Opinion
Civil Action No: SA-03-CA-0977-XR.
July 19, 2004
ORDER
On this date, the Court considered Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Response. The Motion is GRANTED (docket no. 11) and this case is DISMISSED. As such, the Court WITHDRAWS the reference of Defendant's Motion for a Protective Order to Magistrate Judge Nancy Stein Nowak. The Defendant's Motions to Strike and for Protective Order are DENIED as moot (docket nos. 15 and 16). The trial setting of August 30, 2004, is hereby VACATED.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). The moving party has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Lab., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1995). The moving party however is not required to negate all of the elements necessary to the nonmovant's case. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994). Once the movant carries its initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Fields v. City of S. Houston, 922 F.2d 1183, 1187 (5th Cir. 1991).
All justifiable inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). In making this determination, the court should review all the evidence in the record and disregard the evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000). In addition, the nonmovant's "burden is not satisfied with `some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' by `conclusory allegations,' by unsubstantiated assertions,' or by only a `scintilla' of evidence." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (citations omitted). If the record, viewed in that light, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the party opposing the motion, summary judgment is proper. Kelley v. Price Macemon, Inc., 992 F.2d 1408, 1413 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1043 (1994) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 577-78).
Factual Background
Plaintiff Sarah Kheiv, a Cambodian woman, worked as a math teacher for the Comal Discipline Center, an alternative school within the Comal Independent School District ("CISD"). In August of 1999, she was hired on an emergency permit which allowed Defendant CISD to hire her for a probationary period while she pursued her Texas teacher's certification. Under a deficiency plan, a school district may hire uncertified teachers for a probationary period of up to three years. This probationary period remained contingent upon Plaintiff taking the appropriate steps towards obtaining her Texas teacher's certification.
Plaintiff avers that under the guidance of Principal Hall during the 1999-2000 school year, she performed well and that because of her hard work, she was awarded a probationary contract for the next two school years. It seems that her performance continued for the 2000-2001 school year but that she did not complete her Texas teacher's certification. For the 2001-2002 school year, a new principal was appointed who implemented new procedures. Part of this change included doubling the amount of students per classroom period. Plaintiff argues that because of the excessive amount of students, she was entitled to a teacher's aide. Although she was initially assigned an aide, the aide was often called away from her classroom to assist other teachers. Plaintiff states that when she approached her new principal and requested full-time assistance, she was criticized and her request denied. Without an aide, Plaintiff avers that it became difficult for her to adequately perform her job.
In addition, at the beginning of the 2001-2002 school year, Plaintiff received a letter denying her request for an extension of her emergency permit and reiterating the requirement that she pass her teacher's certification exam. The letter ended by stating that her "contract will not be renewed for the 2002-2003 school year" if she did not comply. Plaintiff states that she received a "series of intimidating correspondence from Comal ISD administration." In part, because of these letters, Plaintiff allegedly suffered heightened stress levels, sudden high blood pressure, severe headaches, and extreme fatigue. Over the holiday break, her doctor recommended that she remain in bed for a period of three weeks, causing her to miss an entire week of school. Shortly after she returned to school, the new principal allegedly requested Plaintiff's resignation. On March 26, 2002, Plaintiff resigned, to be effective at the end of the school year, rather than have her probationary contract recommended for termination at the Board of Trustees meeting which was scheduled for that evening. However, Plaintiff completed all three years of her probationary contract at CISD.
Although Plaintiff's resignation became effective at the end of the school year, Plaintiff's probationary contract also ended. Thus, Plaintiff did not have a contract extending beyond her effective resignation date.
Plaintiff argues that she has been the victim of national origin discrimination in her employment and that she was retaliated against for having filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). Plaintiff's complaint alleges that she was forced to resign, effective at the end of her third school year, even though she did not have a continuing contract with CISD. In connection with Defendant's discrimination, Plaintiff argues that Defendant tortiously interfered with her employment contract. Finally, Plaintiff brings this action arguing that CISD intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her.
