.
The CTA sought summary judgment on two grounds. First, relying upon Kiesel v. Chicago Transit Authority, 6 Ill. App. 2d 13 (1955), it stated that it owed no duty to protect Brock, its passenger, from obvious street dangers. Second, it argued that it owed Brock no duty to warn because the pothole was an open and obvious condition.
A fortiori, the carrier is not required to exercise a high, or the highest, degree of care to prevent injury to an alighting passenger by reason of conditions existing on the surface of the street at the point where he alights.Kiesel v. Chicago Transit Authority, 126 N.E.2d 170, 172 (Ill. App. 1955) (quoting 13 C.J.S. Section 733, pp. 1378-79). In Crutchfield, the injured party, as in this case, was a student riding a regular city bus on a scheduled route to attend a function at her school.
The CTA has no duty to protect its passengers from obvious street dangers. ( Crutchfield v. Yellow Cab Co. (1989), 189 Ill. App.3d 1091, 545 N.E.2d 961; Kiesel v. Chicago Transit Authority (1955), 6 Ill. App.2d 13, 126 N.E.2d 170.) Furthermore, contrary to the plaintiffs' argument, the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act provides that a local public entity such as the CTA is not liable for injuries caused by its failure to initially provide "regulatory traffic control devices, stop signs, yield right-of-way signs, speed restriction signs, distinctive roadway markings or any other traffic regulating or warning sign, device or marking, signs, overhead lights, traffic separating or restraining devices or barriers." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3-104.
In fact, the contrary is true: the CTA has no duty to protect its passengers from obvious street dangers. See Kiesel v. Chicago Transit Authority (1955), 6 Ill. App.2d 13, 126 N.E.2d 170. Because the CTA's duty to Crystal was fully performed when she stepped off of the bus and arrived safely at the bus stop designated by the City, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the CTA and against plaintiff and Yellow Cab.