Kibbee v. Kostelic

4 Citing cases

  1. Coppa v. Kuiper

    467 P.2d 273 (Colo. 1970)   Cited 2 times

    He could not look to other states for authority as Colorado's adjudicative processes were and are different from those of any other jurisdiction. It thus becomes apparent that in the early, rather disordered state of our adjudication statutes with a paucity of decisions interpreting the statutes, Judge Yeaman easily could conclude that the Las Animas proceedings could and would be a continuation of those in Bent County. As illustrative of this conclusion we find that a district judge may have reached the same conclusion under much more definite statutes as late as 1928. Kibbee v. Kostelic, 87 Colo. 215, at 219, 287 P. 652. In attaching significance to the statement in the order that the referee should consider testimony given to a previous referee in the same matter, we are not unmindful that similar language was contained in the 1881 statute.

  2. Quirico v. Hickory Ditch

    276 P.2d 746 (Colo. 1954)   Cited 3 times

    In view of said findings, it further is our considered opinion that the four-year statute of limitations should be held to apply in this instance. Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Arkansas ValleyCo., supra; Kibbee v. Kostelic, 87 Colo. 215, 287 Pac. 652; Stratton v. Beaver Farmers' Canal and Ditch Co., 87 Colo. 349, 287 Pac. 861; Moore v. Burritt, 106 Colo. 413, 105 P.2d 1084. It may well be that notice in the original adjudication proceeding actually was defective and if subjected to timely objection might have been deemed insufficient, but such is the nature of property rights to the use of water that there must come a time beyond which all such objections are barred. It is important that decrees determining priority rights to use of water have both vitality and finality. The trial court likewise determined the issues against defendants with respect to the diversion of water collected by the Bowen Drainage Canal. Defendants did not claim the right to the use of water diverted from that canal pursuant to any contract with the canal company, as did the plaintiff, but simply the right of appropriation and application to a beneficial use as though the drainage canal were a natural stream.

  3. Dalpez v. Nix

    45 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1935)   Cited 6 times

    Since the trial court found that the water here involved, if not intercepted, would have found its way into Wright's draw and Maverick draw — in other words, that it belonged to the stream — all of the parties in the district who had appropriations down the stream were necessary parties, if the priority of the petitioner Nix was to be adjudicated as of a date later than the date of the last decreed priority in general adjudication proceedings. This was clearly determined by this court in the case of Kibbee v. Kostelic, 87 Colo. 215, 287 Pac. 652, wherein the following language is used: "The court likewise had jurisdiction to entertain the application of Kostelic, but we think, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, it reached the wrong result. Section 1788, under which both the application of Pledger and Kostelic were initiated, provides that the owner of a priority who has failed to offer evidence under any adjudication provided for by our statutes, may obtain leave and make proof of such priority, but in ascertaining and determining the same, by repeated decisions of this court, the priority awarded in such circumstances must bear a date later than the latest priority awarded in the general decree in that district.

  4. Stratton v. Beaver Co.

    287 P. 861 (Colo. 1930)   Cited 2 times

    As Stratton did not ask for a reargument or review of the company's decree within two years after its entry, and did not within four years after the entry of that decree attempt to have it set aside, Stratton is deemed and held to have acquiesced in that decree and is barred from asserting any rights in conflict therewith. In Kibbee v. Kostellic, 87 Colo. 215, 287 Pac. 652, just decided, we held that the two limitation statutes referred to above apply, not only to general adjudication decrees entered in proceedings under section 1760, C. L., but also to decrees entered in proceedings under section 1788, C. L. The decree awarding priority to the company's ditch was rendered in a proceeding brought under section 1788, C. L. That decree conclusively settles in favor of the company's ditch the question of priority involved in this suit. 2.