The stipulated work of prospecting for minerals having been seasonably begun and diligently prosecuted and successfully carried out by appellants, at large expense to them, and with full knowledge, consent and approval of appellees, resulting in the discovery of a good grade of coal in large commercial and paying quantities, the legal title to all minerals in the land covered by said conveyance from appellees to G.J. Thomason thereupon became vested in appellants for a period of twenty years and as much longer as any of the minerals can be found in or under the land, in paying quantities, in perpetuity. Key v. Big Sandy Oil Co., 212 S.W. 300; Tickner v. Luse, 220 S.W. 578. The language of plaintiffs' conveyance to defendant is apt in a deed passing a present interest in land, an executed contract, but inapt in a lease, carrying a mere option.
The express stipulations as to drilling in the two leases, if they be of the same character and relate to the same subject as the implied covenant for reasonable development, do not state the full duty of the lessee to develop, but relate to the development within a specified time less than the entire time that the leases might endure and do not destroy the implied covenant for reasonable development during the remainder of the lease period. Duff v. Dubose, 27 S.W.2d 122; Leonard v. Prater, 36 S.W.2d 217; Key v. Big Sandy Oil Gas Dev. Co., 212 S.W. 300. MR. PRESIDING JUDGE SMEDLEY delivered the opinion of the Commission of Appeals, Section B.Page 489
The language contained in the contract was a present grant of title, a legal title, in the minerals and lands therein described for the full space and term of ten (10) years from date thereof, and for such other and further period of time as any of said minerals shall be produced, constituting the entire grant as one capable of indefinite duration, subject to the contingency of being defeated according to the conditions subsequent named therein. Texas Company v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717; Hynson v. Gulf Co., 232 S.W. 873; Davis v. Texas Co., 232 S.W. 549; Smith v. Womack, 231 S.W. 840; Richmond v. Hog Creek Oil Co., 229 S.W. 563; McKay v. Lucas, 220 S.W. 172; Pierce-Fordyce Oil Association v. Woodrum, 188 S.W. 245; Hickernell v. Gregory, 224 S.W. 691; Thomason v. Upshur County, 211 S.W. 325; Key v. Big Sandy Oil Gas Development Co., 212 S.W. 300; Jackson v. Pure Oil Operating Co., 217 S.W. 959; McEntire v. Thomason, 210 S.W. 563; Thomason v. Ham, 210 S.W. 561; Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169; Priddy v. Green, 220 S.W. 243; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101; Rich v. Donaghey, 177 P. 86, 3 A.L.R., 352, and extensive note thereunder. The surrender clause in the grant did not limit the legal title conveyed to lessee, but, on the contrary, evidences the fact that the legal title is in the lessee, as its purpose is to permit the lessee to surrender and re-convey unto the lessor the legal title it acquired by virtue of the grant, and to release lessee from further obligations under the covenants entailed on lessee by reason of its ownership of the legal title.
The mineral conveyance being executed and delivered for a valuable consideration and passing a present legal title and plaintiffs in error having performed everything necessary to vest the title for twenty years, and as much longer as any of the minerals could be produced in paying quantities, there cannot be an abandonment and the issue of abandonment cannot arise, for a legal title to minerals cannot be abandoned nor the issue arise where everything required to keep the title vested for a certain length of time has been performed. (Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81; Key v. Big Sandy Oil Co., 212 S.W. 300; Tickner v. Luse, 220 S.W. 578). Under the doctrine of stare decisis the Court of Civil Appeals erred in not reversing the judgment of the trial court, and in not treating this case, and the issues therein, which were involved in the former appeal of this case, in accordance with its decision.
stances to possession and ownership," but it was a conveyance of "the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the land as property," so that "the grant amounted to a defeasible title in fee to the oil and gas in the ground." Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, and cases cited; Southern Oil Co. v. Colquitt, 69 S.W. 169; Houston Oil Co. of Texas v. Hamilton, 109 Tex. 270; Chapman v. Dearman (Tex. Sup.), 229 S.W. 1112; Swayne v. Lone Acre Oil Co., 98 Tex. 607; 27 Cyc., 687, 688; Barringer Adams on Law of Mines Mining, p. 36; 1 Thornton's Oil Gas, sec. 19-20; Scott v. Laws (Ky.), 215 S.W. 81. Also, following the Daugherty and Colquitt cases, these among others from the Courts of Civil Appeals, McEntire v. Thomason, 210 S.W. 565, 2nd District, per Chief Justice Conner; Thomason v. Upshur Co., 211 S.W. 325, 327, 329; Crabb v. Bell, 220 S.W. 624, 8th District, per Justice Higgins; the adversely cited case, Munsey v. Marnet Oil Gas Co., 199 S.W. 689, 5th District, per Justice Rasbury; Key v. Big Sandy Oil Gas Dev. Co., 212 S.W. 301, 2nd District, per Justice Dunklin; Smith v. Womack, 231 S.W. 843. Independent of the dollar, and treating the test drilling and hoped-for royalties as the main consideration to the Arnolds, when the drilling requirements were complied with at the large cost and outlay, it was as though the Arnolds had said, "we grant, and in exchange you drill at your cost," thus supplying the most ample consideration of "benefit" and "detriment," see Page v. Payne, 41 Tex. 146; 13 Corp. Juris, pp. 311, 334-335; 9 Cyc. 311, 313, 320; Duff v. Duff (Ky.), 218 S.W. 1009, and cases cited; 21 Am. Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd ed., 926; Fisher v. Crescent Oil Co., 178 S.W. 907; National Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Teel, 95 Tex. 586-87; Von Hatzfeld v. Haubert, 224 S.W. 222-223; and see for analogy, White v. Cole, 87 Tex. 500, 502, and Stitzle v. Evans, 74 Tex. 599, citing Russell v. Kirkbridge, 62 Tex. 457; Archer's Oil Gas, p. 344, and (3) the contingent future consideration of hoped-for royalties could not affect the
"In the case of life * * * insurance, the cause of action is held to arise in the county where the insured died." In Prader v. National Masonic Accident Ass'n, 95 Iowa 149, 63 N.W. 601, it was held that the loss under a life insurance policy occurred where the insured died; and to the same effect is the holding in Bankers' Life Ins. Co. v. Robbins, 53 Neb. 44, 73 N.W. 269; Id., 55 Neb. 117, 75 N.W. 585; Jenkins v. Hawkeye Commercial Men's Ass'n. 147 Iowa 113, 124 N.W. 199, 30 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1181; Roberts v. American National Assur. Co., 201 Mo. App. 239, 212 S.W. 300; Bruil v. Northwestern Mutual Relief Ass'n, 72 Wis. 430, 39 N.W. 529. Until the death of M. Lewin, the insured, appellee had no cause of action. Neither had any loss, which in any way affected her occurred.