Analysis
Plaintiff alleges that the denial of her request for a teacher's aide and the intimidating letters demonstrate that Defendant CISD discriminated against her because of her national origin. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits an employer from treating certain employees less favorably than others "because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1); Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). Plaintiff carries the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the statute. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). To establish a prima facie case for discrimination in employment, Plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was qualified for the position; (3) that she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that after suffered the adverse action, the employer sought additional similarly qualified applicants. Evans v. City of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 2001); Frank v. Xerox Corp., 347 F.3d 130, 137 (5th Cir. 2003).
Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination because she is not qualified for her position. See McDaniel v. Temple Indep. Sch. Dist., 770 F.2d 1340, 1347 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding plaintiff offered no evidence that her lack of certification as a school administrator was not the true reason for not promoting her). Although CISD may hire uncertified teachers on a temporary basis as they work towards their certification, that temporary basis is limited to a period of three years. TEX. EDUC. CODE § 21.102(c). Plaintiff cannot dispute the fact that she failed her certification exam three times and was not certified to teach math in the State of Texas. Plaintiff also cannot argue that she was unaware of the contingency requiring her to pass her certification exam. Defendant provided letters reminding Plaintiff of her obligations throughout her three years at CISD. The letters are dated from September 21, 1999, January 28, 2000, December 13, 2000, and August 13, 2001. While Plaintiff argues that these letters are threatening, the letters merely reiterate her obligations and close with the conclusion that her contract will not be renewed if she does not become certified. In addition, although Plaintiff argues that the administration became more hostile after the change in principals, the letters demonstrate that even the prior principal urged Plaintiff to complete her certification process or her contract would not be renewed. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish that she was qualified for the position which she was allegedly forced to resign from at the end of her third year.
Plaintiff also does not establish a prima facie case that the denial of her request for a teacher's aide was in some way discriminatory. Plaintiff's conclusory allegations and speculation that she was denied an aide because of her national origin does not meet the above standard. See Douglass v. United Services Auto. Ass'n., 79 F.3d 1415, 1429 (5th Cir. 1996). The mere fact that her aide was repeatedly called away to work for other, presumably non-Cambodian, teachers demonstrates that the school district did not have an aide for each and every teacher. While Plaintiff alleges that the change in classroom size and time created an immediate necessity for more teachers' aides, she offers no evidence that the change did not affect all the teachers or that she was treated less favorably. Plaintiff points to no other incident to demonstrate CISD's alleged discrimination.
Plaintiff also alleges that CISD retaliated against her for filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. Title VII prohibits retaliation against employees who engage in protected conduct, such as filing a complaint of discrimination. Gee v. Principi, 289 F.3d 342, 345 (5th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff again bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case by showing that she engaged in a protected activity, suffered an adverse consequence and that a causal nexus exists between the two. Id. Plaintiff has not alleged any protected activity which in some way caused her allegedly forced resignation. Plaintiff has not alleged that she filed a complaint with the EEOC prior to resigning. Her complaint was filed in May of 2003, more than a year after her last day on the job. While this is not in and of itself determinative, it supports the proposition that Plaintiff did not file with the EEOC until after her resignation. Other than filing with the EEOC, Plaintiff does not allege any other protected activities. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish a discriminatory retaliation claim.
Plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress and state law contractual interference claims also fail. "In Texas, the elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with contractual relations are (1) there was a contract subject to interference, (2) the act of interference was willful and intentional, (3) such intentional act was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's damages, and (4) actual damage or loss occurred." Juliette Fowler Homes, Inc. v. Welch Assocs., Inc., 793 S.W.2d 660, 664 (Tex. 1990). Likewise, an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim relies upon an intentional act. But as an agency of the state, CISD is immune from liability arising out of any intentional tort. Delaney v. Univ. of Houston, 835 S.W.2d 56, 59 (Tex. 1992); TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE § 101.057(2). Thus, because sovereign immunity applies to CISD, Plaintiff's state law tort claims are barred.
Conclusion
Plaintiff worked her entire three years at CISD, the maximum allowed by law because Plaintiff had not passed her Texas teacher's certification exam. Plaintiff's allegation that she was discriminated against because she received letters informing her of her obligations, and because she was forced to share "her" teacher's aide, are unfounded. In addition, Plaintiff's state law tort claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Therefore, because Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED in full, this cause is DISMISSED. The August 30, 2004, trial date is VACATED.