Key Enterprises of Delaware v. Venice Hosp

23 Citing cases

  1. PRECISION CPAP, INC. v. JACKSON HOSPITAL

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:05cv1096-MHT (WO) (M.D. Ala. Mar. 8, 2010)

    In making a determination of whether a plaintiff has alleged antitrust injury, "a court must consider the effect on competition and not simply the effect on the ultimate consumer." Key Enterprise of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated as moot en banc, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993). If the allegations of the plaintiffs are proven true, competition has been injured because competing DME vendors no longer have access to the discharged-hospital patients who require DME.

  2. Robles v. Humana Hosp. Cartersville

    785 F. Supp. 989 (N.D. Ga. 1992)   Cited 34 times
    Holding that the plaintiff did not have standing in a case where there was no evidence that the plaintiffs inability to practice medicine at the only hospital in the county had any anticompetitive impact on the quality, quantity or price of services provided at that hospital

    This use of power in one market to dominate or control a secondary market is called "monopoly leveraging". See Key Enterprises of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1566-68 (11th Cir. 1990). Plaintiff's application of this theory in this case, however, flies in the face of both practical sense and economic reality.

  3. M M Med. Supplies v. Pleasant Valley Hosp

    981 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1992)   Cited 161 times
    Concluding that expert affidavit that identified the facts upon which the expert's opinion was based should be considered on a motion for summary judgment

    United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100, 107, 68 S.Ct. 941, 945, 92 L.Ed. 1236 (1948). Neither Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Community Hosp., 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990), nor Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990), suggests otherwise. In both Advanced Health-Care and Key Enterprises, hospitals either explicitly tied DME sales to the provision of hospital services, entered into exclusive dealing agreements with specific DME providers, and/or took other affirmative steps to prevent DME sales to their patients by vendors not affiliated with those hospitals.

  4. Pozzi Window Co. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co.

    429 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (S.D. Fla. 2004)   Cited 6 times

    The Court must review all of the evidence in the record, in the light and with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposing the motion.See e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S.Ct. 2097, 2110 (2000);Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir. 1990). Pozzi suggests that Auto-Owners' failure to supply the Court with a transcript of the trial makes it impossible for the Court to review all the evidence in the record and the reasonable inferences arising therefrom.

  5. Aquatherm Indus. v. Florida Power Light

    971 F. Supp. 1419 (M.D. Fla. 1997)   Cited 8 times
    Dismissing attempted monopolization claim where plaintiff failed to adequately allege relevant market

    603 F.2d at 275. In the single Eleventh Circuit case to consider the monopoly leveraging theory, Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1566-1568 (11th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992), vacated as moot, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1126, 114 S.Ct. 2132, 128 L.Ed.2d 863 (1994), the three-judge panel defined monopoly leveraging: Doe. 76 at 18 ("While neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has yet decided whether to follow Berkey Photo in assessing a claim of monopoly leveraging . . .").

  6. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan

    506 U.S. 447 (1993)   Cited 795 times   7 Legal Analyses
    Holding that proof of relevant market is essential under § 2

    We reverse. See, e.g., CVD, Inc. v. Raytheon Co., 769 F.2d 842, 851 (CA1 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Twin Laboratories, Inc. v. Weider Health Fitness, 900 F.2d 566, 570 (CA2 1990); Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1079 (CA3 1978); Abcor Corp. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 916 F.2d 924, 926, 931 (CA4 1990); C.A. T. Industrial Disposal, Inc. v. Browning-Ferris Industries, Inc., 884 F.2d 209, 210 (CA5 1989); Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 917 F.2d 1413, 1431-1432 (CA6 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 899 (1991); Indiana Grocery, Inc. v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 864 F.2d 1409, 1413-1416 (CA7 1989); General Industries Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 804 (CA8 1987); Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America, 885 F.2d 683, 693 (CA10 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990); Key Enterprises of Delaware, Inc. v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550, 1565 (CA11 1990); Neumann v. Reinforced Earth Co., 252 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 15-16, 786 F.2d 424, 428 429, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 851 (1986); Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (CA Fed. 1991), cert. denied, 505 U.S. 1205 (1992).Our grant of certiorari was limited to the first question presented in the petition: "Whether a manufacturer's distributor expressly absolved of violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act can, without any evidence of market power or specific intent, be found liable for attempting to monopolize solely by virtue of a unique Ninth Circuit rule?

  7. Covad Communications Co. v. Bellsouth Corp.

    299 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2002)   Cited 31 times
    Describing the threshold requirements for properly pleading an antitrust violation as "exceedingly low"

    We have previously held that monopoly leveraging can violate Section 2: "[W]hen a party with monopoly power abuses its monopoly power in one market as a means of gaining an unlawful competitive advantage in and monopolizing another market, we have no hesitation to conclude that the Sherman Act prohibits such conduct." Key Enters. of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1568 (11th Cir. 1990), vacated as moot by 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court has also found that a triable question of fact exists on a Section 2 claim where a defendant used its control over one market to gain dominance in another market.

  8. Key Enterprises of Delaware, v. Venice Hosp

    9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993)   Cited 28 times
    Dismissing an appeal "[b]ecause the case became moot after the panel published its decision but before the mandate issued"

    Following oral argument, a panel of this court reversed and directed the district court to enter judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the jury's verdict. Key Enterprises of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 919 F.2d 1550, 1568-69 (11th Cir. 1990) (Key I), rehearing granted and vacated by Key Enterprises of Del., Inc. v. Venice Hosp., 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992) ( Key II). The defendants filed a Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc (Petition for Rehearing), and we stayed the mandate pending consideration thereof. See Fed.R.App.P. 41(a).

  9. Key Enterprises of Delaware v. Venice Hosp

    979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992)   Cited 7 times

    Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. ON PETITION FOR REHEARING AND SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC (Opinion December 28, 1990, 11th Cir., 1991, 919 F.2d 1550) Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, FAY, KRAVITCH, HATCHETT, ANDERSON, EDMONDSON, COX, BIRCH, DUBINA, BLACK and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

  10. Thompson v. Metropolitan Multi-List, Inc.

    934 F.2d 1566 (11th Cir. 1991)   Cited 130 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Holding that $30,000 to $70,000 is "clearly substantial"

    There are three elements to a section 2 claim. The plaintiffs must prove: first, the existence of "concerted action by knowing participants," Key Enterprises of Delaware v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990); second, a specific intent to monopolize, id.; and third, an overt act. Id.