Opinion
No. 25982-0-III.
June 26, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Spo-kane County, No. 06-2-00094-8, Kathleen M. O'Connor, J., entered February 22, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Korsmo, J., concurred in by Sweeney and Brown, J J.
Officer Erin Blessing entered the wrong license plate number into her computer and received a report back that the license plate she had observed was expired. She then stopped the vehicle on the basis of that erroneous report. The driver of the vehicle, James Keyes, sued Blessing over the mistake. Contentious litigation followed. The trial court denied sanctions over alleged discovery violations and, subsequently, dismissed the action on the basis of qualified immunity. Mr. Keyes appealed, contending that the court erred in not granting him sanctions and by granting summary judgment. Concluding that the summary judgment was proper and that the requested discovery sanction was moot, we affirm.
Officer Blessing was patrolling in the East Sprague region of the City of Spokane and saw a truck driven by Mr. Keyes that was travelling under a trip permit. She entered license plate number "A43082I" into her computer. The license plate, partially obscured by a trailer hitch, was actually "A43082J." The computer reported back that the "I" license plate was expired. The mistake in the license plate information was not discovered until a citation was being prepared.
Keyes, acting pro se, sued Blessing and the City of Spokane pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He served a set of interrogatories on the city. After the responses were received, he filed a motion to compel and for sanctions, contending that the answers were incomplete and that counsel violated CR 26(g) by certifying the interrogatory answers without sufficient inquiry. As a sanction for the alleged violations, Mr. Keyes sought more time to prepare his case.
The trial court found that there were no discovery violations in the interrogatory answers. The court also commented that it believed the city had acted in good faith in responding to the requests. Accordingly, the discovery motions were denied.
The trial court later granted the respondents' motion to dismiss the case on the basis of qualified immunity. The court found that no jury would find the officer's decision to stop the car was unreasonable and that the officer had not acted unreasonably. Mr. Keyes then appealed to this court.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is proper when, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the opposing party, there are no issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Trimble v. Wash. State Univ., 140 Wn.2d 88, 93, 993 P.2d 259 (2000). A trial court's ruling on a summary judgment motion is reviewed de novo since an appellate court sits in the same position as the trial court. Hubbard v. Spokane County, 146 Wn.2d 699, 706-707, 50 P.3d 602 (2002). Like the trial court, we too conclude that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in dismissing this action.
The essential elements of a § 1983 action are allegations that a defendant (1) acting under color of state law, (2) deprived the plaintiff of rights protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 1, 11, 829 P.2d 765 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983), cert. denied sub nom, City of Seattle v. Robinson, 506 U.S. 1028, 121 L. Ed. 2d 598, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992). An officer is entitled to qualified immunity in a § 1983 suit when her actions are "objectively reasonable when measured against clearly established law." Robinson v. City of Seattle, 119 Wn.2d 34, 65, 830 P.2d 318, cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1028 (1992).
Mr. Keyes also claims that the traffic stop violated Article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. However, there is no private right of action under that provision of the state constitution. Reid v. Pierce County, 136 Wn.2d 195, 213, 961 P.2d 333 (1998).
The parties agree that Officer Blessing acted under color of state law. They disagree over whether her actions deprived appellant of a right protected by the Constitution of the United States. Detention of an automobile constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. If the seizure is "unreasonable," then a violation of the Constitution has occurred. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809-810, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996). An officer can make a traffic stop as long as probable cause exists to believe a violation of the traffic laws has occurred. Whether the officer had other reasons for making the stop is irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 810, 813.
Here, Blessing acted upon the belief that the license plate had expired. This was a reasonable and understandable traffic code enforcement action. Confusing the letter "I" with the letter "J" due to the presence of a trailer hitch was not objectively unreasonable. A mistake of fact does not render an otherwise reasonable search or seizure unreasonable. For instance, in Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 94 L. Ed. 2d 72, 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987), officers served a search warrant for the third floor of an apartment building that they believed contained a single apartment. In fact, the floor was divided into two apartments. Officers found evidence of a crime in the apartment belonging to respondent Garrison; the warrant had been for the apartment of a man named McWebb. The United States Supreme Court upheld the entry into Garrison's apartment. Based on a reasonable view of the evidence, it was understandable that officers believed there was only one apartment on the third floor and that it was appropriate to serve the entire floor. Id. at 86-88.
Similar is Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 28 L. Ed. 2d 484, 91 S. Ct. 1106 (1971). There officers seeking to arrest Mr. Hill found and arrested Mr. Miller, believing him to be Hill. The United States Supreme Court found that the mistake was reasonable and upheld the arrest of the wrong man.
Somewhat similar is Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148, 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990). There officers obtained consent from someone they believed was a resident of the apartment; she actually was not a resident. The United States Supreme Court reversed a lower court ruling suppressing the evidence obtained during the search. It reasoned that the officers could have reasonably believed that the person who gave consent had authority to do so and they remanded for the trial court to consider the question.
These cases teach that a reasonable mistake of fact does not render a search or seizure unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, Officer Blessing's error here does not render her stop of the vehicle improper under the federal constitution. Reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion — the mistake of fact did not render this search unreasonable. The trial court correctly determined that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment.
Discovery
Mr. Keyes filed a motion to compel the city to file more complete answers to some of his interrogatories. He asked that as a sanction for the alleged violations he be allowed more time to prepare his case, which he hoped to change to a class action suit. The trial court found that there were no violations. We agree with the trial court that there was no error here. In light of the sanction sought and the court's ruling on the summary judgment, the issue on appeal also is moot.
A trial court's decision on discovery sanctions is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wash. State Physicians Ins. Exch. Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 122 Wn.2d 299, 338, 858 P.2d 1054 (1993). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its order is manifestly question. unreasonable or based on untenable grounds." Id. at 339.
Appellant contends that many of the interrogatory answers were incomplete. He also argues that the trial court erred in applying a "good faith" standard to the city's responses when sanctions were mandatory under Fisons. We do not agree that the experienced trial judge applied the wrong standard here. Her comments about "good faith" arose during her explanation of what the Fisons case meant. She was not applying a "good faith" standard to defeat the sanctions motion. She found that the answers were complete and also noted that the city had acted in "good faith." She did not rule that the motion failed due to the good faith actions of the city.
In any respect, the discovery issue is moot in light of our conclusion that summary judgment was proper. "Where, as here, we can no longer provide appellants effective relief, the cases are moot." In re Detention of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 200, 728 P.2d 138 (1986); accord, In re Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 376-377, 662 P.2d 828 (1983). This case is in the same situation. The only sanction sought was a continuance of the proceedings. In light of the fact that summary judgment was properly granted due to immunity, a continuance is of no moment. An extension of time for a defunct case is meaningless relief. Thus, even if there had been error in ruling on the sanction motion, the requested remedy is useless. This court cannot provide any meaningful relief.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment and did not err in denying the discovery motions. Accordingly, the rulings of the trial court are affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
SWEENEY, J. and BROWN, J., concur.