Khou Chang v. Astrue

Full title: KHOU CHANG, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social…

Court: UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Date published: Jul 21, 2012

Case No.: 1:11 -cv-02002 - JLT (E.D. Cal. Jul. 21, 2012)

Opinion

Case No.: 1:11 -cv-02002 - JLT

07-21-2012

KHOU CHANG, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security Defendant.

Jennifer L. Thurston

ORDER GRANTING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S

REQUEST FOR AN EXTENSION OF TIME

(Doc. 13)

In this action, the administrative record was filed on April 13, 2012. (Doc. 12). As a result, the opening brief was due ninety-five days later, on July 17, 2012.¹ (See Doc. 7 at 3). However, on July 19, 2012, the parties filed a stipulation for an extension of time for Plaintiff to file an opening brief. (Doc. 14).

1 The Court's scheduling order allows thirty days after the filing of the administrative record for a plaintiff to file a letter brief, and thirty five days for the defendant to respond. (Doc. 7 at 3). If the parties did not agree to a remand, the opening brief was to be filed within thirty days of the defendant's response. (Id.)

The Scheduling Order allows a single thirty-day extension by the stipulation of parties. (Doc. 7 at 4). Beyond this extension, "requests to modify [the Scheduling Order] must be made by written motion and will be granted only for good cause." (Id.) Here, Plaintiff seeks an extension until September 14, 2012, which is nearly sixty days from the original due date. Accordingly, the Court interprets the parties' stipulation as a motion to modify the scheduling order.

According the parties' stipulation, the extension is required "in order to properly address the issues within the administrative record in this matter." (Doc. 13 at 2). Significantly, the parties should be familiar with the issues due to the briefing required prior to the filing of an opening brief with the Court. Presumably, the parties complied with the scheduling order, because the deadlines are considered "firm, real and are to be taken seriously by parties and their counsel." Shore v. Brown, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94828 at *7 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2009). Consequently, Plaintiff has not demonstrated good cause for an extension beyond the thirty days permitted by stipulation under the Scheduling Order.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:

1. The parties' request for an extension of time is GRANTED IN PART; and
2. Plaintiff SHALL file an opening brief on or before August 17, 2012.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Jennifer L. Thurston

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE