Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:06 CV 1907 (CFD).
January 9, 2007
RULING ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
Plaintiff K.G., by and through her parents and next friends Mr. and Mrs. G., moved for an automatic preliminary injunction pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) to require the defendant, Plainville Board of Education ("the Board"), to continue to fund K.G.'s placement at the Perkins School for the Blind ("Perkins") pending the conclusion of this lawsuit. The Board opposes the motion on the ground that an agreement between the Board and K.G.'s parents, dated July 22, 2005, renders § 1415's "stay-put" provision inapplicable to these proceedings. For the reasons that follow, the plaintiff's motion [docket # 7] is denied.
K.G. is a disabled student who is eligible for special education and related services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. Since January 20, 2003 she has been a residential student at the Perkins School for the Blind. The Board has paid the cost of the placement under agreements between the Board and K.G.'s parents for school years 2003-2004, 2004-2005, and 2005-2006. At the Board's Planning and Placement Team ("PPT") meeting on April 4, 2006, however, the Board proposed that K.G. be placed in Plainville High School for the 2006-2007 school year. K.G.'s parents challenged that decision by filing for a due process hearing on June 15, 2006. The hearing officer granted an initial motion to maintain K.G.'s placement at Perkins pending the outcome of the due process hearing on August 19, 2006. On October 27, 2007 the hearing officer issued a Final Decision and Order finding that the Board's Individualized Education Program ("IEP") for the 2006-2007 school year would be appropriate to K.G.'s special education needs in the least restrictive environment. In this lawsuit, K.G. now seeks to overturn the hearing officer's Final Decision and Order, and this motion seeks a preliminary injunction to maintain her placement at Perkins until this case is resolved.
Under 20 U.S.C. § 1415, which establishes procedural safeguards for students covered by IDEA, "during the pendency of any proceedings [regarding the child's placement] conducted pursuant to this section, unless the State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree, the child shall remain in the then-current educational placement of the child." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (emphasis added). This portion of the statute is known as the "stay-put" provision, and its purpose is to provide covered students with "an automatic preliminary injunction . . . in favor of the status quo." Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir. 1982). The "stay-put" provision does not apply, however, if the educational agency and the student's parents agree otherwise. Id.
For purposes of this motion, the determinative issues are whether the July 22, 2005 agreement between K.G.'s parents and the Board is enforceable, and whether the Perkins placement was subject to "stay put" protection. Originally, in January 2003, K.G.'s parents first moved K.G. to Perkins unilaterally, with the risk that the Board would not pay for the placement. Since the 2003-2004 school year, the Board has agreed to pay for K.G.'s placement at Perkins through yearly settlement agreements with K.G.'s parents. However, the yearly settlement agreements with the Board never designated Perkins as K.G.'s "stay-put" placement; to the contrary, each agreement specifically disclaimed "stay-put" protection in the event of a due process challenge by K.G.'s parents, and each specified that K.G.'s parents would work with the Board to transition K.G. to the Board's school for the following academic year. In the July 22, 2005 agreement, by which the Board agreed to pay for Perkins for the 2005-2006 school year, paragraph three reads:
In the event [K.G.'s] Parents initiate due process with regard to [K.G.'s] educational placement for the 2006-2007 school year, stay put does not apply, and both parties agree to expedite the hearing so that there is a hearing officer order regarding the issues in dispute prior to the commencement of the 2006-2007 school year.
The Board argues that this provision means that K.G. waived Perkins as her "stay-put" placement under § 1415(j), and thus she is not entitled to remain there pending the outcome of this litigation. The Board asserts that it bargained for this waiver in exchange for its agreement to pay for the 2005-2006 Perkins placement. K.G. argues that she did not waive her "stay-put" rights because the Board's actions, including its yearly agreements to pay for Perkins and its inclusion of Perkins staff members at the Board's annual PPT meetings for K.G., indicate that the Board conceded Perkins to be K.G.'s "stay-put" placement, regardless of the July 22, 2005 agreement. In further support of this argument, K.G. cites the hearing officer's August 19, 2006 decision to keep K.G. at Perkins pending the outcome of K.G.'s due process hearing. Alternatively, K.G. argues that the waiver of "stay-put" protection in the July 22, 2005 agreement should not be enforced as a matter of public policy.
The Court concludes that "stay-put" under § 1415(j) does not apply here because K.G. waived this statutory protection in the July 22, 2005 agreement, which is enforceable. Under § 1415(j), "[a]n agreement in which a board of education agrees to pay tuition to a private school makes that school the child's pendency placement unless the stipulation is explicitly limited to a specific school year or definite time period." Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. v. L.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d 692, 697 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (emphasis added) (citing Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 908); see Gabel v. Bd. of Educ. of Hyde Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 368 F. Supp. 2d 313, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (same); Mr. J. v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 2d 226, 238 (D. Conn. 2000) (citing D.R. v. East Brunswick Bd. of Educ., 109 F.3d 896, 901 (3d Cir. 1997)). Here, the July 22, 2005 agreement not only specified that the Board would pay for Perkins for only the 2005-2006 school year, but it also stated that K.G.'s parents would work with the Board to transition K.G. to the Board's schools for the 2006-2007 school year. The Board's decision to pay for K.G.'s unilateral placement at Perkins was clearly conditioned on these elements of the agreement; the Board's involvement with Perkins staff at annual PPT meetings and the fact that the Board agreed to pay for the placement do not alter the agreement's unambiguous terms. See Zvi D., 694 F.2d at 904 ("Payment and placement are two different matters.").
Additionally, although a hearing officer's determination requiring a school board to reimburse a student unilaterally placed in private school does adjust the student's "stay-put" placement under § 1415(j), that did not occur in this case. L.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d at 696-97 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Pawling Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Schutz, 137 F. Supp. 2d 83 (N.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd 290 F.3d 476, 484 (2d Cir. 2002)). Contrary to K.G.'s assertions, the hearing officer's August 19, 2006 decision did not order K.G. to remain at Perkins for the start of the 2006-2007 academic year on the ground that the Board's plan was inadequate, and hence the "stay-put" provision of § 1415(j) required such a result. Instead, the hearing officer based her decision on evidence that K.G.'s best interests require minimizing the number of transitions between schools, and, despite both parties' good faith efforts, the due process hearing could not be concluded by the start of the 2006-2007 school year. The August 19, 2006 decision did not make any assessment of the Board's proposed plan for K.G., and hence that decision did not shift K.G.'s "stay-put" placement to Perkins. In light of this, the July 22, 2005 agreement remains in effect, including its provision waiving "stay-put" protection in the event of a due process challenge.
Finally, enforcing K.G.'s waiver of "stay-put" protection is in accordance with public policy. Although it is true that IDEA's procedural protections are designed "to provide stability and consistency in the education of a student with a disability," the statute itself contemplates such waivers. L.P., 421 F. Supp. 2d at 696 (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305 (1988)); see 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). As the Third Circuit and district courts within this Circuit have recognized, settlement agreements between parents and school boards should be encouraged in light of the significant federal policy favoring settlements. D.R., 109 F.3d at 901 ("We are concerned that a decision that would allow parents to void settlement agreements when they become unpalatable would work a significant deterrence contrary to the federal policy of encouraging settlement agreements."); Mr. J., 98 F. Supp. 2d at 238 ("Public policy dictates that settlement agreements [between parents and school boards] should be enforced."). The Court agrees that public policy requires enforcing the clear terms of the July 22, 2005 agreement.
The plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction [docket # 7] is denied. The Board shall continue its established plan to transition K.G. to Plainville High School in accordance with the hearing officer's Final Order and Decision of October 27, 2006.
SO ORDERED.