Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-2683.
March 31, 2005
MEMORANDUM/ORDER
Currently before the court is defendant's unopposed motion for summary judgment. Defendant asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain Mr. Khalid's suit, which seeks to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service from collecting taxes by way of levy on his employer, and award plaintiff $500 in damages for such levy. For the reasons expressed below, the court agrees with defendant that it lacks jurisdiction in the instant case.
The Internal Revenue Code's Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C . § 7421(a), provides that, subject to a limited set of exceptions, no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed. Id. The [Supreme] Court has interpreted the principal purpose of this language to be the protection of the Government's need to assess and collect taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference, and to require that the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund. Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 736 (U.S. 1974) (citing Enochs v. Williams Packing Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1. (1962)). Given the purpose of § 7421(a), Congress has limited the set of circumstances warranting departure from the prohibition on enjoining tax assessment or collection.
These exceptions are exclusive. See, e.g., In re Becker's Motor Transp., 632 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1980) (we are of the opinion that judicially created exemptions to § 7421(a) contravene clear congressional intent. . . .).
None of those circumstances arises here. The only exception that would potentially apply to an individual in Mr. Khalid's position is contained in 26 U.S.C. 6 § 330(e)(1), which states:
Other exceptions pertain to levies against partnerships, 26 U.S.C. § 6225(b); individuals who file joint tax returns 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e); individuals who post a bond, 26 U.S.C. § 6672(c), or otherwise furnish partial payment of their tax liability, 26 U.S.C. § 6694(c); and so on.
Except as provided in paragraph (2), if a hearing is requested under subsection (a)(3)(B), the levy actions which are the subject of the requested hearing and the running of any period of limitations . . . shall be suspended for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are pending. In no event shall any such period expire before the 90th day after the day on which there is a final determination in such hearing. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 7421(a), the beginning of a levy or proceeding during the time the suspension under this paragraph is in force may be enjoined by a proceeding in the pro per court, including the Tax Court. The Tax Court shall have no jurisdiction under this paragraph to enjoin any action or proceeding unless a timely appeal has been filed under subsection (d)(1) and then only in respect of the unpaid tax or proposed levy to which the determination being appealed relates. Id.
In other words, a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a suit seeking to enjoin a levy assessment during the time that a hearing, and its result, are pending. The hearing in question shall be held by the Internal Revenue Service Office of Appeals, 26 USCS § 6330(b)(1), and it must have been requested within thirty days of receiving notice of an intent to levy, § 6330(a)(3).
Mr. Khalid's most recent Intent To Levy Due Process Notice was issued on May 24, 2002. At no time has Mr. Khalid sought a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals. Accordingly, 26 U.S.C.S. § 6330(e)(1) does not apply here. Since none of the other exceptions to § 7421 (a) applies here, the court lacks jurisdiction to hear Mr. Khalid's suit. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that defendant's motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.